[ARFC] Improve Liquidity Buffer for USDC on Aave v3 Ethereum Core – Raise Slope 2, Lower Optimal Utilization

[ARFC] Improve Liquidity Buffer for USDC on Ethereum Core – Raise Slope 2, lower optimal utilization

[This post is personal views only, not representing those of Circle]

Summary

USDC on Aave v3 Ethereum Core has been essentially pinned at full utilization for four days. Variable borrow rate has been flat at the post-kink ceiling (~14%) the entire time, and pool supply contracted by ~$60M in the last 24 hours as repayments were matched dollar-for-dollar by queued withdrawals. The rate is not clearing the market. I think a parameter recalibration is warranted. Specifically:

  • Slope 2: ~10% → 50% target, with an interim Risk Steward step at 40%.
  • Optimal utilization (U^*): 92% → 85% target, with an interim step at 87%.
  • Slope 1: hold at 3.5%. Base rate: hold at 0%. Reserve factor: hold at 10%.
  • Slope 2 Risk Oracle: pause or floor for USDC during this incident; re-engage when conditions normalize.

The intent is narrow: restore the post-kink region as a functional price discovery range so the pool can clear through price instead of through the withdrawal queue. The added benefit is also to shift the effective maturity of the pool from unknown to near-instantaneous again with under 100% utilization rate. The latter has important implications in attracting capital inflows to restore a healthy onchain market.

The practical path I’d suggest is a Risk Steward action by @LlamaRisk + @Aave Labs on the interim parameters, followed by full-governance ratification on the target within a week. LlamaRisk has the data, the authority (via the 2/2 Risk Steward multisig), and — per their continuity statement — explicit manual-AGRS coverage of Slope 1, Slope 2, Base, and U^*. I’d defer to their judgment on exact values; the numbers below are a starting point.

1. Current state

Aavescan snapshot, 2026-04-22:

Metric Value 24h Δ
Utilization 99.87% essentially unchanged
Total supplied $1.89B ≈ −$60M
Total borrowed $1.89B ≈ −$60M
Available liquidity < $3M thin
Variable borrow rate 13.82% near ceiling
Supply rate 12.42% near ceiling

Pool supply and debt have shrunk roughly dollar-for-dollar over the past 24 hours. Repayments are matched by queued withdrawals; net new deposits and net new borrows are close to zero.




Source: USDC on Ethereum V3 | Aavescan

2. Why the rate isn’t clearing

The marginal-borrower mix appears to have shifted since the April 18 rsETH event. External reporting (CoinDesk; Aave forum) describes ~$300M of incremental borrow flow in the 72h following the exploit, dominated by trapped-liquidity extraction:

  • Stuck USDC/USDT suppliers borrowing other stables against their own deposits and exiting via DEX.
  • Users whose WETH is on Core (unfrozen but with LTV=0) or on still-frozen Prime / L2 deployments, reaching for dollar liquidity through whatever non-WETH collateral they have available.
  • Users holding non-WETH collateral (WBTC, other stables) drawing USDC to extract dollar liquidity from positions whose normal exit paths are temporarily blocked.

These borrowers are structurally rate-insensitive over short horizons. A user accepting a potential dobule digit headline loss to exit via swap is treating the borrow rate as a fee for bypassing the queue; at 14%, one week of carry costs ~27 bps and one month ~117 bps — small compared to the loss they’re already absorbing. They likely don’t unwind until rates are multiples of current levels.

On the supply side, the current rate ceiling is competitive but not a dominant strategy given liquidity issues. An allocator pricing in the observable illiquidity require much more of a premium that the current ceiling doesn’t clearly provide.

Even though supplying USDC on Aave is safe, the illiquidity of the pool requires more compensation, as the instrument have shifted from one with instantenous liquidity to one with uncertain maturity.

The active lever is supply attraction. If a meaningful share of borrowers are rate-insensitive, steepening Slope 2 works primarily by making the pool an irresistible destination for new LP capital. Lifting the rate ceiling to 35–50% range should incentivize inflows within hours, pushing utilization back below the kink and allowing rates to re-anchor automatically. This is how Treasury repo, fed funds, and commercial paper clear: price spikes, capital arrives, price normalizes. The kinked IRM was designed to reproduce this behavior; at the current S_2 = 10\%, it’s under-amplified for this specific shock.

Deadweight loss As with any price ceiling, restricting free market clearing leads to suboptimal consumer welfare and deadweight loss. This inefficiency leads to deterioration of markets and exit of participants that seek more competitive venues over time.

3. Parameters

3.1 Current parameters (inferred)

Parameter Value
Base variable borrow rate (R_0) 0%
Slope 1 (S_1) ~3.5%
Slope 2 (S_2) ~10%
Optimal utilization (U^*) 92%
Reserve factor 10%

3.2 Max-rate math at various Slope 2 values

With R_0 = 0 and S_1 = 3.5\% held fixed, variable borrow APR at U=100% equals S_1 + S_2. Supply rate at U=100% = borrow rate × (1 − reserve factor) = borrow rate × 0.9.

Slope 2 Max borrow rate at U=100% Max supply rate Assessment
10% (current) 14.0% 12.6% Current state — does not clear
25% 28.5% 25.7% Plausible but likely insufficient given rate-insensitive borrower share
40% (proposed interim) 43.5% 39.2% Likely clears via supply attraction within hours
50% (proposed target) 53.5% 48.2% Comfortable margin for additional stress
75% 78.5% 70.7% Incremental deterrence minimal; larger discontinuity risk at kink

3.3 Proposed two-step path

Interim (Risk Steward action, same day):

Parameter From To Δ
Slope 2 ~10% 40% +29.5 pp
Optimal utilization 92% 87% −5 pp
Slope 1 3.5% 3.5%
Slope 2 Risk Oracle (USDC) active pause or floor at static S_2

Target (full-governance ratification, 5–7 days):

Parameter Interim Target Δ
Slope 2 40% 50% +10 pp
Optimal utilization 87% 85% −2 pp

The interim lands closer to the target than to the status quo intentionally. If borrower-side demand is rate-insensitive and the active lever is supply attraction, a modest step (say S_2 = 25\%) may produce only partial rotation and leave the pool still pinned — burning a steward action window without producing clearing. A single decisive move, with the option to soften afterwards, looks more efficient. That said, this calculus depends on the marginal-borrower-elasticity assumption; LlamaRisk may reach a different conclusion on the evidence they hold.

3.4 Resulting rate curve

Utilization Current Interim (S2=40%, U*=87%) Target (S2=50%, U*=85%)
50% 1.9% 2.0% 2.1%
80% 3.0% 3.2% 3.3%
85% 3.2% 3.4% 3.5% (kink)
87% 3.3% 3.5% (kink) 10.2%
90% 3.4% 12.7% 20.2%
92% 3.5% (kink) 19.1% 26.8%
95% 5.4% 28.7% 36.8%
97% 7.1% 35.1% 43.5%
100% 14.0% (observed) 43.5% 53.5%

Below 85% utilization — the pool’s normal operating regime — the proposed curves essentially coincide with the current curve. The change is structural only above the kink.

3.5 Why these specific values

S_2 = 50\% at target. At U=100% this produces a supply rate around 48%, competitive with every onchain and offchain allocation by a wide enough margin to pull capital in within hours. 75% adds little additional deterrent while worsening rate discontinuities near the kink. 30% risks leaving rate-insensitive borrowers in place.

U^* = 85\% at target. The current 8 pp of headroom above the kink was consumed in hours on April 18. 15 pp is closer to what a pool of this scale probably wants; cost is ~30–40 bps of incremental borrow rate at typical healthy-regime utilization. Reasonable cases exist for 80% (more defensive) or 88% (less disruption).

Slope 2 Risk Oracle pause for USDC. Two reasons. First, empirical: LlamaRisk’s own February 2026 retrospective documented that during the WETH utilization spike, the oracle’s first response was a reduction of Slope 2 from 8% to 6.5% (below its published floor), that Slope 2 reached only 9.75% some 28 hours after the breach, and that during a follow-on spike at 99.85% utilization the oracle “did not respond for 43 hours.” The retrospective’s language — the oracle “diverged from its specification” — is LlamaRisk’s. Second, operational: the oracle was built by Chaos Labs, whose orderly exit from Aave on 2026-04-06 means ongoing support is no longer contractually provided. During an active stress event, a static parameter under direct steward control is operationally simpler. The oracle can be re-engaged in calmer conditions once its maintenance story is settled. None of this is a criticism of Chaos Labs — they contributed three years of high-quality work to Aave and their offboarding was professional.

4. Risk considerations

4.1 Supply rotation

A supply rate approaching 40–50% under stress should pull USDC from sophisticated allocators across venues. This is the primary intended clearing mechanism. Rates remain elevated only as long as utilization stays above the kink; decay is automatic as supply arrives. My sense is the rotation takes hours, not days, but LlamaRisk’s elasticity views are more authoritative.

4.2 Repayment interaction

Borrowers repaying at elevated rate incur one-time interest at the rate they repay at; for repayment windows of hours to a day, the cost is basis points. The IRM applies continuously — no cliff.

4.3 Asymmetry with the WETH IRM flattening

The DAO flattened WETH’s IRM on April 20 (S1→2%, S2→3%, U*→94% on Core) to avoid rate-driven liquidations of the stuck rsETH-backed WETH positions during socialization. That action was pool-specific and, in context, reasonable. USDC is different: the asset is healthy; the only stress is withdrawal demand. Flattening WETH and steepening USDC are complementary responses to different problems, not contradictory signals.

4.6 What I’d welcome LlamaRisk’s view on

Short list where LlamaRisk’s data or judgment should override mine:

  • The actual marginal-borrower composition post-April 18 (above is a read from public flows, not address-level data).
  • Whether the interim should in fact be closer to 25% than 40% — a gentler step may be appropriate if my rate-insensitivity read is overstated.
  • Cross-instance implications for USDC on Arbitrum, Base, Polygon, Avalanche, Optimism, Linea.
  • Disposition of the Slope 2 Risk Oracle during the Chaos Labs transition window.

5. Execution

  1. Risk Steward action, same day. LlamaRisk and Aave Labs execute the interim parameters (S_2 = 40\%, U^* = 87\%) and the USDC-specific oracle pause/floor via the 2/2 multisig and manual AGRS. The scope is within the envelope of prior steward IRM actions (including the April 20 WETH flattening and the February 7 steward bypass of the oracle during the WETH incident).
  2. Full-governance ratification within 5–7 days. Standard ARFC → Snapshot → onchain vote targeting S_2 = 50\%, U^* = 85\%.
  3. Protocol Emergency Guardian fallback. The 5-of-9 EMERGENCY_ADMIN multisig is available if stewards decline to act and conditions continue to deteriorate. This is a contingency.

Follow-on proposals for USDC on Arbitrum, Base, Polygon, Avalanche, Optimism, and Linea should follow this one if those pools show similar pinning; I’d leave that call to LlamaRisk as the venue-specific data comes in.

6. Open to input

Pushback welcome — especially from LlamaRisk and Aave Labs on the inferences above, from Chaos Labs on the Slope 2 Risk Oracle’s intended operating range (their perspective would sharpen §3.5), and from other risk researchers on the clearing-rate estimate. The narrow question is whether current parameters produce a clearing market; if not, what parameter adjustment best restores that property. I’ve offered one answer above and would find a different one useful, not less so.

7. Specification (machine-readable)

market: aave-v3-ethereum-core
asset: USDC
reserve_address: "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48"

# Interim — Risk Steward action (same day)
irm_interim:
  baseVariableBorrowRate: 0.00        # RAY
  variableRateSlope1:      0.035
  variableRateSlope2:      0.40
  optimalUsageRatio:       0.87
  reserveFactor:           0.10

# Target — full-governance ratification
irm_target:
  baseVariableBorrowRate: 0.00
  variableRateSlope1:      0.035
  variableRateSlope2:      0.50
  optimalUsageRatio:       0.85
  reserveFactor:           0.10

slope2_risk_oracle:
  mode: "paused_for_USDC"             # alternative: "floored" at interim=0.40 / target=0.50

8. References

6 Likes

Proposing such a massive change and suggesting it happen immediately will only accelerate capital flight from both USDC and AAVE. Terrible idea

4 Likes

Arc is proposing a 50% interest rate on a population that is in some cases physically unable to deleverage

So instead of helping to recover stolen funds by freezing hacked USDC, Arc decides the best course of action is to liquidate people in the USDC pool? First of all, players are still figuring out methods to freeze/claw back the stolen funds, secondly it’s unclear who will pay for/socialize the loss, thirdly some tokens are still frozen!

This is a crisis, not an economics lesson. LlamaRisk should not listen to Arc and punish everyone in the USDC pool just because Arc thinks its not an efficient market.

Hypocrisy of selective intervention and tone deaf.

4 Likes

Had a chat with Gordon - he’s not representing Circle or Arc.

He’s just trying to help based on some of the comments from MonetSupply @ Spark (see here https://x.com/MonetSupply/status/2045690569825906692). CEO of Circle just QT’d without hesitation as he backs anything his team put out but it’s not from them specifically.

Gordon realises some of the issues with this proposal and he’s thinking of best ways to address given his position at Circle.

4 Likes

When do you think things can’t get any worse…

2 Likes

I believe Aave’s priority right now should be rebuilding market confidence rather than aggressively forcing utilization normalization through extreme interest rate adjustments.

I’m also concerned that abrupt rate shocks could destabilize highly leveraged and recursive borrowing positions (which is most of ETH Positions), potentially triggering liquidation cascades and broader contagion across other collateral assets.

Temporary periods of Hight utilization do not necessarily imply issues. In my view, this level of controlled withdrawal queue may be preferable then to introducing aggressive slope 2 changes that could unintentionally accelerate systemic deleveraging.

As a DAO Member who live and die Aave, I trust that both @AaveLabs and @LlamaRisk are evaluating the broader second-order risks involved and are better positioned to assess long-term protocol stability rather than reacting purely to short-term utilization pressure.

For now, I would vote “NAY” on this proposal. We’re in a difficult week, but short-term stress alone should not justify overly reactive parameter changes.

1 Like

I had a chat with Alex from keyring. He made me realize that the liquidation points are much lower than I initially expected. So that’s the constraint, I fully understand that this is not doable. Also to be fully clear, this is proposed personally, it’s not coming from Circle.

2 Likes

Gordon, thanks for taking your time to post this. There are a few questions and concerns that I have re. this proposal.

  1. Is this solely a tug of war being played on the turf of interest rates? The proposal’s core argument from which it derives conclusions is that borrowers are ignorant about the rates in short term, since their priority is merely to exit, and high enough rates would discourage such behavior and moreover bring supply. But would a supplier supply USDC knowing full well that the collateral they might be underwriting might be directly or indirectly exposed to rsETH (and hence bad debt can happen). Would the rates be able to cover for bad debt?

  2. Have you considered the scenario, that if USDC supply doesn’t come on time, and if positions get liquidated (because of the high interest rate)? How would the liquidations be processed, since there are collaterals where utilization is very high, and not enough is present to process liquidations normally

It seems like the real solution needs to consider risk premium for suppliers but also take into account of not liquidating positions with illiquid collaterals

1 Like

This is an actionable steps and proposals but adjusting USDC along won’t solve it issue. The USDT is having the same problem and making USDC more expensive will only let users exit USDC market.

The whole slopes needs a long due overhaul, together with the risk management system of AAVE V3. If we take DAI as example, it’s slope is much steep and had some liquidity when USDC and USDT both were fully utilized.

The overhaul requires Professional risk managers, with credit and market risk expertise from traditional banking expertise plus some crypto mindset to solve the issue. AAVE V4 solved the issue partially but now the reputation damage is done.

It was great to chat with you recently!

This is from a user named @zer0byte01 on a popular telegram chat and I haven’t checked the authenticity but it shows the size of positions close to liquidation.

At 12x lev this would be 1.3% per day so unless I’ve messed up my maths it would mean all these positions would be liquidated within a week which is about 4bn in assets hitting AMMs over a short period of time. Likely this would have a downward pressure on many of the collaterals and cause further cascading liquidations.

It’s not fair for the borrower. Many Borrower don’t repay the debt because their Collateral ETH are frozen, others are lacking of confidence. Pull up the borrow rate is to punish the victim!

Thanks for the proposal @GordonLiao, here I constructed USDC borrower snapshot as of 2026-04-23 07:00:00 UTC with a forward-looking deterministic analysis over the most vulnerable USDC positions.

TL;DR

  • USDC remains highly utilized (98.06%), but is no longer fully pinned; available liquidity is about $34,938,518
  • Observed variable borrow APR is 11.68% at snapshot time (2026-04-23 07:00:00 UTC).
  • Under proposal scenarios at current utilization, modeled 30-day material debt-at-risk is concentrated around $61,288,618.
  • Under pinned-utilization stress (99.87%), target-curve stress introduces one material <=7d account and raises 30-day material debt-at-risk to $70,142,038.

Methodology

  • User set: addresses with positive net USDC debt.
  • Risk state: live getUserAccountData for HF, debt, collateral.
  • Debt mix modeling: reconstructed USDC share applied to user-level debt growth; non-USDC debt accrues at current debt-weighted baseline APR.
  • Assumptions: static prices, no top-ups/repay/migrations, deterministic accrual.

Current State Snapshot

  • Supply: $1,803,583,630
  • Borrow: $1,768,645,111
  • Available liquidity: $34,938,518
  • Utilization (borrow/supply): 98.06%
  • Observed USDC variable borrow APR: 11.68%
  • Observed USDC supply APR: 10.32%
  • Population covered: 9,036 users
  • Material users (debt >= $100k): 1,408

Material HF Distribution

Cumulative Material Debt-at-Risk (0-90 days)

This curve maps the exact continuous exponential decay of Health Factors across time horizons, providing a continuous view of when capital crosses the liquidation threshold.

Scenario-Based Bar Graph

Current observed APR

  • 7-Day Risk: 0 Users / $0.00M Vol
  • 30-Day Risk: 1 Users / $0.90M Vol

Interim @ current util

  • 7-Day Risk: 0 Users / $0.00M Vol
  • 30-Day Risk: 3 Users / $61.29M Vol

Target @ current util

  • 7-Day Risk: 0 Users / $0.00M Vol
  • 30-Day Risk: 3 Users / $61.29M Vol

Interim @ 99.87% util

  • 7-Day Risk: 0 Users / $0.00M Vol
  • 30-Day Risk: 3 Users / $61.29M Vol

Target @ 99.87% util

  • 7-Day Risk: 1 Users / $0.90M Vol
  • 30-Day Risk: 5 Users / $70.14M Vol

Scenario Table (Material Users)

Scenario 7d users 7d debt-at-risk 30d users 30d debt-at-risk
Current observed APR 0 $0 1 $903,834
Interim @ current util 0 $0 3 $61,288,618
Target @ current util 0 $0 3 $61,288,618
Interim @ 99.87% util 0 $0 3 $61,288,618
Target @ 99.87% util 1 $903,834 5 $70,142,038

Largest Address Deep-Dive: 0x0591926d5d3b9cc48ae6efb8db68025ddc3adfa5

This address is the largest debt concentration in the sensitivity set and materially drives scenario-level debt-at-risk outcomes.

  • Total debt: $60,157,937
  • Reconstructed USDC debt: $50,804,404 (84.45% of total debt)
  • Non-USDC debt (modeled baseline accrual): $9,353,533
  • Collateral: $66,203,217
  • Current HF: 1.0125
  • Debt headroom to HF=1 under static prices: $749,022 (1.25% debt growth buffer)
Scenario Days to liquidation HF @ 7d HF @ 30d USDC carry/day USDC carry/30d Share of scenario 30d material debt-at-risk
Current observed APR 43.2 1.0104 1.0038 $15,378 $463,382 0.0%
Interim @ current util 16.1 1.0070 0.9894 $44,385 $1,348,555 98.2%
Target @ current util 13.4 1.0059 0.9848 $53,694 $1,635,737 98.2%
Interim @ 99.87% util 14.4 1.0064 0.9866 $49,907 $1,518,719 98.2%
Target @ 99.87% util 12.2 1.0053 0.9820 $59,288 $1,809,076 85.8%

At current-utilization interim/target scenarios, this single address contributes ~98% of 30-day material debt-at-risk, highlighting strong single-name concentration.

Top 30 Most Vulnerable Material Accounts

The following 30 addresses hold material debt ($>$10k) and are the absolute closest to the HF < 1.0 boundary. They will be the first to default under the accelerated interest rate.

Rank Address Total Debt (USD) USDC Debt (USD) Initial HF
1 0xb0f76a4c60c6c993ac30bdda24c5f7f98a03249c $903,834.10 $845,027.68 1.0075
2 0x0591926d5d3b9cc48ae6efb8db68025ddc3adfa5 $60,157,937.49 $50,804,404.39 1.0125
3 0x211c2f0b9b5a521c7c14fe067baa89fbab8d6a6e $11,536.28 $11,007.00 1.0177
4 0x67672db04f5e6b5fcbccc9564a36c2b3a85fc9b0 $4,135,760.38 $168,850.00 1.0202
5 0x512f98be678c85f1b66f643cca4d557a36a9ad5c $36,991.72 $31,317.63 1.0218
6 0x9e283ba6d80faaf1bee7270e21eee5c375266611 $226,846.59 $213,709.45 1.0241
7 0x355b5f013a1ede94607f7a4ce45c0132f053507c $21,740,207.58 $1,915,000.00 1.0259
8 0x6f10b22517ab7a3f5aa722e62a6917a3a7c2e2b8 $1,614,480.45 $1,152,000.00 1.0280
9 0xb1bcfa1004019f54ffd1e6f0bfe9425f82e71fb2 $20,593.14 $19,118.18 1.0292
10 0xa57e4d659e6fb88317a68ea19d18cb8784908157 $31,981.53 $385.00 1.0300
11 0xf2035c797bc9ef9f3396e747e8b73907d420770c $209,231.17 $174,456.22 1.0311
12 0x8a93aae912e40dad3b64120c74dd27269acc1df7 $805,889.54 $766,901.97 1.0311
13 0x2304eb247ae2dcf91ba372b458fc7e4ccc55ee42 $8,047,530.00 $7,999,659.91 1.0325
14 0x848edbf93e6c56a2580023b820591622ad7f80a2 $110,870.48 $26,899.99 1.0326
15 0x287f4637b332457934e700f52ce772c2ec2881f6 $92,750.85 $89,761.74 1.0354
16 0x0c245411babbef9d19b4929be810a7c8c1937a6f $15,997.42 $15,594.14 1.0356
17 0x3313495b01228b95ae6b0103ce9e4161a32202bf $662,142.70 $63,964.04 1.0356
18 0x618ca7d5aef24dac6cb70553b5dbf5f40a315cac $10,983.15 $10,447.23 1.0359
19 0x17b9f4fb6860d3bd05d6393a1fb29e9782a593d9 $20,062.05 $19,327.47 1.0372
20 0x6d16527bfa9514e246f71137c19a304b64f1e46a $17,509.42 $16,717.93 1.0387
21 0x6c87a26bec3cf0e0156eba691cbfd1b4c5ec12cc $43,992.54 $40,000.00 1.0394
22 0xa8cf19d23d9331754bda7656cc0f0bd422df9d83 $11,159.13 $10,959.29 1.0395
23 0x44d322a634ca8f4ecaae5d0bea3e49496f09b2d5 $83,932.80 $83,051.00 1.0401
24 0xaddaa4ab654434c7e0540245aa98ed4589361e02 $28,497.66 $26,100.00 1.0405
25 0x5a988f1ea42c216c73a0ea0f8ad886616afaabaf $11,867.96 $3,177.40 1.0422
26 0xf183b397d161402c46d4d32b08819c3cfd322975 $82,275.55 $76,439.81 1.0425
27 0x30963fb71ec4a5d88fece5c540d156788b00b10d $50,266.41 $49,280.22 1.0427
28 0x5700bfd5bd9f5b41158094a50b43ae5b77cdb5ac $22,323.12 $19,940.11 1.0436
29 0xee82e96a09ffe53c3b49ec6a3c424ff3abd58813 $64,714.66 $61,994.36 1.0437
30 0x407a4e523a4e7eab58eb61fb66d7b0555f6dfb08 $15,267.00 $15,245.16 1.0448

Interpretation

  • Count-based risk is dominated by dust accounts; debt-weighted risk remains concentrated in a small set of loop-heavy wallets.
  • At the current (not fully pinned) utilization, no material account is in <=7d liquidation under interim/target-at-current-util scenarios.
  • Under pinned stress, the target curve notably tightens clocks for the most levered material accounts.

Caveats

  • This is sensitivity analysis, not a forecast of realized liquidations.
  • It excludes collateral price shocks and behavioral responses.
  • A separate post will propose a balanced parameter set.

Thanks to @GordonLiao for the framing, @JosueMpia for the pushback, and @Yevhen for the data. Reading the three together, I think the path forward is narrower and more interesting than any of the individual posts alone, and I want to argue for it from a protocol-economic-sustainability lens rather than from a rate-elasticity one.

Where Gordon’s diagnosis survives the retraction. The core insight — that USDC-on-Aave silently shifted from a demand-deposit-style claim to a term-deposit-style claim while continuing to price at demand-deposit rates — does not depend on his prescription being right-sized. It’s an observation about the instrument, not the parameter set. Yevhen’s snapshot showing 98.06% utilization with ~$35M available liquidity is better than 99.87%, but it is not a return to the pre-event state; it’s a pool still trading meaningfully inside the stress regime. Suppliers at current APRs are still under-compensated for the maturity-risk component of what they now hold, and sophisticated allocators will continue to quietly rotate out of that mispricing whether or not the pool is technically “pinned.” This is the slow version of the same drain Gordon flagged in its fast version.

Where JosueMpia’s confidence argument has more force than it’s being given. “Rebuilding confidence” is not sentimental — in a lending protocol, depositor confidence is the product. But confidence has two distinct failure modes, and they pull in opposite directions:

  1. Cascade-induced failure — rate shock triggers liquidations of leveraged positions, which degrades collateral, which produces further liquidations. This is what the post is rightly worried about.

  2. Attrition-induced failure — the instrument is mispriced for its current risk characteristics, sophisticated supply leaves first, less sophisticated supply inherits a worse pool, and the base compounds negative selection over weeks rather than hours.

Only optimizing against (1) produces (2). Only optimizing against (2) produces (1). The actual objective is to find a path that doesn’t trigger either, and that path is narrower than “do nothing” and narrower than “S2=50%.”

Where Yevhen’s data becomes the binding constraint. The single most important finding in this thread is not Gordon’s clearing-rate estimate or JosueMpia’s cascade concern — it’s that one address carries ~98% of 30-day material debt-at-risk under the interim scenario. A $60M position with a $749k debt headroom to HF=1 is not a population to be optimized over; it’s a single point of failure whose liquidation mechanics would themselves damage the collateral pool most other borrowers depend on. This reframes the problem. We are not designing an interest rate curve; we are designing a curve subject to a hard constraint that one specific account’s days-to-liquidation must stay above the window in which replacement supply can realistically arrive.

Gordon’s retraction in post #7 implicitly accepts this — “the liquidation points are much lower than I initially expected” is exactly the right reading of Yevhen’s table, and it matters that the author of the proposal updated on the evidence within hours. That is healthy governance, not weakness.

The cost-value framing, stated cleanly.

Path Supply-side cost (attrition) Borrower-side cost (cascade) Demonstrated governance posture
Hold current parameters High and compounding; the mispricing is the cost ~$0.9M 30d material debt-at-risk under observed APR Reactive, defers to time
Gordon’s target (S2=50%, U*=85%) Resolved fast via supply attraction $70.1M 30d debt-at-risk under pinned stress; 1 account enters 7d liquidation window Decisive but over-weights one failure mode
Gordon’s interim (S2=40%, U*=87%) Resolved but slower $61.3M 30d debt-at-risk concentrated in 3 accounts Still weighted toward supply side
Graduated intermediate (roughly S2=20–25%, modest U* tightening) Partial re-pricing; signals direction without solving it Materially below interim’s $61M, by construction of the curve Explicitly tension-holding
Do nothing + wait Compounds indefinitely None incremental Reads as paralysis externally

The intermediate path does not “clear the market” in Gordon’s sense. It does not need to. It needs to accomplish two things simultaneously: (a) re-price the maturity component enough that the attrition rate slows and the signal to sophisticated suppliers inverts, and (b) stay strictly inside the envelope where Yevhen’s most-exposed accounts retain a workable deleveraging window. Those are achievable jointly; they are not achievable at S2=50%.

On the protocol-sustainability frame. For a lending protocol, durable revenue is a function of a renewing supply base and a solvent borrower base. These aren’t in opposition in normal regimes; they are right now. The question “what maximizes sustainable revenue” under this constraint is neither “maximize clearing speed” nor “minimize parameter movement.” It’s “find the smallest parameter change that reverses the attrition sign while keeping every material account outside the 14-day liquidation window.” That is a well-posed optimization problem, and LlamaRisk has the data to solve it.

What I’d suggest from here.

  1. Drop the 40%/50% target for now — Gordon has effectively done so; the thread should acknowledge that and move on rather than re-litigate.

  2. Commission a liquidation-aware parameter proposal from LlamaRisk specifically anchored to Yevhen’s top-30 vulnerable accounts, with the hard constraint that no material account’s days-to-liquidation falls below ~21 days under the proposed curve.

  3. Treat the single-name concentration as its own workstream — a $60M single-address exposure with 1.25% headroom is a systemic dependency that no interest-rate path fixes; it deserves direct engagement (position unwinding support, bespoke risk parameters, or collateral review) independent of the curve discussion.

  4. Keep the Slope 2 Risk Oracle paused for USDC during this period — Gordon’s operational argument on this is independent of his rate-level argument and holds on its own.

The proposal as originally specified shouldn’t pass. The diagnosis behind it shouldn’t be abandoned. Those are not contradictory positions, and I think the most productive version of this thread is one that holds both.

-- Robby Greenfield | Tokédex.org

I came up with a better proposal in just two seconds. According to DefiLlama, Circle earns around $50 million per week. So why wouldn’t you want to help the Aave protocol and DeFi users?

For avoidance of doubt, Risk Oracles were sunset, and Risk Steward keys were immediately rotated to Aave Labs and LlamaRisk with the announcement of our departure 2 weeks ago. As such, Chaos Labs is not permissioned to act on behalf of the Aave protocol, and all risk operations on Aave are manual, and only those two parties can act on behalf of the protocol.

Thanks to Gordon for a carefully argued proposal and for the explicit invitation for Chaos input on the Slope 2 Risk Oracle. We agree that the proposed recommendation makes sense under normal conditions, where a rate increase effectively incentivizes borrowers to reduce their positions. Given the specific cause of the current USDC utilization rate, however, we think that the above approach introduces second-order risks on the protocol that could cause undue harm to USDC usage and demand on Aave.

Reacting to a Black Swan event

While the proposal’s reasoning holds under normal market behavior, the assumptions it rests on are less reliable during a crisis event like the one currently unfolding on Aave.

The standard IRM framework was designed for organic supply/demand fluctuations. In a black swan event like this, the priority should be containment and preventing losses from propagating into markets that are fundamentally healthy.

The WETH market on Aave is currently at 100% utilization. WETH suppliers cannot withdraw, and as such, their natural response is to borrow stablecoins against their frozen WETH collateral as a synthetic exit. This is not organic USDC demand that a rate signal can reprice; these borrowers are more rate-insensitive than the other market participants, and they currently represent a meaningful and growing portion of the market.

Additionally, the USDC suppliers on the market are largely rate agnostic because of the uncertainty of protocol solvency, driving withdrawals of the newly freed up liquidity in the market.

The priority of Aave and its partners at this time should be to minimize potential losses to depositors, in accordance with protocol size contraction. Increasing the borrow rate of any “synthetic exit” assets is not the way to do it.

Slope 2 Risk Oracle

The post recommends pausing or flooring the Slope 2 Risk Oracle for USDC during this incident. We want to clarify that the Risk Oracle has already been deactivated as part of our orderly offboarding from Aave, which was completed on April 6. The oracle is no longer operational, and its access to the market parameters has been revoked as well.

Rate parameter management now falls entirely under LlamaRisk’s scope through the Manual Risk Steward. It is worth noting that the interim parameter changes proposed in this ARFC, specifically a 30% increase to Slope 2 and a 5% change to UOptimal in a single action, exceed the bounds of what the Risk Steward mechanism is designed to execute in a single step, which is 20% Slope 2 and 3% UOptimal, respectively.

Ensuring a safe market for USDC depositors

The proposal’s core thesis is that steepening Slope 2 will attract new supply capital at elevated rates, pushing utilization back below the kink and restoring normal market function. We think this thesis is unlikely to hold under current conditions and that the recalibration would produce three compounding negative effects.

It would concentrate the borrower base into non-liquidatable WETH collateral. If the rate increase clears some borrowers, the freed liquidity will be swiftly withdrawn, and the borrowers who remain will disproportionately be those borrowing USDC against WETH collateral.

These positions are borrowing stablecoins solely to exit the market while their WETH collateral is fully utilized, making them the least rate-sensitive portion of the market. WETH collateral on Core is at 100% utilization and cannot be efficiently liquidated: if a liquidator calls liquidationCall on a WETH-collateralized USDC position, they need to receive WETH as seized collateral but cannot withdraw it from the pool. The liquidator inherits the same trapped position, making liquidation highly unappealing.

The USDC market would end up with a concentrated borrower base whose collateral is effectively non-liquidatable under current conditions. This creates a compounding effect: raising the USDC borrow rate pushes these positions closer to liquidation, and bad debt on the USDC reserve begins to accrue.

A market currently among the safest on the protocol would accumulate bad debt risk entirely because the rate recalibration pushes out healthy borrowers, leaving only structurally illiquid ones.

It would accelerate outflows rather than stabilize the pool. If new supply temporarily frees up USDC liquidity, the immediate beneficiaries are users queued for withdrawal, since existing USDC suppliers are highly likely rate-agnostic given the market uncertainty. Locked suppliers would withdraw as soon as liquidity appears, absorbing incoming capital. The pool would briefly dip below 100% utilization, trigger a wave of exits, and re-pin. For supply attraction to durably restore the pool, incoming capital would need to exceed withdrawal demand (currently unquantifiable) and new suppliers would need to be willing to sit in a pool that could re-pin at any moment.

It would inflict real damage on existing borrowers and correlated markets. Current borrow rates are already causing significant stress. Strategies involving yield-bearing stablecoins (in particular sUSDe) are deeply unprofitable in the current rate environment, where those assets are consequently experiencing pricing pressure. Pushing variable borrow rates toward 40–50% would intensify this dynamic considerably. Users holding sUSDe or similar yield-bearing collateral against USDC debt would face forced unwinds at distressed prices. The borrowers most likely to be pushed into unwinding are not the trapped-liquidity extractors, but the ordinary DeFi positions that were otherwise healthy, now caught in a cross-fire. These projects suffering heavy losses will likely result in less structural demand for USDC debt going forward.

USDC presents minimal solvency risk as a collateral asset. USDC on Core is overwhelmingly a borrowed asset rather than a collateral asset, so USDC collateral positions are not being liquidated in any meaningful volume. The pool does not require meaningful available liquidity to remain solvent. Unlike WETH, where liquidity is necessary for liquidators to seize and exit collateral to avoid bad debt, USDC liquidity is a convenience for suppliers.

In summary, while the current illiquidity is frustrating for depositors, it does not create a solvency exposure that warrants emergency rate intervention with the second-order risks described above.

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I’m writing as an affected USDC borrower on Aave V3 Ethereum Core. My position was opened under normal market conditions and is not related to rsETH, looping, or any activity that caused the April 18 incident. This notice is intended to raise concerns that should be addressed before the DAO votes on the proposed Slope 2 changes.

Summary of concerns

  1. Asymmetric treatment of affected users. On April 20, the DAO lowered WETH borrow rates (Slope 2 → 3%) to protect looper positions against cascade liquidations. The current proposal would raise USDC Slope 2 to 40–50%, forcing the cost of the rsETH incident onto a group of users (USDC borrowers) who had no role in the incident, received no benefit from the rsETH listing, and took no leveraged positions. Protecting one group of users while imposing losses on another unrelated group — within the same incident — is not equitable risk management. It is selective loss allocation.

  2. Misallocation of liability. The source of the bad debt is:

    • KelpDAO’s 1-of-1 DVN bridge configuration (negligent design)

    • LayerZero’s documented default configuration recommendation

    • Aave’s onboarding process, which listed rsETH at 95% LTV without auditing the bridge infrastructure supporting the asset USDC borrowers are none of the above. Shifting the cost to them via Slope 2 inverts the natural hierarchy of responsibility.

  3. Legal exposure. The pending class action against Circle (Gibbs Mura, U.S. District Court, Massachusetts, filed April 14, 2026) establishes that courts are now willing to examine whether crypto-financial infrastructure providers can be held liable for knowing actions or inactions that cause user harm. Key elements of that claim — identifiable duty, capability to act, inconsistent application of authority — map directly onto the asymmetric WETH/USDC treatment described above.

  4. Notice of potential liability. This post is intended to place the DAO, Aave Labs, service providers (LlamaRisk), and delegates on formal notice that the proposed action is contested on fairness and legal grounds. If the proposal is adopted without addressing the asymmetry and without a compensation mechanism for affected USDC borrowers, any subsequent decision operates as knowing action after notice — a materially stronger cause of action than baseline negligence under tort doctrine.

What would resolve this

Any of the following, in combination or alone, would address the core issue:

  • Symmetric rate adjustment: if Slope 2 is raised on USDC, raise it comparably on WETH. Apply the same “market clearing” logic to both assets.

  • Compensation mechanism: cap USDC borrow APY at historical median (e.g., 10%) during the incident window, or create a rebate facility from the DAO treasury for pre-incident USDC borrowers.

  • Loss allocation to the source: public formal demand to KelpDAO for bad debt coverage, with supply caps and delisting threats as leverage, before cost-shifting to users.

Call to action

I’d ask the forum — particularly LlamaRisk, Aave Labs, and large delegates — to address these concerns before the interim Risk Steward action is executed and before governance ratification proceeds.

I just straight up ask: Is there a regulatory risk if this proposal doesn’t pass?

Aka will you have to freeze the liquidity, because Aave manipulated the rates and violated the “Code is Law”-Mechanisms? Additionally to raiding the Emergency Fund that was supposed to cover these type of scenarios.