[ARFC] rsETH LTV & LT Update


title: [Risk Stewards] rsETH LTV & LT Update
author: @TokenLogic
created: 2025-03-07


Summary

This publication proposes revising the rsETH LTV & LT to match other LRTs on Aave Protocol.

Motivation

rsETH has demonstrated consistent growth on mainnet both with the Core and Prime market. Expanding its presence to Arb and Base instances is expected to further accelerate its adoption and allow for more competition for wstETH debt.

To promote a level playing field between LRTs, this publication proposes aligning the LTV and LT parameters of rsETH with those of ezETH and weETH.

Kelp DAO is providing a 2x Kernel points bonus to eligible holders of rsETH across Aave Protocol.

Specification

The rsETH LTV & LT across Aave instance is to be amended as outlined below:

rsETH/wstETH E-Modes

Parameter Current Proposed
LTV 92.50% 93.00%
LT 94.50% 95.00%

rsETH is currently listed on Core and Prime, soon Base and Arbitrum.

Disclosure

TokenLogic does not receive any payment for this proposal.

Next Steps

  1. Gather feedback from the community.
  2. Risk Stewards implement the change progressively over two updates, 0.25% each.

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.

Summary

LlamaRisk supports this change in LT & LTV for the emode rsETH/wstETH market on Prime and Core instances. The proposed adjustment increases maximum leverage from 13.33x to 14.29x, providing a more competitive setup than other venues.

On Aave, rsETH is priced using Kelp’s internal exchange rate, Chainlink’s ETH/USD market feed, and a CAPO adapter that protects against rate inflation. This design favors the internal rate over the market rate to avoid liquidation cascades during temporary secondary market depegs. The underlying assets of rsETH are stETH, ETHx, and ETH. Notably, Kelp prices stETH at a 1:1 ratio with ETH.

Our analysis shows that the only significant edge case leading to a price dislocation between rsETH and wstETH would occur if ETHx—comprising roughly 14% of rsETH—experiences extreme depreciation relative to ETH. For instance, our model indicates that a 1% depeg in rsETH would require approximately a 7.14% drop in ETHx, while a meaningful dislocation would necessitate a 35–40% decline. Importantly, any rate depeg scenario would be driven by slashing of ETHx, as slashing of stETH would result in correlated price movements between rsETH and wstETH under emode.

Given the unlikelihood of severe ETHx slashing events—and since heavy liquidations would only occur under such unlikely events—the resulting liquidation volumes are expected to remain well contained within the market liquidity of rsETH/wstETH. Furthermore, the risk from leverage looping is marginal in the worst-case scenario, with the expected increase in exposure remaining below 2.116%.

Detailed Analysis (click to expand)

Analysis

Analysis timestamp: 1741566100

Kelp DAO’s rsETH comprises ETHx, stETH, and native ETH. The composition at the time of analysis is as follows:

Source: Kelp, March 11th, 2025

For the rsETH e-mode category, rsETH is allowed as collateral to back the wstETH borrowings. With more than 60% of stETH, the exchange rate between rsETH/wstETH is inherently strong, which is important for the users under this e-mode category.

Liquidation Risk Analysis: rsETH/wstETH Market Dynamics

The primary liquidation risk vector exists through potential rsETH depegging from wstETH, which fundamentally requires ETHx depreciation (stETH is hardcoded 1:1 ETH peg via Oracle). Given that ETHx comprises ~14% of rsETH’s composition:

  • 1% rsETH depeg ➔ ~7.14% ETHx depreciation required
  • 5% rsETH depeg ➔ ~35.7% ETHx depreciation required

These thresholds imply substantial network slashing events would be needed to trigger meaningful depegging - a historically unprecedented scenario in liquid staking markets.

Price Shock Analysis

Source: LlamaRisk, March 12th, 2025

LT Adjustment Impact (0.945 ➔ 0.95)

  • Requires additional 0.5% rsETH depeg compared to the previous configuration to reach critical collateralization and liquidation levels (~2% and ~5%, respectively)
  • Shifts liquidation threshold from ~36% to 40% ETHx price depreciation
Simulated Liquidation Process

Arbitrage Workflow:

  1. ETH flash loan acquisition
  2. ETH ➔ stETH conversion
  3. stETH ➔ wstETH wrapping
  4. Debt repayment
  5. Collateral seizure (rsETH)
  6. rsETH ➔ ETH swap (critical path)
  7. Flash loan repayment
  8. Profitability verification

Key Bottleneck:
Step 6 (rsETH liquidity) constrains maximum profitable liquidation amounts due to:

  • Rising slippage with larger positions
  • Pool depth limitations

Liquidation Capacity Limits

Source: LlamaRisk, March 12th, 2025

Practical Boundaries:

Metric Threshold
wstETH Debt 1,350-1,400
rsETH Collateral 1,730-1,800
Slippage Tolerance ≤5%

Beyond these limits, price impact erodes liquidation profitability.

Quantitative Validation

Source: LlamaRisk, March 12th, 2025

Sample Swap Impact:

  • Input: 1,800 rsETH ($3,870,000 @ $2,150)
  • Output: ~1,775 ETH ($3,672,750 @ $2,070)
  • Price Impact: 5.058%

Key Findings

Critical liquidations require extreme ETHx depreciation (35-40%), which is unlikely outside catastrophic network failure. The proposed changes introduce modest improvements that do not pose a huge risk surface. Market liquidity inherently constrains maximum liquidation sizes through swap economics and is a bottleneck for high liquidation volumes.

Leverage Loop Risk Analysis: rsETH Collateralization Impact

We analyze the systemic risk of maximum leverage utilization under different Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratios, considering a supply cap of 400,000 rsETH ($860M at $2,150/rsETH). The strategy involves:

  1. Using rsETH as collateral to borrow wstETH
  2. Converting borrowed wstETH back to rsETH
  3. Repeating this process until reaching supply cap limits

1. Base Case Calculation (Original LTV)
Objective: Determine initial collateral required to reach the supply cap through 10x leverage loops

image

Solving for initial collateral:
image

2. Proposed LTV Impact Analysis
Using same initial collateral ($119,135,574) with new LTV:

image

Result:

  • Potential exposure increases to ~$878,200,000
  • Demonstrates protocol’s increased vulnerability surface

3. Risk Exposure Delta
image

Key Findings

The proposed LTV configuration introduces a 2.12% increase in maximum potential exposure under stressed conditions.

Disclaimer

This review was independently prepared by LlamaRisk, a community-led decentralized organization funded in part by the Aave DAO. LlamaRisk is not directly affiliated with the protocol(s) reviewed in this assessment and did not receive any compensation from the protocol(s) or their affiliated entities for this work.

The information provided should not be construed as legal, financial, tax, or professional advice.

Summary

Chaos Labs supports the proposal to increase rsETH’s LT and LTV in Aave V3 Core and Prime Instance’s E-Mode.

Motivation

rsETH is currently configured with an LTV of 92.5% and an LT of 94.5% in the E-Mode for both the Ethereum Core and Prime Instances.

As a Liquid Restaking asset, rsETH carries a more more significant set of underlying risks compared to LSTs, such as its additional duration risk derived by the longer withdraw time from Eigenlayer staking, the combination of the counterparty and slashing risk of all the backing assets, which in rsETH’s case are wstETH and ETHx, and slashing events from AVS validation.

However, based on our assessment of its volatility, liquidity, and supply distribution, we believe an increase in its LTV and LT within E-Mode is justified, enabling users to enhance their capital efficiency.

Volatility

Over the past three months, the deviation between rsETH’s market rate and its internal exchange rate has suffered fluctuations. As shown in the chart, the largest observed deviation has been 102 bps, which, while fairly significant is sufficent to support the proposed change. Additionally, when deviations occurred, rsETH demonstrated a strong ability to mean-revert quickly back to its internal exchange rate.

Liquidity

The liquidity of rsETH has seen a slight decline over the past three months but has generally remained stable. Currently, selling 2K rsETH for USDC incurs less than 3% price slippage.

Supply Distribution

The supply of rsETH on Ethereum Core Instance is well distributed. Among the top 10 suppliers, all except two are borrowing wstETH or WETH, both of which are highly correlated with rsETH. Of the remaining two positions, one has no borrowing activity, while the other maintains a high health score above 9.

The largest borrowed asset against rsETH is wstETH, accounting for 98.42% of the total distribution, significantly reducing the likelihood of large-scale liquidations.

The supply distribution of rsETH on the Ethereum Prime Instance appears highly concentrated in a single position. However, this position belongs to a CIAN rsETH/ETHx leverage vault, which employs a looping strategy using wstETH as the borrowed asset. Since CIAN vaults are managed as a single position but represented by multiple suppliers, the apparent concentration is a structural characteristic rather than an actual risk. Furthermore, because the vault exclusively borrows wstETH, which is highly correlated with rsETH, the liquidation risk remains minimal.

Specification

Given these observations, we recommend increasing rsETH’s LTV and LT in E-Mode for both the Ethereum Prime and Core Instances.

Asset Chain Market Current LTV Recommended LTV Current LT Recommended LT
rsETH Ethereum Main E-Mode 92.5% 93% 94.5% 95%
rsETH Ethereum Prime E-Mode 92.5% 93% 94.5% 95%

Next Steps

We invite a community discussion around the proposed parameter updates and, barring community objection, will follow up with a Snapshot vote in five days.

Disclaimer

Chaos Labs has not been compensated by any third party for publishing this ARFC.

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0