I’d like to raise a design-level question regarding the interaction between reserve factor extraction and bad debt (deficit) coverage in Aave v3 / v3.3.
Currently, the treasury extracts the reserve factor from all accrued interest at the reserve level. When bad debt is later recognized and eliminated via Umbrella, aTokens are burned from stakers, while prior treasury extraction is not adjusted.
At an aggregate level, this results in a distributional outcome where:
Treasury retains fees extracted from interest accrued on positions that later generate bad debt
Umbrella stakers absorb 100% of deficit elimination
This is not presented as a bug or security issue. All mechanisms appear to operate as specified. The question is whether this distributional outcome is an explicit design choice, and whether it is documented for Umbrella participants.
I’m interested in the community’s perspective on:
Whether this trade-off was intentionally chosen
Whether it has been discussed previously
Whether explicit acknowledgment or documentation would be beneficial
I have a more detailed accounting analysis available and am happy to share it if useful.
Hello @abdulwahed !!
According to the official Aave documentation:
“The system includes crucial deficit offset mechanisms that provide first-loss protection. For example, USDT staking has a 100,000 USDT offset, meaning the Aave DAO covers the first 100,000 USDT of bad debt before any staker assets are affected.”
So Umbrella stakers don’t absorb 100% of the deficit as stated in your post. The DAO provides first-loss protection through the deficit offset mechanism, and only amounts exceeding this threshold are covered by staker slashing.
Hello @abdulwahed. Some points to hopefully clarify more the rationale of the design choices:
The Reserve Factor mechanic (fees to the treasury as a percentage of borrowed interest) is technically totally independent from Umbrella, and kind of totally also from deficit dynamics in the Aave pool. On the second, not totally because the deficit’s existence influences the supply rate (it is accounted for in the utilisation calculation).
This is a design decision, because to take into account some historic treasury fees versus slashing of Umbrella staker afterwards would be a very complicated mechanism, without too much benefit.
With the previous said, it is important to take into account that Umbrella has a mechanism called deficit offset. The offset is, in simple terms, a threshold X (e.g., 100’000 USDC) of deficit accrued, to not be covered by slashing of stakers, but by the DAO treasury.
In practice, that means that while the treasury is healthy and the deficit is minor (partially by accruing fees via Reserve Factor, but also other mechanics), the DAO can decide to cover deficit offsets again and again, that way protecting stakers from minor slashing, and making the Umbrella coverage more and more solid over time.
Technical Assessment: Aave v3.3 Reserve Factor and Deficit Mechanics
The Aave v3.3 architecture separates fee extraction from deficit absorption by design. Reserve factor extraction occurs continuously as interest accrues to the reserve—this is a real-time operation that compounds into the treasury independent of ultimate debt repayment. When bad debt materializes (a position liquidated with insufficient collateral), the remaining debt is burned and recorded as a reserve deficit, which Umbrella stakers eliminate by burning aTokens.
These are intentionally distinct accounting flows: fee accrual is forward-looking and continuous, while deficit recognition is retrospective and discrete. The system does not attribute accrued interest back to specific positions or implement clawback mechanisms on previously extracted fees.
This creates a documented temporal asymmetry: the treasury captures reserve factor on all interest during a position’s lifetime, including interest from positions that ultimately generate deficits absorbed by Umbrella stakers. However, the Umbrella architecture partially addresses this through the Deficit Offset mechanism, where the DAO provides first-loss coverage funded by protocol revenues (including reserve factor accumulations). Per LlamaRisk’s analysis, this offset layer means stakers are explicitly “not the first-loss protection layer”—DAO-funded reserves absorb initial deficits before staker slashing occurs.
Reserve Factor: Extracted continuously on accrued interest; no per-position attribution or clawback on bad debt events
Design Intent: The separation between fee extraction and deficit coverage appears intentional; architectural alternatives (e.g., deferred vesting, treasury Umbrella participation) exist but were not implemented in v3.3