LlamaRisk recommends onboarding lisUSD as a borrowable asset with conservative parameters. lisUSD as an over-collateralized stablecoin on BNB Chain with approximately $63M in circulation, backed by $366M in collateral (primarily BNB and slisBNB). Despite aiming to maintain a USD peg, lisUSD has experienced several depegs, including a significant 20% depeg in December 2022 and more recent smaller fluctuations.
The asset maintains about $20M in DEX liquidity, primarily on PancakeSwap, though this liquidity is concentrated with two major providers controlling 99.9% of the main liquidity pool. On security, Lista DAO demonstrates commitment through multiple audits and an Immunefi bug bounty program.
However, several risks remain: governance is centralized with the core team having veto powers and exclusive proposal rights; the admin multisig has notable access control capabilities; there’s minimal legal clarity regarding lisUSD’s status and user rights; and the stablecoin has dependency on BNB price stability. We suggests using Chainlink’s lisUSD/USD price feed for market rate pricing.
Overall, while lisUSD has reasonable fundamentals and liquidity, its governance structure, history of depegs, and concentrated liquidity warrant conservative integration parameters with Aave.
Collateral Risk Assessment (click to expand)
1. Asset Fundamental Characteristics
1.1 Asset
lisUSD is a decentralized, over-collateralized BEP-20 stablecoin pegged to the US Dollar, native to the BNB Chain. It was initially launched as $HAY on August 10, 2022, by Helio Protocol and subsequently rebranded as $lisUSD following the project’s evolution into Lista DAO.
lisUSD is backed by two distinct types of collateral:
- Classic Collateral: Comprises relatively low-risk, high-liquidity assets, including BNB, ETH, slisBNB (liquid-staked BNB), wBETH, wstETH, BTCB, USDT, and FDUSD.
- Innovation Zone Collateral: Includes higher-risk, newer, or experimental assets such as mCAKE and solvBTC, each subject to stringent borrow limits and additional risk controls. It is designed to mainly integrate new Liquid Restaking Tokens (LRTs) and Liquid Staking Derivatives (LSDs) such as weETH, solvBTC, and others. Increased innovation zone collateral risk is priced in through decreased LTVs and tighter debt ceilings. For example, BTCB’s debt ceiling is roughly half of BNB’s.
Currently, lisUSD is predominantly backed by BNB and its liquid-staked derivative, slisBNB. As of March 31, 2025, the circulating supply of lisUSD is approximately $63m, with nearly 2/3 of this supply borrowed specifically against BNB and slisBNB combined. The total collateral value backing lisUSD amounts to $366M, indicating that the stablecoin maintains substantial over-collateralization. This level of over-collateralization reduces risk substantially.
1.2 Architecture
lisUSD is issued via a Collateralized Debt Position (CDP) model, where users deposit collateral assets into the CeVault within Lista DAO to mint lisUSD, thereby accessing liquidity. The Minimum Collateralization Ratio (MCR) varies per collateral asset, such as 120% for BNB and 125% for ETH and slisBNB. If the collateral value falls below its MCR, positions are subject to liquidation via Dutch auctions to repay outstanding debts. This ensures system solvency.
To maintain lisUSD’s USD peg, Lista DAO implements multiple stability mechanisms. The Peg Stability Module (PSM) allows users to mint lisUSD from USDT or USDC at a 1:1 ratio, initially without fees unless lisUSD trades at a premium, in which case incremental mint fees may be introduced with fee adjustments made in precise increments of 0.01%. Users can redeem lisUSD back to USDT or USDC subject to daily limits (500,000 lisUSD) and fees (2%) to incentivize market liquidity.
Previously, the borrow rate of lisUSD was manually adjusted to affect the supply and demand of lisUSD, potentially causing delayed or inadequate responses in trying to maintain the peg during certain market events, leading to increased volatility and difficulty maintaining a stable peg. Lista DAO is now implementing a dynamic borrow rate through Algorithmic Market Operations (AMO), which dynamically adjusts lisUSD borrowing rates based on market price, raising rates to reduce supply if the price falls below the peg and lowering rates if the price exceeds the peg. In the docs, it is mentioned as “similar” to Curve Finance’s MonetaryPolicy contracts, which basically works like this:
- When the crvUSD price falls below $1, Borrowing interest rates automatically increase, incentivizing borrowers to repay debt, thus reducing crvUSD supply and driving the price back up toward the peg.
- When the crvUSD price rises above $1, Borrowing rates decrease, encouraging users to borrow more crvUSD, increasing supply, and bringing the price down toward the peg.
Source: Interest Rate Mechanics, Curve Docs
In short, this AMO, similar to crvUSD’s interest rate mechanics, is another mechanism to maintain lisUSD’s peg to USD.
The 1/LTV or MCR (Minimum Collateralization Ratio) differs for each collateral, e.g., BNB 120%, ETH 125%, slisBNB 125%. On top of that, there is a Collateral Debt Limit (amount of lisUSD borrowed against collateral), which is independent of the underlying collateral amount (if it exceeds MCR). For BNB, this is 50M lisUSD; for ETH - 10M lisUSD, creating a theoretical limit on the lisUSD market supply at a time; currently ~125M.
The lisUSD Savings Rate (LSR) provides holders with passive interest, enhancing demand and peg stability. LSR replaces the current Single Staking Pool. LSR provides auto-compounding lisUSD rewards to users staking lisUSD, with the yield sourced from borrow interest within the ecosystem. It is similar to the Dai Savings Rate (DSR), which incentivizes long-term holding and stability of lisUSD.
Direct Deposit Module (D3M) is a mechanism that enables the direct minting of lisUSD by the DAO and deposits lisUSD into DeFi platforms (cannot be freely circulated elsewhere) like Aave and Venus to boost liquidity and optimize market rates. Unlike traditional minting tied to collateralized assets, D3M leverages credit-based minting and does not require collateral backing the lisUSD. By supplying lisUSD to external money markets, Lista DAO can optimize borrow rates across ecosystems and enhance the on-chain liquidity of lisUSD.
1.3 Tokenomics
Lista DAO implements a Collateral Debt Limit for each supported collateral asset, therefore defining the maximum amount of lisUSD that can be borrowed against each specific asset type, for example, 50 million lisUSD for BNB collateral and 20 million lisUSD for slisBNB. These individual asset limits establish a maximum supply of lisUSD, currently capped at approximately 125 million lisUSD.
LISTA is the governance token for Lista DAO. It can be locked into veLISTA. veLISTA holders possess voting rights within Lista’s governance system.
LISTA can be locked for up to 52 weeks. Users that lock LISTA start earning a share of LISTA Community Rewards through LISTA tokens, which incentivizes locking and, therefore, governance participation.
Source: Lista Locker, March 16, 2025
The total veLISTA amount is much higher than the total LISTA locked because the locked LISTA token amount is multiplied by the lock duration to get the veLISTA amount. For example:
- 1 LISTA (Lock 52 weeks) = 52 veLISTA
- 1 LISTA (Lock 20 weeks) = 20 veLISTA
- 1 LISTA (Lock 1 Week) = 1 veLISTA
veLISTA holdings decrease linearly every week. If users do not turn on the auto-locking feature, their veLISTA holdings decrease every Wednesday UTC+0. For example, a user locks 1 LISTA for 52 weeks on Thursday. Next Wednesday，their veLISTA = 1*(52-1) = 51 veLISTA. More information about the veLISTA supply is available in the docs.
1.3.1 Token Holder Concentration
Source: Top 100 lisUSD holders, BscScan, March 31, 2025.
The top 5 holders of lisUSD are:
0x37DB1AE9B24055D1F9fE973Aea40B7EB2995D0Bf, which holds 28.79% of the supply, is the lisUSD Staking Pool.0x0966602E47F6a3CA5692529F1D54EcD1d9B09175, which holds 22.44% of the supply, belongs to Lista DAO.0xb1Da7D2C257c5700612BdE35C8d7187dc80d79f1, which controls 19.82% of the supply, is lisUSD/USDT PancakeSwap pool (which is the top liquidity lisUSD pool in terms of TVL).0xaa57F36DD5Ef2aC471863ec46277f976f272eC0c, which holds 16.2% of the supply, belongs to, Lista DAO and it is most likely a vault, as it has the vaultManager function.0x1b6F2d3844C6ae7D56ceb3C3643b9060ba28FEb0, which holds 2.97% of the supply, belongs to APX and is the ALP pool.
These 5 addresses alone hold more than 90% of the lisUSD supply, suggesting that most lisUSD is not held naked and is used composably within DeFi.
2. Market Risk
2.1 Liquidity
Source: lisUSD Liquidity, LlamaSwap, March 31, 2025.
lisUSD has robust onchain liquidity. There is a 7.5% slippage for buying lisUSD (HAY is the old name before rebranding) with 14.08m USDT.
2.1.1 Liquidity Venue Concentration
Source: lisUSD Liquidity Pools on BSC by Trading Volume, GeckoTerminal, March 31, 2025.
lisUSD DEX liquidity is available on PancakeSwap and THENA. The total lisUSD liquidity across DEXs on the BSC network is approximately $20 million, with most of it held in PancakeSwap pools.
2.1.2 DEX LP Concentration
The primary liquidity hub for lisUSD is the lisUSD/USDT pool on PancakeSwap ($17m liquidity, $14.5m of it in lisUSD), which means around 85% of lisUSD DEX liquidity is concentrated in this liquidity pool.
Source: lisUSD Liquidity Providers on the main PancakeSwap Pool (with $17m liquidity), DeBank, March 31, 2025.
Two addresses contribute 99.9% of the liquidity on this pool. The first address 0x0966602e47f6a3ca5692529f1d54ecd1d9b09175, provides 76%, and this address is probably operated by Lista DAO from the account balance (holds LISTA token), and transaction history with LISTA DAO.
Source: lisUSD Liquidity Providers on the staked PancakeSwap Pool, DeBank, March 31, 2025.
The second address 0xd069a9e50e4ad04592cb00826d312d9f879ebb02 belongs to PancakeSwap and is a staked pool. Having liquidity largely held in two pools decreases redundancy for liquidity.
2.2 Volatility
Source: Historical lisUSD Price Chart, CoinGecko, March 31, 2025.
lisUSD’s price has maintained a correlation with USD—however, multiple instances of lisUSD deviated by more than 1% for a significant period. A maximum depeg of nearly 20% was observed on December 3, 2022. This was a security event of another protocol called Ankr, and Lista DAO was indirectly affected. At that time, the attacker used the hacked aBNBc as collateral and minted Hay (currently known as lisUSD), then swapped all to BUSD, causing the price to depeg. Also, a 3% depeg is documented on December 20, 2023, and April 12, 2024, and multiple smaller, less sustained depegs.
Even in the last month, there have been prolonged periods where lisUSD lost its peg.
Source: lisUSD 1 Month Price Chart, CoinGecko, March 31, 2025.
As previously explained, their PSM, AMO, and other mechanisms are expected to enhance price stability further. Despite this, past depegs are still worth considering nonetheless.
2.3 Exchanges
lisUSD is exclusively traded on DEXs and is not currently listed on any centralized exchange.
2.4 Growth
Source: lisUSD Supply, Dune, March 31, 2025.
The supply trend of lisUSD shows considerable volatility and cyclical behavior. Sudden contractions have followed periods of sharp growth. The total supply has fluctuated significantly between 30 million and 80 million tokens since late 2023. The lisUSD supply is declining from its recent peak, which may suggest decreased borrowing activity/increased repayments.
3. Technological Risk
3.1 Smart Contract Risk
Lista DAO has demonstrated a strong commitment to security by subjecting its smart contracts to multiple external audits.
- CertiK (2022) audit: 1 major, 1 medium, and 4 minor severity vulnerabilities were found. Four minor vulnerabilities were resolved, with 1 major and 1 medium vulnerability unresolved.
- PeckShield (2024), who tested the Multi-Oracles function, with 1 low severity vulnerability found.
- BlockSec (2024) tested the PSM and found 1 medium and 1 low severity vulnerabilities were found. One medium vulnerability was resolved. Acknowledged but not resolved was 1 low vulnerability.
- BlockSec (2024), tested feature: AMO
- 3 medium and 3 low severity vulnerabilities were found. Resolved: 1 medium and 2 low vulnerabilities. Acknowledged but not resolved: 2 medium and 1 low vulnerability.
- BailSec (2024), tested feature: USDT Staking to Pancake
- 2 high and 5 low vulnerabilities were found. Resolved: 2 high and 2 low vulnerabilities. Acknowledged but not resolved: 3 low vulnerabilities.
- Supremacy (2024), tested feature: LISTA Token
- No vulnerabilities were found.
3.2 Bug Bounty Program
An Immunefi Bug Bounty Program, which has been live since June 16, 2022, and updated in Feb 2025, covers smart contract bugs for lisUSD and related contracts, with reward tiers by severity: critical bugs can yield $100k-$1M, high severity up to $10K. Lista could improve the efficacy of this program by increasing the rewards on the lower tiers.
3.3 Price Feed Risk
The Lista DAO protocol itself employs a “Multi-Oracle” system to price collateral. Previously, ListaDAO solely depended on the Binance Oracle, ChainLink Price Feed, RedStone Oracle, and API3 Oracle for price data. Most collateral assets have now switched to the “Resilient Price Oracle,” which uses an algorithm to compare and validate prices from different sources (Main oracle, Pivot oracle, Fallback oracle), ensuring greater accuracy and reliability. The upgraded Oracle infrastructure allows for the real-time addition of new price oracles and offers the flexibility to activate or deactivate oracles for specific tokens as needed. It works as below:
Source: Resilient Price Oracle Flowchart, Lista Docs
Some assets like ETH and WBETH still depend on single price feeds like Chainlink and Binance Oracle, respectively, and are pending transition to the Resilient Oracle, so all collateral assets are gradually transitioning to the Resilient Oracle solution.
lisUSD has a market rate price feed available through Chainlink. This is a robust mechanism to price this asset with, as it should maintain parity with collateral value should another collateral depeg occur. Nevertheless, risks remain from redemption bank runs or protocol hacks, which may result in abnormal liquidation conditions.
Pricing both collaterals for lisUSD and Aave pricing lisUSD is, therefore, a complex operation and one not without risk.
3.4 Dependency Risk
lisUSD and its stability depend primarily on the BNB Chain and its assets (specifically BNB). As an over-collateralized stablecoin heavily backed by BNB, lisUSD is exposed to BNB price risk, as BNB volatility can trigger liquidations. A severe crash in BNB could challenge lisUSD’s stability if collateral ratios become hard to maintain. The protocol’s health thus depends on the overall stability of the BNB Chain ecosystem.
Additionally, lisUSD’s model depends on liquid staking providers: slisBNB, the core collateral, is essentially a liquid staking token. Any issues in BNB’s staking mechanism or validator set, such as slashing events, staking halts, etc., could affect slisBNB’s value and, thereby, lisUSD backing.
4. Counterparty Risk
4.1 Governance and Regulatory Risk
Lista DAO’s native voting portal is on Snapshot, so the vast majority of governance decisions are off-chain, requiring trust in the Lista DAO Core Team to execute on the wishes of the DAO.
Even though the Total veLISTA in the system is 2.89 billion, the number of votes on Snapshot, and therefore governance participation, is relatively low, with the recent proposals getting approximately 20-40 million votes.
Proposals such as modifying fees, adding new collateral, increasing and decreasing collateral rate, and collateral debt cap fall within the scope of governance. However, the Lista DAO Core Team retains veto rights and can take corrective actions to ensure the security and proper functioning of the protocol without a Snapshot poll. Possible actions include pausing relevant smart contracts to fix a critical bug in the protocol and rejecting a successfully added gauge if the token(s) in question are deemed unsafe, malicious, and/or detrimental to Lista’s ecosystem.
The following is the LISTA token distribution:
Source: LISTA token distribution, BscScan, March 31, 2025.
Currently, most of the supply is controlled by LISTA DAO wallets. This is because, upon launch on June 20, 2024, 10% of LISTA’s total token supply was allocated towards Binance Megadrop, 8.5% was allocated towards Lista’s Airdrop campaign, 3.5% was allocated towards ecosystem growth, 1% was allocated towards investors & advisors. So, on the launch day, the total circulating supply of LISTA was 23% (230,000,000 LISTA tokens). The core team and investors hold a large share of LISTA.
Source: LISTA’s token distribution, Lista Docs.
Notable allocations to Investors and advisors (19%) and Team (3.5%), plus DAO Treasury (8%), suggest some centralization, as nearly 30.5% is controlled or influenced by core stakeholders.
Users with any amount of veLISTA can vote on proposals, and their voting power is directly proportional to the amount of veLISTA they hold. However, only Lista DAO Core Team members can submit proposals for voting.
Each proposal’s voting period lasts 3 days. A proposal is approved when it receives support from over 50% of the veLISTA tokens cast in the vote.
Once a proposal is passed, the Lista DAO Core Team promises to implement it within 1 to 2 weeks.
On Snapshot, there have been 17 proposals so far.
The fact that only the Lista DAO Core Team can create proposals, that the Team has veto power, that the voting participation is quite low, and that all governance updates are done off-chain poses concerns about the effectiveness and decentralization of the DAO structure.
Legal & Regulatory Risk
The Legal Disclaimer is exclusively directed to cover the LISTA token and does not include any clauses or references, either direct or indirect, related to lisUSD. Likewise, no Terms of Use or User Agreement delineates the operational parameters of lisUSD or clarifies its users’ respective rights and obligations. One notable deficiency in this regard is the absence of any provision granting users the right to redeem lisUSD or to claim a proportional share of the reserves underpinning the stablecoin. Additionally, the missing eligibility requirements, governing law, and risk disclosures diminish transparency and hinder users from effectively assessing and managing their risk exposure and expectations.
Furthermore, it remains uncertain whether any policy relating to blacklisting or asset restrictions has been instituted. While such a measure is not strictly mandatory, users should be adequately informed if there is a possibility that their stablecoin holdings might be subject to freezing at any point.
Concentrating control over governance parameters in a single authority can make it more straightforward for regulators to identify a specific party they deem responsible, potentially subjecting that entity to additional licensing obligations.
Although over-collateralizing with cryptoassets can create a solvency buffer, it likewise introduces volatility risks. Regulators are inclined to investigate whether this volatility, alongside the characteristics of the collateral—particularly experimental assets with less established liquidity—could undermine the token’s stability and raise systemic or consumer-protection concerns.
Certain collateral tokens, especially those designated within the “Innovation Zone,” may be classified by regulators as securities or unregistered investment tokens, thereby increasing scrutiny of any protocol that uses them for stablecoin issuance. In theory, if authorities imposed enforcement measures against these collateral tokens, the stablecoin’s peg could be adversely affected, though this scenario remains more hypothetical than an immediate risk.
From a consumer-protection standpoint, the existence of a tiered collateral framework (“Classic Collateral” versus an “Innovation Zone”) prompts questions regarding how users are expected to distinguish between what is considered “safe” and what is deemed “experimental.” The absence of clear disclaimers on these matters exacerbates uncertainty, as there is no transparent explanation of the distinctions or the associated risks.
This results in legal uncertainty and, therefore, risk to Aave.
4.2 Access Control Risk
4.2.1 Contract Modification Options
lisUSD has a variety of access control options. These include:
- Increasing supply caps
- Moving lisUSD from one address to another
- Burning lisUSD
- Changing address lisUSD amounts without the address’ signature.
These do not present significant risks to Aave.
4.2.2 Timelock Duration and Function
The admin is a timelock. The duration is 86400 seconds (getMinDelay), which is 1 day.
4.2.3 Multisig Threshold / Signer identity
Currently, the admin is a timelock address (0x07D274a68393E8b8a2CCf19A2ce4Ba3518735253) that is controlled by a multisig. All roles (proposer, cancellor, and executor) are controlled by the same 3/6 multisig. The signers are:
Each address is an EOA.
This presents some risk, but the Team has confirmed that all signers are Lista-aligned entities (DAO, core team, or treasury team). Therefore, the degree of risk this presents is limited due to (temporarily) aligned incentives.
Note: This assessment follows the LLR-Aave Framework, a comprehensive methodology for asset onboarding and parameterization in Aave V3. This framework is continuously updated and available here.
This review was independently prepared by LlamaRisk, a community-led decentralized organization funded in part by the Aave DAO. LlamaRisk is not directly affiliated with the protocol(s) reviewed in this assessment and did not receive any compensation from the protocol(s) or their affiliated entities for this work.
The information provided should not be construed as legal, financial, tax, or professional advice.
