Hubs & Spokes in Aave V4: A Risk-Centric Analysis

The composability of Aave V4 architecture represents a shift in how lending protocols can be structured. By introducing multiple primitives and more flexible parameter differentiation, the protocol moves away from a rigid, singular deployment model toward a modular Hub & Spoke design. This architecture allows for a variety of configurations, each presenting distinct trade-offs regarding capital efficiency, risk isolation, and systemic complexity.

At LlamaRisk, we have analyzed the potential configurations that this flexible infrastructure enables. The objective of this analysis is not to predict the final implementation of Aave V4 but to map the theoretical design space available to the protocol. This ensures that governance participants and stakeholders understand the implications of how liquidity, risk, and asset integration can be organized. The following sections detail four unique architectural model choices, the strategic role of Hub-to-Spoke credit lines, and the expansion of the modularity through generalized utility spokes.

The Fundamental Shift: From Monolithic to Modular

In previous iterations of the protocol, liquidity was pooled into a single pool or a strictly disjoint set of pools (different instances on the same chain). While this maximized liquidity depth, it also meant that the entire protocol shared a unified risk profile. If a single asset within the pool experienced a catastrophic failure, the contagion could theoretically affect all stablecoin depositors. The V4 architecture introduces the concept of a “Hub”—a liquidity container—and “Spokes”—functional modules that interact with that liquidity.

This separation allows for the creation of multiple Hubs, each governed by different risk parameters, operated by different entities, or dedicated to specific asset classes. The core question for protocol architects and governance is how to arrange Hubs, Spokes, and Credit Lines to balance the competing needs of safety, growth, and efficiency.

Model A: The Monolithic Hub (Enhanced V3 Model)

The first and most familiar model is the Monolithic Hub. In this configuration, the protocol maintains a single, primary Hub where the vast majority of protocol liquidity and assets reside. All functional Spokes draw from this unified pool, either directly or by tapping into the liquidity via Credit Lines. This model is essentially an evolution of the Aave V3 paradigm but rebuilt on the V4 infrastructure.


Note: Specific assets/issuers are mentioned for illustrative purposes only.

From a liquidity perspective, Model A offers the highest degree of efficiency. By pooling all assets into a centralized Hub, the protocol avoids fragmentation. Borrowers can access the full range of strategies, which tends to stabilize interest rates and reduce utilization spikes. For lenders, a unified pool generally offers the most consistent yield generation, as capital is not stranded in underutilized pockets of the system.

However, the primary drawback of the Monolithic Hub is the concentration of risk. Because all assets coexist within the same liquidity bucket, there is no structural isolation. If a long-tail asset listed in the Monolithic Hub were to suffer a critical exploit or a total collapse in value that exceeded risk parameters, the solvency of the entire pool could be threatened. In this model, Umbrella—the protocol’s safety module—must cover the entire system. This necessitates a conservative approach to asset listing and draw caps setup. To protect the collective liquidity and make all assets share a similar risk profile, governance must reject assets that introduce excessive volatility or centralization risk, effectively restricting the protocol’s ability to service newer, more experimental markets that may have higher demand but an unjustifiable risk profile.

Nonetheless, additional levers arrive with Aave v4 to introduce better risk differentiation:

  • Risk Premium, which ensures that higher-risk strategies bring incremental revenues to the LPs, boosting overall attractiveness of deposits and potentially even subsidizing the low-margin nature of bluechip asset- related borrowing strategies;
  • Credit Lines, which enable any isolated Hub to subsidize other non-connected Spokes to tap into the liquidity, specifically necessary during the bootstrapping phase of new markets and strategies. This allows a temporary, strictly defined liquidity allocation in cases where asset listing on the Main Hub would not be justifiable from the risk perspective.

Model B: Risk-Profiled Hubs (Segregation by Risk-Return)

Model B represents a reimagination of the protocol, shifting it closer to a platform of distinct credit funds. In this arrangement, the protocol is divided into multiple, distinct Hubs, each catering to a specific risk profile. For example, the system could feature a Low-Risk Hub focused on bluechip assets tranches, a High-Yield Hub accepting slightly riskier borrowing strategies, and a High-Risk Hub designed for volatile or emerging assets that are of the highest risk.


Note: Specific assets/issuers are mentioned for illustrative purposes only.

The defining characteristic of this model is risk isolation. Each Hub operates with its own independent liquidity and, crucially, potentially its own dedicated Umbrella module. A catastrophic failure in the High-Risk Hub would have no direct financial impact on the liquidity or safety of the Low-Risk Hub. This separation allows users to self-select their risk exposure. A risk-averse depositor can supply liquidity solely to the Low-Yield Hub, confident that their funds are not exposed to the volatility of speculative assets.

This model allows for targeted parameterization. Risk managers can tailor collateral efficiency parameters and interest rate curves specifically for the risk profile of each Hub. However, this segregation comes at the cost of liquidity fragmentation. Splitting liquidity into multiple distinct pools results in shallower markets for each. This can lead to increased interest rate volatility and reduced capital efficiency compared to the monolithic model. Furthermore, the viability of the Umbrella becomes a challenge for higher-risk Hubs. While a Low-Yield Hub acts similarly to the current Umbrella module for the V3’s Core market, attracting stakers to backstop a High-Risk Hub would likely require extremely high premiums, potentially making the economics of such a Hub unsustainable.

In order to solve the liquidity bootstrapping problem, a waterfall of credit lines could be created, each strictly limiting the maximal possible exposure to lower tranches. That way, even if liquidity of the Low-Risk Hub indirectly flows to the High-Risk Hub, the bad debt risk is exponentially smaller, covered by the Umbrella module of the intermediate risk tranche.

Model C: Asset-Centric Hubs (Segregation by Asset Profile)

Taking the concept of segregation further, Model C organizes Hubs not by risk level but by asset category or ecosystem. This model foresees highly specialized Hubs, each dedicated to a specific asset type or strategy, such as RWAs, specific stablecoin ecosystems (like an Ethena Hub), or LSTs. Each Hub functions as a standalone market with its own liquidity and potentially its own (or shared) Umbrella module. Effectively, it is a more granularly split representation of Aave’s current ecosystem, together with a Prime market instance targeting ETH-correlated borrows, the Horizon instance targeting RWAs, and other white-label instances focusing on a small subset of asset types.


Note: Specific assets/issuers are mentioned for illustrative purposes only.

The primary advantage of Asset-Centric Hubs is the ability to facilitate permissionless innovation and ecosystem integration. New asset types can be onboarded rapidly within their own isolated environments without requiring a risk reassessment for the entire protocol. This can foster a deeper partnership approach, allowing external protocols to have a dedicated, Aave-powered credit market for their assets. It allows the protocol to serve as infrastructure for distinct financial ecosystems without exposing one central Hub to their idiosyncratic risks.

However, Model C suffers from “Null Internal Diversification.” Within a Hub dedicated to a single asset class or protocol, risk is highly concentrated. For instance, in a Hub dedicated entirely to a specific stablecoin ecosystem, a de-peg event would likely wipe out the entire Hub, as all collateral and borrow demand are correlated. Additionally, capitalizing an Umbrella for a single-asset Hub is exceptionally difficult. Backstopping such a Hub effectively needs an isolated risk perception of that specific asset class, which may also demand high risk premiums, hence higher borrow rates. Creation of shared Umbrella modules for multiple Hubs would be possible with the assumption that the risk profile would be balanced between the covered Hubs. Finally, a proliferation of asset-specific Hubs creates complexity for the user experience, requiring lenders to perform due diligence on dozens of individual Hubs rather than a single central liquidity Hub.

Model D: The Hybrid Model

The models described above are not mutually exclusive and can be constructed in conjunction. For example, Model D proposes a hybrid approach that combines the stability of a monolithic core with the flexibility of isolated, satellite spokes. In this configuration, the protocol maintains a primary Main (Low-Risk) Hub (similar to Models A & B) focused on top-tier, blue-chip assets with the highest liquidity and security. This serves as the foundation of the protocol.


Note: Specific assets/issuers are mentioned for illustrative purposes only.

Alongside this core, the architecture enables the creation of specialized satellite Hubs. These function as sandboxed environments for specific ecosystem integrations or assets with unique risk profiles. This structure preserves the benefits of a unified protocol—deep liquidity for major assets—while allowing for expansion into new markets without compromising the solvency of the main pool.

The interaction between these layers is key. The Main Hub can act as a senior lender, cautiously extending credit lines to select satellite Spokes connected to separate Hubs. This allows the Main Hub to generate additional yield while maintaining a conservative primary risk profile, effectively separating the stable core from the higher-than-benchmark risk exposure, albeit at a cost of higher liquidity fragmentation. However, this model may ultimately result in higher complexity and a worse user experience due to the mixing of completely isolated and interdependent Hubs.

Comparative Analysis of Architectural Models

To synthesize the trade-offs inherent in these designs, the following comparison highlights how each model performs across key dimensions of risk and efficiency.

Dimension Model A: Monolithic Hub Model B: Risk-Profiled Hubs Model C: Asset-Centric Hubs Model D: Hybrid Model
Liquidity Depth Maximum. A nified pool ensures deep markets and stable rates. Moderate. Liquidity is split across yield tiers, resulting in shallower markets. Low. Highly fragmented into isolated asset pools. Moderate. Maintains a deep core while allowing fragmentation at the edges.
Risk Isolation Moderate. Contagion can affect all LPs, albeit risk is contained via careful parameterization. High. Failure in a High-Risk Hub does not impact the Low-Risk Hub. High. Risk is contained entirely within the specific asset ecosystem. Balanced. Core is protected from Satellites; Satellites are isolated from each other.
Capital Efficiency High. Assets are fully fungible, and utilization is maximized. Medium. Fragmentation may lead to idle capital in specific tiers. Low. Capital is trapped in specific silos and cannot cross-pollinate. Medium. Core ensures efficiency, while satellites allow for targeted capital deployment.
Asset Listing Scale Slow. Conservative listing process creates a bottleneck. Medium. Easier to onboard assets to risky tiers, but still categorized. Fast. Isolated creation of hubs for any asset class. Fast. Satellites allow for rapid experimentation without putting the core at risk.
User Experience Simple. One pool, one set of rates. Moderate. Users must choose their risk tolerance/hub. Complex. Users must navigate many distinct Hubs. Complex. Users must understand the distinction between Standard and Satellite Hubs.

The Strategic Role of Inter-Hub Credit Lines

A novel feature of the V4 architecture is the ability to establish credit lines between Hubs. This mechanism allows liquidity to flow from a parent Hub to a Spoke of a secondary Hub, introducing new possibilities for surgical risk management and capital allocation. The rationale for these credit lines generally falls into three categories: liquidity bootstrapping, spoke stabilization, and yield enhancement.

Liquidity Bootstrapping

When a new, specialized Hub is launched—for example, a Hub dedicated to a new asset type—it faces a “cold start” problem, exactly like any new instance on Aave V3. Without existing liquidity, there is no utility for borrowers; without borrow demand, there is no yield for lenders. A credit line from the Main Hub allows the new Spoke to draw initial liquidity to service early borrow demand. This kickstarts the market, allowing the Spoke to function immediately while it works to attract organic deposits.

However, this introduces a core challenge: if the Main Hub provides cheap, abundant liquidity, there is little incentive for the new Hub to build its own deposit base. Users and integrators may simply rely on the credit line. To mitigate this, risk premiums must be applied. The borrowing cost from the Main Hub’s credit line should logically be set higher than the new Hub’s native borrowing rate (e.g., Main Hub Cost + 2%). This pricing structure incentivizes borrowers to prioritize borrowing directly from the new Hub to capture better yields, eventually rendering the credit line a secondary, rather than primary, source of capital.

Spoke Stabilization

Markets are rarely static, and smaller, specialized Hubs may face periods of significant withdrawal pressure or transient utilization volatility. In such scenarios, a credit line from a parent Hub can act as a stabilizer. If a specific Hub experiences a liquidity crunch, the credit line provides an immediate source of deeper liquidity, allowing it to retain users instead of unwinding or migrating positions. This function is analogous to a “lender of last resort” mechanism within the protocol’s own internal economy.

Yield Enhancement and Risk Transfer

For the Main Hub, extending credit lines serves as a method of yield enhancement. By lending to a higher-risk environment, the senior Hub can capture a risk premium. Ideally, these loans are structured as “Senior Debt.” This means the credit line should be subject to more restrictive parameters than native borrowing within the Spoke, enforced by tightly defined draw caps of the credit line. In the event of a shortfall, the Main Hub’s capital would theoretically be better protected than the Spoke’s native, higher-risk deposits, especially if an Umbrella module covering the riskier Hub exists and can act as a layer of junior defense.

Conflict of Interest and Risk Alteration

Despite the utility, extending credit lines introduces a conflict between the protocol’s stability goals and user expectations. When a conservative Hub lends to a risky Spoke, it alters its own risk profile. Depositors in the Main Hub become indirectly exposed to the assets in the riskier satellite Hub. Even if the credit line is small relative to the total pool, this transmission of risk must be carefully managed. Transparency is critical; users must understand that their exposure is not limited to the assets in their specific Hub but extends to the counterparties (other Hubs) that their Hub lends to.

Expanding the Ecosystem: Generalized Spokes

Beyond the organization of liquidity into Hubs, the modular nature of the architecture allows for the generalization of Spokes. A Spoke is not merely a connection point for borrowers; it is any module that interacts with the liquidity layer. This flexibility allows for the integration of diverse functionalities that were previously difficult or impossible to implement directly on the core protocol.

The Umbrella Spoke

The Umbrella module itself would be implemented as a Spoke. This allows for flexibility in how coverage is applied. As noted in the analysis of different models, the Umbrella can be configured to cover a single Hub, a specific set of Hubs, or the entire network. This modularity is essential for the Model B and Model C configurations, where risk profiles vary drastically. The Umbrella Spoke defines the conditions under which safety funds are slashed and used to recapitalize a Hub, allowing for distinct insurance markets to develop around distinct risk pools.

GHO Direct Minting Spoke

The protocol’s native stablecoin, GHO, can be integrated via a dedicated Direct Minting Spoke. In previous iterations, stablecoin minting was often tied to specific facilitators. A dedicated Spoke allows the protocol to control GHO minting capacity and parameters directly at the architectural level. This Spoke can interact with specific Hubs to allow users to mint GHO against their collateral with greater efficiency, or it can serve as a facilitator that manages the supply based on the algorithmic market state.

Vaults Spoke: Segregated Collateral

One of the most significant additions for institutional adoption is the Vaults Spoke. Traditional DeFi lending usually relies on pooled collateral—User A’s WBTC sits in the same contract as User B’s ETH. While efficient, this creates regulatory and custodial challenges for institutional actors who require asset segregation.

A Vaults Spoke allows for the creation of isolated positions where collateral is not commingled with the general pool. Instead, the collateral is held in a segregated vault, yet the user can still borrow against it by accessing the protocol’s liquidity. This structure satisfies the strict custody and bankruptcy-remoteness requirements of many institutional investors and CeFi services. In essence, this would mean enforcing and facilitating individual borrowing conditions for such actors in order to maximize the protocol’s revenue.

Debt Trading Spoke

The architecture supports the creation of a Debt Trading Spoke, conceptually similar to mechanisms seen in protocols like Fluid. In a typical lending market, a borrower who wishes to exit a position must repay the debt. A Debt Trading Spoke changes this dynamic by allowing users to trade their debt positions.

By leveraging the deep liquidity of Aave, this spoke enables users to swap their debt obligations—for example, swapping a variable-rate USDC debt for USDT debt, or transferring a debt position to another user (along with the collateral) without unwinding the underlying assets. This introduces a new revenue stream for the protocol in the form of swap fees generated directly at the protocol level. Furthermore, it increases market efficiency and competitiveness by allowing borrowers to actively manage their liabilities in response to changing interest rates as well as providing the needed tools to execute more flexible actions.

CDP Spokes

The modular design facilitates the creation of Collateralized Debt Position (CDP) Spokes that can integrate deeply with external DEXs, specifically those supporting concentrated liquidity ranges.

In this setup, LPs can use their LP positions as collateral within a CDP Spoke to borrow assets from Aave. This unlocks the value of the liquidity positions without requiring the LP to remove their funds from the DEX. The integration goes beyond simple collateralization; the Spoke can manage the specific risks associated with impermanent loss and the volatility of LP tokens. This symbiosis creates a more capital-efficient market where liquidity on the DEX is supported by the lending capacity of the credit protocol, and vice versa.

Conclusion

The Aave V4 architecture offers a vast design space that goes beyond the binary choice of pooled versus isolated choices. By utilizing Hubs, Spokes, and Credit Lines, the protocol can theoretically mimic the structures of traditional finance—ranging from universal banking (Monolithic) to specialized hedge funds (Risk-Profiled) and prime brokerage services (Vaults).

While Model A provides the continuity of deep liquidity that DeFi relies on, the limitations regarding risk contagion are real. Conversely, while Model C offers maximum containment, it fragments liquidity to a degree that may harm utility. As governance weighs these or even more options, the focus must remain on the interplay between capital efficiency and the containment of systemic risk. These are the primary directions LlamaRisk will focus on when participating in the Aave V4 architecture definition process.

Disclaimer

This review was independently prepared by LlamaRisk, a DeFi risk firm funded partly by the Aave DAO, and is published solely within the scope assigned by the Aave DAO. Other than any compensation payable by the Aave DAO for that assigned scope, LlamaRisk has not received any direct or indirect compensation or other consideration for this work from any Aave DAO service provider, delegate, contributor, affiliated entity, or any third party, including any protocol(s) discussed herein. The information is provided for informational purposes only and should not be construed as legal, financial, tax, or other professional advice.

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Designing Aave v4 Backward from $75 Billion

First, I want to acknowledge the fantastic work done in this analysis by @LlamaRisk . It’s a thorough, forward-looking perspective that carefully maps hub configurations and enumerates risk vectors. It’s exactly the kind of deep analysis the community needs to understand early architecture decisions, and I think it sets a high bar for discussions around Aave v4.

That said, I want to offer a complementary perspective: one that looks backward from scale.

My view is that large financial systems especially traditional banks don’t start from risk categories alone. They start with the scale they intend to achieve and the growth rate they aim to sustain. Only then do they design internal risk architecture to support that ambition.

If Aave v4’s target is $75 billion in TVL by 2030, the central question shifts. It is no longer only how to minimize early risk. The real question becomes what kind of system can absorb that scale without collapsing under governance load, liquidity fragmentation, or correlated failures. That’s the lens I’m using in this perspective: what architecture and governance framework can credibly support $75 billion, and how does that change how we think about hubs and spokes today.

From this backward perspective, a single hub trying to do everything cannot scale. It’s not unsafe at launch, it’s a coordination problem. Every new asset, spoke, or parameter change adds friction to governance and amplifies systemic fragility. Scaling requires multiple hubs, not as an optional design choice, but as a structural necessity. Each hub needs an explicit economic identity, a clear target TVL, and a defined failure tolerance. This is what I agree with LlamaRisk. Trying to recreate v3 is not the goal.

Looking forward to 2030, hubs must be few, purposeful, and economically distinct. One hub should be tailored to attract conservative institutional capital. This core hub would mirror a safe retirement account: low volatility assets, conservative loan to value ratios, predictable rate curves, and minimal governance change. If it earns trust, this hub alone could plausibly hold a large tranche of the total target. Another hub should consolidate ETH correlated exposure and liquid staking tokens where higher utilization and higher volatility are priced rather than avoided. A third hub should be explicitly capped and dedicated to experimentation, hosting LP collateral, structured products, and new market designs that are innovation oriented but do not threaten the broader system.

Do you see where I am going with this? Backward perspective. Here, we already know we want at least 3-4 hubs. The risk-centered analysis from @LlamaRisk lays out the universe of architectural choices brilliantly. What I’m adding here is a directional criterion: what choices are compatible with a $75 billion TVL target? This backward lens complements the forward analysis, giving us a framework to evaluate hub models not just for early risk safety, but for long-term scalability and institutional credibility.

Next, setting explicit TVL targets for each hub ensures system growth is deliberate and credible, rather than relying on organic scale to emerge by chance. For instance, a plausible allocation to reach a $75 billion aggregate might be: a core institutional hub at $30 billion, a yield-focused hub at $13 billion, a prime or specialized counterparty hub at $22 billion, and a frontier innovation hub at $9 billion. Together, $30B + $22B + $13B + $10B equals $75B. These figures are illustrative rather than prescriptive, but they demonstrate how clearly defined TVL targets for each hub naturally shape operational, legal, and spoke’s types.

Designing from scale does not contradict a risk centered analysis. It complements it by anchoring architectural choices to a directional growth target. Forward looking exploration identifies the universe of possible hub topologies. A backward scale centered strategy chooses among them by asking which ones can carry the intended balance sheets without causing governance collapse or liquidity dysfunction.

Scenario: Working Backward from $75 Billion TVL

For this scenario, the hubs are organized as they are on testnet core, yield seeking, prime, and frontier, each with distinct economic purposes. The 2030 aggregate TVL target is $75 billion, with hub allocations of core 31 billion, prime 22 billion, yield seeking 13 billion, , and frontier 9 billion.

Hub 2030 TVL Target APY Risk Premium Internal Return Expectation Annualized Fees Protocol Revenue
Core $31B 4.5% 0.5% 5% $310M $93M
Prime $22B 6% 1% 7% $264M $70M
Yield-Seeking $13B 8% 2% 10% $156M $46M
Frontier $9B 12% 3% 15% $108M $36M
Total $75B 7.1% 1.5% 9.25% $838M $245M

These numbers are illustrative and actual outcomes will depend on macroeconomic conditions, regulatory environment, and execution realities. All figures are nominal USD-equivalent TVL.

How to read the tables

Each table below will list the spokes under a given hub, an illustrative TVL ramp from 2026 through 2030 summing to the hub’s 2030 total, and a short paragraph outlining the required actions and preconditions for that hub and its spokes to realize that growth. This approach makes explicit the link between hub design, governance requirements, and credible scale, showing how each hub contributes to the aggregate target while remaining economically coherent.



Core Hub — Institutional Balance Sheet

The Core Hub exists to attract conservative, long-duration capital that prioritizes predictability over yield. In banking terms, it functions like a wholesale funding desk or an investment-grade lending book. By 2030, this hub should plausibly hold $25–31B in TVL on its own.

Spokes Ideas Collateral 2028 TVL 2030 TVL
ETH Conservative Lending Native ETH $4.80B $8.50B
Blue-Chip LST Lending stETH, rETH, cbETH $2.40B $5.30B
Stablecoin Liquidity USDC, USDT $2.40B $4.20B
Tokenized T-Bill Tokenized U.S. Treasuries $1.20B $2.10B
Tokenized Commercial Paper Onchain CP (IG issuers) $1.00B $1.60B
Horizon RWA RWAs reserves $0.85B $1.60B
Centralized Exchange Treasury Fiat-backed stablecoins $0.75B $1.30B
Insurance Float Deployment Premium float tokens $0.95B $1.90B
Corporate Cash Management Vaults Stablecoins, T-bills $0.85B $1.60B
Public-Sector Digital Currency Pilots CBDC representations $0.65B $1.20B
Core Hub Total $15.25B $31.0B

The Core Hub is the institutional anchor of Aave v4. It must be boring, stable, and auditable, because its reputation will determine the protocol’s ability to attract pension funds, corporate treasuries, and insurance capital. From a backward-looking perspective, this hub is not optional or secondary—it is the gravitational center of the entire system. Without a credible Core Hub, $50 billion is unreachable, and $75 billion becomes aspirational at best.

Spokes in this hub are intentionally plain. They include ETH and ETH-like collateral lending, high-quality liquid staking tokens with strict correlation constraints, major stablecoins under conservative parameters, and, if included at all, tokenized short-duration real-world assets that behave like cash equivalents. There are no experimental mechanics, no custom liquidation logic, and no complex composability. Governance changes are rare and deliberate.

This hub aligns with the article’s “low risk, high trust” model, but the backward insight is critical: this hub must be designed first and foremost to inspire confidence among institutional allocators. In bank terms, this is where pension funds, treasuries, and insurance balance sheets would conceptually feel comfortable.

Prime Hub — Cash Management & Payments

The Prime Hub functions as Aave v4’s cash management and on-chain money market layer. It serves payment rails, short-term treasury allocations, and high-frequency liquidity needs. From a backward-looking perspective, this hub is essential: predictable, operationally reliable liquidity underpins the protocol’s ability to scale and support both Core and Yield-Seeking activities.

Spokes Ideas Collateral 2028 TVL 2030 TVL
Prime Spoke (General) ETH, wstETH, USDC, USDT, GHO $5.08B $9.17B
Stablecoin E‑Mode USDC, USDT, GHO $3.05B $5.50B
Cross‑Chain Liquidity Hub assets with CCIP bridges $2.03B $3.67B
Isolation Stable High‑confidence stablewares $1.52B $2.75B
RWA Liquidity Tokenized treasuries / money markets $1.01B $1.83B
Collateral Segregation Segregated institutional vaults $0.84B $1.46B
LST & Correlated Asset Staked ETH derivatives $0.67B $1.28B
Synthetic Cash Cash‑like synthetics (USDx, EURx) $0.67B $1.28B
Liquidity Efficiency Protocol‑managed rebate incentives $0.67B $1.28B
Prime Hub Total 15.5B $22.0B

Spokes in Prime include stablecoin borrowing and lending, delta-neutral strategies, low-volatility yield products, and on-chain equivalents of repo-like structures. The hub is distinct from the Core Hub because its capital is active, transactional, and liquidity-sensitive, rather than conservative and long-duration.

Yield-Seeking Hub — Structure Yield & Leverage

The Yield-Seeking Hub is where higher-return, higher-correlation strategies reside, designed to be coherent under stress. This hub attracts yield-focused institutional and professional capital seeking structured returns while understanding the associated risks. From a backward-looking perspective, this hub is essential: it concentrates risk and leverage in a controlled environment, allowing the Core Hub to remain conservative and stable.

Spokes Ideas Collateral 2028 TVL 2030 TVL
LST and LRT Leverage stETH, rsETH, ezETH $1.52B $2.84B
Ethena Basis USDe, sUSDe $0.95B $1.90B
Maple PT Fixed-Rate Principal Tokens $0.71B $1.42B
Market-Making Vaults Blue-chip tokens $0.48B $0.95B
Delta-Neutral Yield Vaults Hedged strategy NAV $0.34B $0.66B
Pendle Markets Tokenized yield derivatives $0.44B $0.88B
Volatility Carry Strategies Options margin collateral $0.39B $0.73B
Cross-Margin Derivatives Portfolio collateral $0.64B $1.25B
Quant Strategy Warehousing Strategy-level NAV $0.48B $0.95B
MEV and Arbitrage Financing Short-duration receivables $0.29B $0.51B
Yield Hub Total 6.24B $13.0B

This hub exists because crypto-native capital seeks leverage, not just safety. It is the analog of a bank’s corporate and structured credit book: higher risk, higher return, but internally coherent. By 2030, this hub could plausibly support $10–13B in TVL without endangering the broader system.

Spokes in this hub include liquid staking token leverage strategies, ETH-correlated yield loops, rehypothecation-aware lending structures, and other mechanisms where risk is understood but non-trivial.

Frontier Hub — Innovation Containment Layer

The Frontier Hub is Aave v4’s experimental sandbox. Its purpose is to contain innovation, absorb the learning costs of novel products, and isolate risk from the broader system. From a backward-looking perspective, this hub is essential: it allows the protocol to explore new markets without jeopardizing institutional trust or the stability of Core and Yield-Seeking hubs. This hub acts as the pressure valve of the system. Spokes include LP token collateral, exotic derivatives, novel liquidation mechanisms, custom oracle schemes, and any market without a well-understood long-tail loss distribution.

Spokes Ideas Collateral 2028 TVL 2030 TVL
LP Tokens as Collateral Uniswap and Balancer LPs $0.74B $3.71B
Babylon Bitcoin Staking BTC staking receipts $0.30B $1.14B
Memecoin Collateral Pilot High-volatility tokens $0.15B $0.61B
Experimental RWA Pilots Novel RWA structures $0.30B $0.76B
Cross-Chain Credit Bridged assets $0.23B $0.76B
NFT Financialization NFT index vaults $0.15B $0.38B
Novel Liquidation Mechanics Experimental auctions $0.06B $0.46B
Restaking Derivative Pilots Emerging LRTs $0.23B $0.69B
Synthetic Asset Experiments Synthetic collateral $0.15B $0.53B
Governance-Approved Sandboxes Mixed experimental assets $0.15B $0.38B
Frontier Hub Total 2.46B $9.0B

In Frontier, failure is expected, priced, and contained. The backward insight is that the hub’s goal is not growth, but systemic protection. It allows other hubs to scale confidently by confining risk and experimentation to a controlled environment.

Large banks have an analogous function, proprietary trading desks, venture lending arms, or structured innovation units but these are always separated from the core balance sheet. Frontier mirrors this model with hard caps, short-leash governance, and clear risk containment rules, ensuring innovation can occur without threatening the protocol’s stability.

What liabilities does Frontier Hub issue, to whom, and why?

Borrowable Who Borrows Purpose / Why It Exists Key Risk Introduced Mitigation / Why It’s Acceptable
CDP LP-backed Collateral LP users Unlock capital from AMM positions AMM tail risk Hard caps on exposure
BTC staking credit units Bictoin users Bootstrap BTC DeFi participation Slashing risk Conservative LTV
Meme-asset margin Degens Market discovery Extreme volatility Small exposure
NFT-backed liquidity NFT funds Illiquidity financing Valuation risk Indexing and caps
Cross-chain credit tokens Bridge operators Liquidity synchronization Bridge failure Hedged routes
Restaking leverage units LRT users Yield stacking Correlated slashing Spoke isolation
Experimental auction cash Liquidators Market testing Auction failure Kill switches
Synthetic asset margin Builders Enable new markets Oracle fragility Simulated pricing / caps
Governance sandbox credits DAOs Experimentation Governance abuse Revocable access
First-loss research notes Risk capital holders Learn failure modes Total loss Explicit labeling

Frontier absorbs experimentation so the rest of the protocol does not have to. It is the analog of bank innovation labs, venture arms, and special-situations desks, with explicit balance-sheet limits and governance oversight.

Conclusion (from my perspective)

This risk centric analysis is excellent. It maps the forward facing risk space clearly, and I respect the depth of that work. I want to add one lens that matters most at scale: design backward from the size of the balance sheet you want. If our goal is $75B TVL, everything else changes. The analysis explores many hub variants, but backward reasoning constrains that freedom.

Why 4 hubs? Because Aave v4 testnet shows it works.

More hubs multiply complexity, fewer hubs force incompatible capital together. 4 hubs is the sweet spot: capital self selects, governance can think clearly, and the system scales without chaos. The Core hub inspires confidence, Prime hub runs reliably, Yield Seeking hub captures opportunity, and Frontier hub safely experiments.

If we follow this path, $75B TVL becomes real, achievable, and fully governable, a system we can scale, trust, and grow over the long term. Thank you for this analysis. I really enjoyed exploring the different hubs and spokes.

Aave will win.

Hello @LlamaRisk and @JosueMpia,

This architectural shift is a massive leap forward. However, looking backward from the $75B scale, I see a persistent “Design Invariant” from V3.3 that could evolve into a systemic risk in V4’s Hub & Spoke model.

In our previous discussion, we identified how the Treasury retains fees from positions that eventually lead to bad debt—a “Fee-on-Loss” asymmetry. In V4, when the Main Hub extends a Senior Credit Line to a Satellite Hub, this doesn’t just scale liquidity; it potentially scales the deficit leak.

My primary concern: Under the proposed Model D, if a Satellite Hub faces a liquidation cascade, does the Main Hub’s “Senior” status result in a “Phantom Yield” scenario? My state-transition models suggest that the Treasury could end up booking Reserve Factor gains from inter-hub debt that is effectively insolvent at the spoke level.

This creates a scenario where Total Assets across hubs ≠ Total Shares + Treasury Accruals, breaking a core accounting invariant even before Umbrella participation.

I’ve modeled this using a State-Graph approach (ferox-pro) and found edge cases in the “Debt Trading Spoke” logic where this asymmetry compounds. I’d appreciate pointers to the specific V4 settlement specs, as I believe a technical synchronization on this “Invariant Violation” would be beneficial for the protocol’s long-term solvency.

Best regards, abdulwahed (HuntKits)