Thanks for the discussion @eboado. The more important issue is the promise of delegation to two voters, which is my primary concern. I do not think it is debatable to say that this is a clear conflict of interest that should be avoided, or at the very least explicitly called out and discouraged. It is not too hard to see how this can be viewed as Certora bribing its way towards renewal and ensuring that it gets renewed in subsequent years as the delegates it has promised delegating to continue to accrue governance power. These concerns are valid regardless of the quality of @Certora’s services and the identity of the delegated parties. At minimum, there should be no promises on how the delegated power is to be used.
Regarding compensation with GHO: I do not have a strong opinion either way. I will say that your arguments against GHO being used for compensation can be summarized as: “We should avoid paying Aave service providers in Aave’s stablecoin because our stablecoin is not well suited for payments.”
So it seems to me that the solution is to improve the stablecoin product.
Thanks @Certora for your response and the information about the delegation split. The rationale for who is receiving the delegation makes sense. As mentioned in my previous paragraph above, this is not about the choice of the delegated parties. But now that we’re on this topic anyhow, I think it would actually be beneficial to the DAO if some/all of the proposition power is delegated to another party for further distribution of this power. Even if Skyward is a service to be made available for all, this is still a centralization vector. We have seen proposals delayed for months with little transparency into why that is the case:
- [ARFC] Add gmBTC on Arbitrum V3 - #9 by bgdlabs
- ARC Proposal: Onboarding sfrxETH from Frax Protocol to Aave V3 Ethereum Market - #21 by ApuMallku
It would be good for the DAO to have another entity/party making proposals to further decentralize as @EzR3aL has mentioned.