[ARFC ADDENDUM] Mandatory Disclosures and Conflict-of-Interest Voting Norms

From my personal point of view, while the COI topic is important and governance already has established COI practices such as disclosures, I find this proposal poorly written in all respects. It expands a kind of non-binding and non-factual oversight to anyone who is a “beneficiary of a proposal,” a term that is not defined. In its basic form, this would pull virtually any user into the framework as “mandatory” and, on top of that, could amount to doxxing. This kind of drafting and language ultimately results in misuse.

The whole point of token governance is to enable participation with tokens one owns, with full sovereignty. We should think carefully before expanding “soft” governance outside of token governance, especially when, as the author states, such soft governance creates a “lack of legitimacy.” A DAO should run on token governance, not on overnight “social contracts” that diminish the legitimacy token governance provides.

I will vote no on this proposal, in light of hoping to see a more reasonable and well-thought-out COI framework that actually makes sense.

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No surprise here. You had the chance to make things better.

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Stani,

I’ve watched nearly all of your podcasts and videos, and I genuinely believe you’re one of the rare idealists in this industry. I can also understand how the recent conflict may have affected you personally.

To be candid, it seems to me that both the DAO and the Labs have reacted more strongly than necessary. At its core, the tension comes from misaligned responsibilities, authority, and incentives—this is a system design issue rather than the fault of any one party. When we rely on moral expectations instead of clear, enforceable rules to constrain an individual’s behavior, it often turns into a kind of tyranny of the few over the many.

As an ordinary AAVE holder, I sincerely hope you can help drive a framework that reconciles the interests of both sides as soon as possible.

Warm regards.

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I want to raise an important concern about the current Snapshot. Three unidentified addresses with significant voting power are voting NAY. These same addresses also voted NAY on the proposal that initiated the current Labs-DAO conflict.

Pattern Analysis:
These addresses appear to have been dormant previously and are now being activated to vote against community consensus. This raises serious questions about voting power concentration and governance manipulation.

Transparency Request:
Can we identify who controls these wallets? This information is critical for several reasons:

  1. Regulatory risk: With the Clarity Act approaching, concentrated, opaque voting power could support classification of $AAVE as a security due to insufficient decentralization
  2. Governance integrity: Token holders deserve to know if coordinated voting is occurring
  3. Accountability: We need transparency about who wields this much influence

Addresses requiring identification:
∙ 0x58dDfB3Db792d2f8E2cdd5ba9726e6b932a3f5aF
∙ 0xdC0990910F47aD479020eD77B0d62BF738C2791a
∙ 0xEA0C12Fd29c3fe5B1ecC82a42702196bd0De6B5A

As token holders, we have a right to transparency and accountability in our governance process.

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You can see who owns it by using Arkham and various service providers.

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I would need an official statement

1 Like