# \[ARFC\] Modify Snapshot Proposal Threshold **URL:** \ **Category:** Governance\ **Created:** [April 20, 2023, 1:06am UTC](https://governance.aave.com/t/arfc-modify-snapshot-proposal-threshold/12821 "2023-04-20T01:06:25Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 1\ **Showing post:** 9
**Author:** ![daqhris](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/user_avatar/governance.aave.com/daqhris/32/3329_2.png) [@daqhris](https://governance.aave.com/u/daqhris)\ **Post date:** [April 27, 2023, 9:37pm UTC](https://governance.aave.com/t/arfc-modify-snapshot-proposal-threshold/12821/9 "2023-04-27T21:37:07Z")
I disagree with the idea that increasing the proposal threshold would lead to receiving quality proposals. Nothing guarantees that a wallet with access to open money markets can’t gather a million tokens and then run some fraudulent proposal in our space. We’re on protocol operating on a permission-less blockchain, which makes me think that, for example, an undetected smart contract hacker could not take advantage of our safety measures based on amount of capital/tokens (250 AAVE). Could there be other methods of safeguarding access to Snapshot proposals that is not dependent on the quantity of held (or staked/locked) AAVE tokens? Like: history of contributions, previous DAO votes, number of delegation, age of wallet, math-based id verification, forum posts, multiple-steps before posting on Snapshot, Gitcoin Passport-verification, timelocking before accepting votes, … I am open to hearing other ideas and propositions. I would just advise against setting a token-based requirement like this. In my mind, It is not an appropriate safety measure to contain the bad actors. --- _[View the full topic](https://governance.aave.com/t/arfc-modify-snapshot-proposal-threshold/12821)._