[ARFC] Chaos Labs Risk Stewards - Decrease Borrow Caps for Yield-Bearing Assets on Aave V3 - 01.14.25

Summary

This proposal recommends reducing the borrow caps of specific yield-bearing assets across Aave markets to address their consistently low utilization rates and lack of borrow demand. This adjustment aims to optimize incentive efficiency while maintaining the protocol’s integrity and flexibility for existing borrowers.

Motivation

The primary motivation for reducing the borrow caps is the structural inefficiency in utilizing these assets. Many of the specified assets are yield-bearing, making them unattractive to borrowers compared to stablecoins or other non-yield-bearing alternatives. Borrowing such assets involves additional costs (e.g., rewards accrual on the debt). As a result, these markets have experienced consistently low utilization.

The following charts show the utilization of the defined borrow cap of the assets and the utilization of the markets over the last three months. It is important to note that the borrow cap already represents roughly 10% of the supply cap of the same asset.

Lowering the borrow caps aligns market parameters with observed demand while preserving safety and allowing the protocol to efficiently allocate future incentives. This is caused by a common phenomenon observed during incentive programs being the looping of the asset with itself, hence diluting the incentives for non loopers. Additionally, technical providers have recommended to keep the risk of exchange rate inflation to a minimum.

Reducing the borrow caps to 1 unit limits new borrowing positions from being opened without affecting existing positions and preventing liquidations.

Specification

The following table shows the recommended borrow caps changes:

Asset Chain Current Borrow Cap Proposed Borrow Cap
weETH Ethereum 200,000 1
weETH Arbitrum 25,000 1
weETH Base 9,000 1
weETH Scroll 6,400 1
rETH Ethereum 19,200 1
rETH Arbitrum 1,360 1
rETH Optimism 720 1
ETHx Ethereum 5,000 1
rsETH Ethereum 1,900 1
osETH Ethereum 1,000 1
MATICx Polygon 5,200,000 1

Next Steps

We will move forward and implement these updates via the Risk Steward process.

Disclosure

Chaos Labs has not been compensated by any third party for publishing this ARFC.

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0

1 Like

Could you instead consider updating curve parameters to match the one from wstEth (especially on Scroll)?
There would be demand to borrow weEth on Scroll given the Eth APR is constantly high and could make it profitable to loop supply Eth and borrow weEth.

Aave is one of the few places where one can express a short position on these LRTs and LSTs. Are these assets so risky that there should be no borrows allowed on them? I find that difficult to believe.

There is quite a big gap between a 100k borrow cap and 0. Is there no middle ground? Perhaps @LlamaRisk can chime in here regarding the safety and what they believe the protocol is able to underwrite. Any risk mentioned seems addressable with less drastic measures.

Regarding rewards allocation - this seems to be conflating protocol incentive design with core protocol functionality. The fundamental purpose of a DeFi lending protocol is permissionless borrowing and lending, up to appropriate restrictions and configurations for user safety and capital efficiency. These restrictions should not be based on incentive optimization challenges. Ultimately, it should fall on the rewards allocators to design their rewards programs in the manner that makes sense for fair allocation, according to their definition of fair.