This proposal marks a philosophical pivot in the purpose of the AaveDAO treasury. Previously, the “slow and steady” mentality of spending funds meant treasury funds were often used for known avenues like as buffers for risk-management, investment in ecosystem grants/projects/upgrades, and swaps to further capitalize the treasury. On the other hand, this proposal represents a shift into the realm of market intervention, where the purpose is to continuously redistribute treasury profits back to existing and new users of Aave.
The goal of growing the user base and transaction volume rather than further building the treasury chest may yet be achieved through market incentives. However, there are two main issues we have with the proposal:
Values:
One of Blockchain at Berkeley’s values as a student-run college organization is to inclusively grow the DeFi ecosystem. Creating “Dilutors” that discourage users to use other protocols goes against this value. This is not beneficial for the ecosystem as it creates silos and deters users from other protocols. As well, users can get around this by creating separate accounts to use Morpho. We also fear that depending on how the Migration bonus is structured, users may maliciously create multiple accounts to first use Morpho, then switch to Aave. This leads directly into our second issue, detail.
Detail:
Financial incentives are tricky to implement because it may incentivise predatory activity. This is where we would love more clarity on the specifics, like why the price tag of $5M was chosen, how the proposal will deter against transfers to new accounts to dodge dilutors, how each rewarded action, booster, dilutor, and bonus is weighed, and timeline on the distribution of rewards. Without this information, it is difficult to determine the possible impact of such a large and expensive proposal and simulate/deter against predatory activity. We hope these concerns are addressed on the AIP.