The ARFC was executed quite quickly since the inception of the post, we should consider if these Risk Steward actions are actually ARFCs, given it leaves very little time to comment or discuss (understandably as the delegated facility of Risk Steward actions need to act timely) and in most cases wouldn’t probably need to be subject to a community discussion given the delegated mandate.
On another note and discussion with @tokenlogic, worth considering whether the 0.2% fee is worth removing. My personal view is that GHO should have as minimal barriers as possible for arbitrageurs. If arbitrageurs know that they can mint and burn GHO without fees, they would be more open to hold GHO since they can convert it back without fees.
The downside is that less of the GHO is routed trough aggregators from dexes (creating less fees for GHO pools). In the future this can be improved by introducing a fee manager that allows to whitelist addresses (such as dex aggregators) to route swaps with custom or zero fees and creating a bd opportunity for the Aave DAO. However, for now, I’d see that arbitrageurs would most likely anyways use these pools to swap into other stables as well part of wider strategies, or when there is not enough USDT in GSM, they would naturally route trough GHO pools as which is what is most likely happening when the caps are reached as in this case.
GSMs do not need of course to run without any revenue as there are few proposals already highlighting to allocate surplus assets into BUIDL, Aave and other similar initiatives as GSMs were originally built to have capital allocation features in mind.
For comparison USDS PSM on Sky does not have fees at the moment.
As GHO keeps growing, over time these fees can be introduced back.