# Technical maintenance proposals

**URL:** <https://governance.aave.com/t/technical-maintenance-proposals/15274>\
**Category:** Development\
**Created:** [October 30, 2023, 3:04pm UTC](https://governance.aave.com/t/technical-maintenance-proposals/15274 "2023-10-30T15:04:01Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Showing post:** 107

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**Author:** ![bgdlabs](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/user_avatar/governance.aave.com/bgdlabs/32/1829_2.png) [@bgdlabs](https://governance.aave.com/u/bgdlabs)\
**Post date:** [August 25, 2025, 8:22am UTC](https://governance.aave.com/t/technical-maintenance-proposals/15274/107 "2025-08-25T08:22:24Z")

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# Re-configuration of Core’s GhoDirectMinter
  

## Simple Summary

This proposal outlines the re-configuration/migration of the current `CoreGhoDirectMinter` to a new instance. This is necessary because upon its activation, the existing facilitator was misconfigured with a redundant layer of `ProxyAdmin`, which prevents future upgrades.

_Being a totally internal component of infrastructure, this doesn’t carry any effect on users or the GHO ecosystem overall. Also, the misconfiguration is not in any way dangerous, but necessary to upgrade the system if required in the future._

  

## Motivation

During the Aave V3.4 upgrade, the model of GHO on the v3 Core Ethereum pool was changed, for the DAO to mint GHO to borrow via a Direct Minter facilitator, same as on v3 Prime Ethereum.

However, this `CoreGhoDirectMinter` facilitator was configured wrongly ([here](https://github.com/bgd-labs/protocol-v3.4-upgrade/blob/main/src/UpgradePayloadMainnet.sol#L106-L110)) in what regards the ownership of the facilitator’s upgradeability: the ownership of the `ProxyAdmin` (`0xf02d4931e0d5c79af9094cd9dff16ea6e3d9acb8`) (proxy admin of the direct minter itself) was assigned to another `ProxyAdmin` contract (`0xD3cF979e676265e4f6379749DECe4708B9A22476`) controlled by the Governance Executor, instead of assigning it to the `GovernanceV3Ethereum.EXECUTOR_LVL_1` directly.

Even if the ownership/admin-chain of the setup doesn’t create any type of security issue (all contracts are part the DAO or contracts controlled), this setup doesn’t allow for future upgrades of the `CoreGhoDirectMinter`: the `GovernanceV3Ethereum.EXECUTOR_LVL_1` owns the top-level `ProxyAdmin` but cannot use it to command the facilitator’s the `ProxyAdmin` below to perform an upgrade.

This proposal resolves the issue by migrating the minted GHO and permissions from the old, non-upgradeable facilitator to a new, correctly configured `CoreGhoDirectMinter` instance.

_This operation has no negative effect as the Direct Minter is internal infrastructure of the DAO, with end users not having any contact with it_.

Addresses of the old facilitator:

- `UpgradePayloadMainnet` contract (V3.4 upgrade payload for the Ethereum Core instance): [`0xC2584B9cA7759FE1ac48D8aE38aeAFE12dbC9876`](https://etherscan.io/address/0xC2584B9cA7759FE1ac48D8aE38aeAFE12dbC9876)
- `GhoDirectMinter` implementation: [`0xe4c958de49303c9be571e00582cf9454586de76f`](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe4c958de49303c9be571e00582cf9454586de76f)
- `GhoDirectMinter` proxy: [`0x593B09afc075B3c326CE2AD7750888645BA8943d`](https://etherscan.io/address/0x593B09afc075B3c326CE2AD7750888645BA8943d)
- `GhoDirectMinter`’s `ProxyAdmin` contract: [`0xf02d4931e0d5c79af9094cd9dff16ea6e3d9acb8`](https://etherscan.io/address/0xf02d4931e0d5c79af9094cd9dff16ea6e3d9acb8)
- `MiscEthereum.PROXY_ADMIN` contract (which itself is an owner of the `GhoDirectMinter`’s `ProxyAdmin` contract): [`0xD3cF979e676265e4f6379749DECe4708B9A22476`](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD3cF979e676265e4f6379749DECe4708B9A22476)
- Owner of the `MiscEthereum.PROXY_ADMIN` contract (`GovernanceV3Ethereum.EXECUTOR_LVL_1`): [`0x5300A1a15135EA4dc7aD5a167152C01EFc9b192A`](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5300A1a15135EA4dc7aD5a167152C01EFc9b192A)

  

## Specification

This proposal will execute a payload to perform the following migration steps:

1. _Transfer state to new Facilitator_
  - The bucket capacity and current GHO level of the old facilitator (`0x593B09afc075B3c326CE2AD7750888645BA8943d`) are read.
  - The new facilitator (new `GhoDirectMinter` on `0x5513224daaEABCa31af5280727878d52097afA05`) is added to the `GhoToken` with the same bucket capacity as the previous one.
  - The new facilitator mints and supplies GHO to the Aave Pool, matching the GHO level of the old facilitator.

2. _Disable the old Facilitator:_
  - After the mint and supply on step 1, there is now liquidity available on the pool for the old facilitator to withdraw its GHO from the pool and burn it..
  - The old facilitator is removed from the `GhoToken`’s list of facilitators.

3. **Update permissions:**
  - The `RISK_ADMIN` role is granted to the new facilitator and revoked from the old one.
  - The `GhoBucketSteward` is updated to control the new facilitator and cease control of the old one.

This ensures a seamless/exact transition of the facilitator’s role and funds (aGHO) while restoring the DAO’s ability to perform future upgrades.

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_[View the full topic](https://governance.aave.com/t/technical-maintenance-proposals/15274)._