Technical maintenance proposals

[bgdlabs]

Re-configuration of Core’s GhoDirectMinter

Simple Summary

This proposal outlines the re-configuration/migration of the current CoreGhoDirectMinter to a new instance. This is necessary because upon its activation, the existing facilitator was misconfigured with a redundant layer of ProxyAdmin, which prevents future upgrades.

Being a totally internal component of infrastructure, this doesn’t carry any effect on users or the GHO ecosystem overall. Also, the misconfiguration is not in any way dangerous, but necessary to upgrade the system if required in the future.

Motivation

During the Aave V3.4 upgrade, the model of GHO on the v3 Core Ethereum pool was changed, for the DAO to mint GHO to borrow via a Direct Minter facilitator, same as on v3 Prime Ethereum.

However, this CoreGhoDirectMinter facilitator was configured wrongly (here) in what regards the ownership of the facilitator’s upgradeability: the ownership of the ProxyAdmin (0xf02d4931e0d5c79af9094cd9dff16ea6e3d9acb8) (proxy admin of the direct minter itself) was assigned to another ProxyAdmin contract (0xD3cF979e676265e4f6379749DECe4708B9A22476) controlled by the Governance Executor, instead of assigning it to the GovernanceV3Ethereum.EXECUTOR_LVL_1 directly.

Even if the ownership/admin-chain of the setup doesn’t create any type of security issue (all contracts are part the DAO or contracts controlled), this setup doesn’t allow for future upgrades of the CoreGhoDirectMinter: the GovernanceV3Ethereum.EXECUTOR_LVL_1 owns the top-level ProxyAdmin but cannot use it to command the facilitator’s the ProxyAdmin below to perform an upgrade.

This proposal resolves the issue by migrating the minted GHO and permissions from the old, non-upgradeable facilitator to a new, correctly configured CoreGhoDirectMinter instance.

This operation has no negative effect as the Direct Minter is internal infrastructure of the DAO, with end users not having any contact with it.

Addresses of the old facilitator:

• UpgradePayloadMainnet contract (V3.4 upgrade payload for the Ethereum Core instance): 0xC2584B9cA7759FE1ac48D8aE38aeAFE12dbC9876
• GhoDirectMinter implementation: 0xe4c958de49303c9be571e00582cf9454586de76f
• GhoDirectMinter proxy: 0x593B09afc075B3c326CE2AD7750888645BA8943d
• GhoDirectMinter’s ProxyAdmin contract: 0xf02d4931e0d5c79af9094cd9dff16ea6e3d9acb8
• MiscEthereum.PROXY_ADMIN contract (which itself is an owner of the GhoDirectMinter’s ProxyAdmin contract): 0xD3cF979e676265e4f6379749DECe4708B9A22476
• Owner of the MiscEthereum.PROXY_ADMIN contract (GovernanceV3Ethereum.EXECUTOR_LVL_1): 0x5300A1a15135EA4dc7aD5a167152C01EFc9b192A

Specification

This proposal will execute a payload to perform the following migration steps:

1. Transfer state to new Facilitator
   • The bucket capacity and current GHO level of the old facilitator (0x593B09afc075B3c326CE2AD7750888645BA8943d) are read.
   • The new facilitator (new GhoDirectMinter on 0x5513224daaEABCa31af5280727878d52097afA05) is added to the GhoToken with the same bucket capacity as the previous one.
   • The new facilitator mints and supplies GHO to the Aave Pool, matching the GHO level of the old facilitator.
2. Disable the old Facilitator:
   • After the mint and supply on step 1, there is now liquidity available on the pool for the old facilitator to withdraw its GHO from the pool and burn it..
   • The old facilitator is removed from the GhoToken’s list of facilitators.
3. Update permissions:
   • The RISK_ADMIN role is granted to the new facilitator and revoked from the old one.
   • The GhoBucketSteward is updated to control the new facilitator and cease control of the old one.

This ensures a seamless/exact transition of the facilitator’s role and funds (aGHO) while restoring the DAO’s ability to perform future upgrades.