[TEMP-CHECK] Further Decentralising the Aave Grants DAO

Thank you @0xbilll for sharing your thoughts and comments. Really appreciate it!

While we appreciate the efforts of AGD to decentralise the grants process, it is worth noting that the discussion started almost 2 years ago. ~50% of the existing members of AGD have continued to be a part of the committee over 3-4 terms without clear performance reviews, and without extending the same opportunity to the broader community to participate in the review committee and contest for those positions based on their expertise.

Moreover, a key point of concern is that the initial set of reviewers appear to be nominated and selected by the proposer/grants lead. There seems to be a lack of clarity on the process for electing, replacing, and assessing the expertise of reviewers after their nominations are submitted. This process has been discussed in various places, such as here, and here, but some community questions on this topic have remained unnoticed and unanswered in the past, as highlighted here.

Through this proposal, we aim to ensure that key community members and experts have an equal chance to contribute to the AGD and participate in funding quality proposals that significantly influence the growth of the Aave ecosystem.

We believe that decentralisation should not be looked at in isolation. It is essential that AGD balances decentralisation with expertise and speed of decision-making. Requiring every proposal to be commented, and voted on by the entire community can result in voter fatigue and low participation. Instead, proposals that fall below the threshold can be approved directly by community-elected experts, reducing the burden on the community while reserving the community voting process for proposals that exceed the threshold and require broader community input.
In relation to entity formation, we would appreciate more clarity on how this step contributes to enhancing community engagement within AGD. It seems to raise concerns about bypassing community voting for the selection of AGD members altogether. Critical information such as internal guidelines are important artefacts that require broader community insight and transparency to help community members get a deeper insight into how proposals are evaluated and their alignment with Aave’s roadmap.

We believe that both Aave community members and experts should be given an equitable and unbiased opportunity to contribute to the AGD and participate in funding quality proposals. This can be accomplished by implementing mechanisms such as community oversight and well-defined success criteria.

Even in the existing AGD structure, the team members are chosen through a voting process, which, in itself, carries the potential for political influence. The only distinction lies in how these team members are selected, with the current process involving nomination by the proposer or AGD lead, rather than self-nomination.

It is important to offer Aave community members a transparent platform to showcase their expertise and backgrounds, facilitating a fair chance at being elected as part of the AGD team. We are open to further insights from fellow community members on this matter as the AGD grants lead and reviewers might have a potential conflict of interest in an open election process for AGD team members election.

We understand that the compensation framework was outlined in the initial proposals; however, there is a lack of clarity and transparency regarding the precise allocation of hours dedicated by each team member to fulfil their responsibilities. Furthermore, there is limited insight into specific details, such as the reference to a $1,300/month compensation for the reviewer, its associated breakdown and the proposer’s recommendation score.

To enhance transparency and eliminate potential ambiguity in committee compensation, we propose implementing a fixed monthly compensation structure. This adjustment would contribute to a clearer understanding of the compensation process for the community. Additionally, we are open to reevaluating the compensation figures in order to remain in line with the DAO’s fiscal constraints and community feedback.

As active community members, we strongly believe that a transparent review process, coupled with well-defined acceptance criteria and constructive feedback, significantly enhances the proposer’s experience and encourages positive word-of-mouth within the community. This approach not only keeps the community and proposers informed about the review process but also serves as a means to ensure that reviewers adhere to the process guidelines and mitigate potential conflicts of interest.

Overall, implementing a transparent review process with community input can help prevent scenarios similar to the one highlighted here, where proposers are left in the dark about the reasons behind the acceptance or rejection of their proposals.

As previously specified, this proposal is open to utilizing other grant tools based on community inputs to enhance transparency and community participation. We believe that transparent software will help AGD strike a balance between a transparent review process, accountability and community participation in the review process. We are proponents of any software that helps us reach this goal.

Increased Transparency - We acknowledge AGD’s efforts towards transparency and believe there’s significant potential to enhance transparency across the entire submission, review, and grants program performance and analytics. Implementing a transparent review process, coupled with well-defined acceptance criteria and constructive feedback, not only enriches the proposer’s experience but also establishes a robust system of community oversight.

Increases Accountability - The proposed model guarantees that AGD members are elected through self-nomination and retained or replaced via community voting, solely based on their performance and expertise. This structure ensures that AGD members are selected by the community itself, rather than through nominations by the AGD proposer or Grants Lead. The process reflects the community’s voice and prevents concentration of decision-making power in the hands of a few.

Turnaround Time (TAT) - Faster response time and communication TAT are highly valued by the proposers and key contributors. Considering community’s sentiment and Aave’e brand as one of the grants program KPIs, swift response and funding TATs are crucial for the timely progression of Aave’s innovation cycle. High-quality builders and small teams need faster access to capital. A faster turnaround time, both in terms of response and funding, reinforces Aave’s brand and fosters continued growth.

Increase in the number of high-quality proposals - The involvement of a service provider that offers substantial value should be viewed as an opportunity to enhance overall outcomes and key performance indicators. Embracing a partnership that enriches AGD through a transparent tool such as Questbook, if proven beneficial, should be considered a strategic step. The utilization of third-party service providers like Gnosis, Snapshot, and Discourse by numerous ecosystems underscores their value and utility, without compromising their suitability for individual ecosystems that adopt them as part of their workflow.

Furthermore, there is limited insight into specific details, such as the reference to the recommendation score, evaluation criteria, decision TAT, the contributions of funded projects directly to the Aave protocol’s roadmap and KPI, the process for selecting reviewers and grants lead etc. To further improve this, we propose decentralising the nomination and selection process of AGD members and making the entire review process transparent.

This proposal is open to utilizing other grant tools based on community inputs to enhance transparency and community participation. Moreover, the compensation model for Questbook is as follows.

The compensation model is 5% of all distributions made to grantees in a month, if 5% of those distributions exceed $9k, Questbook is capped at receiving only $9k, if 5% of those distributions fall below $9k, for example $7k, Questbook will only take $7k that month.
It is important to note that this can be further readjusted should the community decide to adopt them and take into consideration additional feedback from the community.

Decentralisation should not be looked at in isolation. It is essential that AGD balances decentralisation with expertise, background of decision makers and speed of decision making. We are strong advocates of healthy public discussions and will adhere to our values. We have no intent of creating the illusion of community support and are open to incorporating community feedback into our proposal. As specified above, we would appreciate more clarity on how a legal entity contributes to enhancing community engagement within AGD. It seems to raise concerns about bypassing community voting for the selection of AGD members altogether.

To summarize, our proposal advocates for an equitable and unbiased opportunity to contribute to the AGD, alleviating concerns of voter fatigue, alongside implementing a transparent review process with built-in accountability measures enabled by community oversight.

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