After running some simulations, and taking the very good points made by @C2tP , I did a quick sumary of analytics to compare all those different options from a numerical and practical point of view (in the table below).
Back up of this image can be find here.
Putting aside risk considerations, it appears that if ACI and Emilio were to delegate their veSDT boost to Aave, the most attractive option to maximise Aave’s impact on Curve’s governance and emissions would be to use sdCRV. The 633k CRV owned by Aave would translate into 837k veCRV votes.
Moreover, if other veSDT holders were to delegate their boosting power, Aave could reach more than 1m veCRV votes, thus increasing by 60% its ability to direct emissions and incentivise liquidity compared to doing it by simply locking CRV.
Finally, I think it’s important to point out that the use of sdCRV doesn’t require to regularly increase the lock duration, an onchain transaction that would be needed every other week or so in order to maintain Aave’s voting power to the maximum if the veCRV road was chosen.
Looking forward to hear feedback on this, I really think a smart approach such as the one mentioned above could be a great opportunity for Aave ahead of the GHO launch.