[TEMP CHECK] Aave Will Win Framework

[AaveLabs]

1. Summary

Aave began with the thesis that decentralized lending could play a major role in traditional finance. Eight years later, that thesis has been validated. Aave is the largest protocol in decentralized finance, commanding a 60% market share in lending. The opportunity ahead, however, is bigger than anything behind us.

Detailed below is a strategic framework proposal for Aave’s next chapter. It asks the Aave DAO to ratify Aave V4 as the protocol’s foundational technology for future growth. It also proposes to direct all revenue from Aave-branded products built to the DAO treasury and to establish a budget for continued development. It also includes a solution to protect the Aave brand.

This proposal asks the DAO to approve the following operational framework:

1. Direct 100% of Aave-branded product revenue to the Aave DAO treasury.

2. Commit to a solution for protecting the Aave brand.

3. Ratify Aave V4 as the protocol’s core technical foundation for future development.

4. Create a framework for the DAO to fund strategic growth and development.

2. Motivation

The LEND token sale in 2017 raised $16M to build a decentralized lending protocol. That protocol became Aave, and that $16M has grown into a multi-billion dollar ecosystem, creating billions in value in the process.

Along the way, Aave Labs has requested DAO funds only for direct protocol development and marketing activities. Everything else has been self-funded. This includes the product layer, which encompasses aave.com, the Aave mobile app, Aave Pro, Aave Kit, and Aave Horizon. It also includes legal and regulatory work such as SEC defense, brand protection, trademark management, and compliance. Business development and growth has been self-funded as well.

We are now entering one of the most important periods that will determine Aave’s success going forward. Fintechs are entering DeFi, institutions are coming onchain, and regulatory clarity is emerging in certain markets that allows us to go direct to consumers. The protocols that win the next decade will be those that move fast, build great tools and products, and capture new markets before competitors. With the right focus, and by investing in important growth areas, Aave is positioned to do exactly that.

Other approaches to this framework exist, however they have different trade-offs. Aave Labs could operate independently and keep product revenue to fund itself, but then there would need to be a separation of the protocol revenues from the ones generated by the Aave-branded products built on top of the protocol. The DAO could directly build and operate Aave-branded products through governance, but the execution would be slow, and governance overhead can’t scale indefinitely to meet the pace required.

3. Specification

100% Aave Product Revenue to the DAO

The first ever Aave governance proposal, AIP-1, established that AAVE token holders govern the Aave Protocol, which has led to the DAO rightfully collecting 100% of protocol fees.

And since the protocol’s launch, Aave Labs has operated aave.com, which became an important access point for most protocol usage across retail users, power users, and integrators. This has supported millions of users with zero security incidents. The DAO has matured quite a bit since AIP-1 and we believe it’s time to align behind a token-centric model.

Under this proposal, 100% of Aave Labs’ product revenue will go to the DAO. This includes:

• aave.com, the existing interface, and all associated fees

• Aave App, the consumer mobile application

• Aave Card, a card tied to Aave App with all fees flowing to the DAO

• Aave Pro, the new interface for Aave V4

• Aave Kit, enterprise solutions for fintechs and institutions building on Aave

• Aave Horizon, Aave’s RWA market and institutional services

• AAVE ETP, exchange traded product of $AAVE

Upon approval of this proposal, the DAO would also receive revenue from the swap integration on aave.com, which currently generates approximately $10 million in annualized revenue. This integration is expected to expand to additional chains and functionality.

Revenue is defined as gross product revenue earned by Aave Labs, minus any direct revenue sharing paid by Aave Labs to external partners including revenue rebates, revenue subsidies, revenue sharing arrangements and any additional direct user incentives.

Product growth incentive budgets are funded by the Aave DAO. Additionally, Aave Labs retains the discretion to redirect a portion of product inflows, such as vault yields, directly into user incentives. Competing for users requires the ability to deploy capital quickly toward growth without waiting for a governance cycle. In these instances, Aave Labs will disclose additional user incentives spending in our quarterly updates.

With proper execution, the product layer can be an additional source of revenue for the DAO treasury. Combined with protocol fees, the DAO can fund its own growth, security, and development from a diversified revenue stream.

Expanding Revenue Through Aave V4

The product layer is one part of the path to increasing the DAO’s annual revenue. The protocol layer, powered by Aave V4, is the other. Aave V3 already generates over $100 million in annualized revenue. Aave V4 expands on V3 with new monetization features that allow the protocol to capture more value from the risk it underwrites.

V4’s architecture also unlocks revenue streams that are not easily possible in previous Aave versions. Each Spoke can extend Aave into a new market or use case, with its own risk parameters and revenue model. As with V3, 100% of Aave V4’s protocol revenue will go to the DAO.

We’ve taken a look at various products and protocols across the crypto and fintech industries to show estimations that highlight the size of the opportunities available:

* These opportunity estimates are based on other protocols or products in each category (e.g. Pendle, Fluid), and the size of the opportunity (e.g. OTC lending volume), etc. They each represent a net new revenue opportunity on top of what Aave generates today, and they are only possible to pursue in a scalable way once V4 is live. Reaching these estimates would also depend on market conditions, scale of adoption, and execution.

Aave V4 also introduces a new reinvestment module, which is an optional net new revenue opportunity for the DAO to consider. Aave pools maintain a significant idle float that currently earns nothing. This reinvestment feature allows the protocol to sweep this capital into short-term, low-risk yield opportunities pre-vetted and approved by the DAO, similar to a collateral listing.

When Aave rates fall below SOFR-rates, it signals underutilized liquidity that could be productively deployed. Based on historical stablecoin float levels and a risk-free proxy SOFR-rate, the additional interest that would have been earned is substantial:

* Based on historical performance and idle liquidity. These figures are illustrative good faith estimates included to inform governance discussions around prioritization and resource allocation. They are not projections, commitments, or expectations, and actual outcomes may vary materially depending on governance choices, execution, adoption, and market conditions.

This interest can be split between depositors and the DAO or whatever else the DAO decides. The analysis does not include other strategies such as ETH staking or reinvesting into higher-yield opportunities, which are also an option if the DAO chooses.

Taken together, these opportunities illustrate the range of operational scale the DAO may need to support across both the protocol and product layers if adoption and market conditions warrant it. Viewed as an aggregate opportunity set, they suggest that the long-term revenue ceiling for the Aave ecosystem is materially higher than today.

Ratification of Aave V4

Aave V3 has served the protocol well, but it is approaching its architectural limits. Adding new features to V3 requires modifying core protocol logic, which involves extensive audits and significant coordination overhead. Meanwhile V4’s architecture allows new functionality to be added through Spokes without touching the core, making experimentation cheaper, faster, and safer.

Importantly, anything V3 does can be recreated on V4, but not vice versa. V4 is a strict superset of V3’s capabilities, meaning no functionality is lost in the upgrade.

V4’s architecture expands the range of revenue models the protocol can support, which is why governance analysis considers higher-scale revenue scenarios when planning long-term operations. To capture the opportunities outlined above, Aave Labs and the rest of the DAO’s service providers should coordinate development efforts around V4. This means prioritizing V4 Spoke development, aligning roadmaps, and shifting new feature work away from V3. Notably, V4 is already live on testnet, has completed an open security contest, and has its first public audit.

The DAO is being asked to agree on this strategic direction and a separate proposal will follow for V4 protocol activation, the launch setup, etc.

V3 Maintenance Plan

That said, V3 should not be shut down hastily or haphazardly. V3 is stable, mature, and battle-tested. There is no need for a rushed, or forced, migration, and the transition should happen in three phases:

1. Active Development. V3 remains the primary production system, with security patches, parameter updates, and critical maintenance continuing as normal. It also makes sense to pause any new features for V3 if this framework is passed.

2. Stable Maintenance. V4 becomes the primary technology layer for expansion and innovation. V3 documentation, tooling, and access points remain fully supported, and users migrate at their own pace.

3. Legacy Support. Once V4 is mature, V3 parameters could be gradually adjusted to encourage migration, following the same approach used in past version transitions. V3 remains open indefinitely for withdrawals, with governance stepping in only for critical security issues.

Note: As per the DAO’s feedback, the timeline for these phases can evolve organically or be decided in a different proposal. In the near term, V3 will run alongside V4 until further discussions are held by the DAO. That said, aligning the DAO behind V4 is important.

Aave Brand Governance

The Aave brand is one of the protocol’s most important assets, built over years of technical excellence, security track record, and community trust. Protecting it is in the best interest of the DAO, token holders, and the broader ecosystem.

Today, Aave Labs is the exclusive legal owner of the Aave trademarks and has been solely responsible for holding, defending, and enforcing them. Because the DAO is not a legal entity, it cannot directly hold or defend trademarks. As a result, trademark stewardship has necessarily sat within Aave Labs.

For the past seven years, Aave Labs has carried this operational burden, and the work is hands-on, expensive, and necessary. Trademarks that are not actively and consistently defended can be weakened or lost, reducing the ability to control how a mark is used in commerce and increasing the risk of misuse or confusion.

At the same time, there are understandable concerns around concentrating long-term control of such a critical asset within a single operating entity, particularly as the DAO continues to mature. To address this, and subject to DAO approval, Aave Labs proposes the creation of a Foundation that would assume responsibility for holding and stewarding the Aave trademarks going forward. The Foundation would be mandated to protect the brand, license it to approved entities, address unauthorized use, and operate in alignment with DAO-approved parameters.

The details regarding the structure, governance, and execution of this Foundation, including any transfer or licensing of trademark rights, as well as proposed approaches to V4 codebase licensing, will be presented to the DAO in a follow-up proposal.

$AAVE Market Access

To go beyond the product/protocol layer and expand market access to $AAVE, Aave Labs will support partners to launch regulated, traditional market products referencing $AAVE as the underlying asset. This includes the potential launch of $AAVE regulated futures, as well as a regulated spot exchange-traded product (ETP).

The introduction of regulated futures and ETP products would represent a meaningful step toward institutional maturity for Aave, broadening access for professional and traditional investors. A standalone proposal covering structure and execution will follow under the workstreams authorized by this proposal.

DAO Growth Requires Resources At Scale

The operational framework outlined above requires execution at scale that matches the opportunity. For Aave to scale and play a role in the real financial system, it should allocate resources in growth the way fintechs, banks, and other financial institutions do. Without commitment to this as a goal, Aave’s upside will always be limited. If all of Aave Labs’ product revenue flows to the DAO, the DAO would need to fund the ongoing development and growth of these products.

Aave Labs Funding Request

The DAO is facing a structural decision regarding Aave Labs’ operating model going forward.

Currently, Aave Labs self-funds a significant portion of its operations. Historically, the ecosystem’s direction of travel (via AIP-1) was to use fees generated by Aave-branded products, such as aave.com and other product surfaces, to cover Aave Labs’ product development, marketing, legal, and operational costs, while the DAO funded direct protocol version development carried out by Aave Labs.

Under the proposed operational framework, all fees from Aave-branded products would go to the DAO treasury rather than supporting Aave Labs’ operations and product development. In this configuration, the responsibility for funding Aave Labs’ activities would shift correspondingly to the DAO.

Aave Labs requests $25 million in stablecoins, 75,000 AAVE, with additional growth and development grants payable upon specific product launches. The funding would be structured as follows:

• Primary Grant:

  • $5 million paid upfront upon approval of the proposal and $20 million streamed over the course of the year.

  • 75,000 AAVE delivered upon approval of the proposal, unlocking linearly monthly over a 2 year period

• Growth/Development Grants:

  • $5,000,000 for Aave App launch, with funds used for user acquisition, marketing, and ongoing development

  • $5,000,000 for Aave Pro launch, with funds used for user acquisition, marketing, and ongoing development

  • $5,000,000 for Aave Card launch, with funds used for user acquisition, marketing, and ongoing development

  • $2,500,000 for Aave Kit launch, with funds used for maintenance and marketing

Note: For clarity, all funds will be spent on Aave-related efforts.

Growth and development grants are released upon delivery and streamed over a period of six months, with governance confirming completion before funds are disbursed. They cover the cost of bringing each product to market, from engineering through go-to-market.

Companies entering DeFi are well-capitalized and spending aggressively on product and distribution. To succeed in the market, Aave needs to invest at a similar scale. This commitment allows for long-term planning, aggressive hiring, and sustained investment in product and go-to-market without the friction of annual budget cycles.

The funding requested is a significant expansion of scope beyond historical funding. To date, Aave Labs has largely self-funded the cost of building and scaling the product layer, seeking DAO support mainly for core protocol development and focused marketing. This proposal secures the investment needed to stay competitive and continue innovating over the next decade. Growing Aave and growing it to the scale of other TradFi alternatives requires stable, predictable funding so contributors can plan, hire, and execute at the standard of a global financial platform.

Altogether, these funds are covering the following costs:

• Continued protocol development (V4 improvements, Spokes, core infrastructure, research, and development)

• Product engineering across Aave Pro, Aave App, Aave Kit, and other products

• Product go-to-market, user acquisition, marketing (e.g. social media/SEO/content) and growth

• Business development

  • Aave Labs invests heavily in partnering with the largest institutional and fintech names to integrate with Aave.

  • Aave Horizon asset onboarding and driving TVL/borrow growth.

  • Ongoing 360° resource provision for institutional integrators, including technical, InfoSec and operational support.

• Application security

  • Aave Labs runs an extensive monitoring program, and very heavy enterprise fees to social media platforms, to protect the Aave brand.

• Events, which historically Aave Labs has already run with funding from the DAO (e.g. rAAVE, DeFi Day)

With this capital, Aave Labs can build with the runway needed to succeed on the items outlined above. It would also reflect the DAO’s decision to fund the level of execution required to support protocol operations at increased scale, should governance determine that expansion is warranted.

In order to be as effective as possible, Aave Labs would retain autonomy over product strategy and operations. Building competitive products requires the ability to move quickly, make decisions without committee approval, and iterate based on market feedback. We suggest the same for other Service Providers who might choose to operate under this framework.

The grants outlined above are for one year and would need to be revisited, if approved, 12 months after the proposal is decided on.

In line with existing DAO practices, oversight of this work is exercised through governance. Aave Labs will provide regular transparency into its activities, including:

• Quarterly updates on progress against funded initiatives, key metrics, and use of DAO-authorized resources

• Ongoing updates on active workstreams and prioritization decisions

• Continued open and responsive communication with the DAO through established governance channels

4. Next Steps

Aave remains early in its journey. What exists today is a base layer, while the real scale of adoption lies ahead as global finance moves onchain. DeFi is still quite small in the grand scheme of things. And over the coming decades, trillions of dollars in assets will migrate onto open rails. In that world, Aave can become the core infrastructure for global finance.

Since 2017, the focus has been on disciplined execution at the frontier, and that conviction has only strengthened. The next phase of growth, fueled by innovation, and institutional adoption will be led by Aave. With sustained commitment and effective execution, the protocol can support significantly greater scale over time and continue establishing itself as core liquidity infrastructure for the onchain economy.

This proposal seeks to establish a framework for Aave’s next decade. Upon approval, it would reaffirm Aave Labs’ alignment with the DAO by directing all Aave-branded product revenue to the DAO treasury. It asks for the ratification of V4 as the technical foundation for this growth and for the funding to execute this vision. This framework’s objective is to position the Aave Protocol as a core piece of global financial infrastructure, with the value it creates directed to the Aave DAO to fund its continued development and success.

In accordance with Aave governance processes, this proposal is intended as an initial Temp Check to gather community feedback on the strategic direction outlined above. Any commitments, structural changes, or funding allocations would proceed through the appropriate stages of discussion, refinement, and governance proposal stages prior to implementation.

If the Temp Check is successful and the community supports this proposal, we will move forward with a formal ARFC submission.

Disclaimer

Historically, Aave Labs has self-funded its endeavors. Due to the nature of the proposal, Aave Labs would receive funding from the DAO in exchange for Aave Labs’ revenue going to the DAO if passed. No third parties co-authored this proposal.

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived under Creative Commons Zero (CC0).

FAQ

1. Why are so many significant items grouped into a single proposal? Shouldn’t these be separate votes?

This proposal presents a single, cohesive strategy. The components are interconnected and depend on each other for success. For example, aligning on V4 as the core technical foundation informs how development efforts are prioritized, while the proposed funding framework supports coordinated execution across protocol and product workstreams. Voting on these items separately could result in a fragmented and unworkable plan. Approving the strategy without the technology, or the technology without the funding to build it, would be inefficient. This proposal is a complete strategic package, and voting on it as a whole ensures the DAO is aligned on a single, comprehensive path forward.

2. The funding request is substantial. Why does Aave Labs need this budget?

The requested budget reflects a deliberate shift in operating model rather than an incremental extension of past funding. Historically, Aave Labs subsidized a broad range of activities and requested DAO support primarily for direct protocol development and focused marketing. Under this framework, the DAO is choosing to fund a wider operational scope directly, including product engineering, go-to-market execution, product relevant legal and compliance work, and business development. This budget is intended to support long-term planning and execution at scale and to enable stable resourcing and sustained focus. It reflects a governance decision about how the DAO wishes to resource protocol-adjacent work as Aave engages more directly with an evolving and increasingly competitive market landscape.

3. Why should the DAO fund Aave Labs now if it has been self-funded for so long?

By directing 100% of revenue to the DAO, Aave Labs will not be able to self-fund going forward. Without the ability to earn or raise revenue, there is no way to cover the costs across product development, business development, and other operational functions Aave Labs has historically funded. Without funding to continue this work these functions would stop.

4. Is this funding request annual?

Yes. Aave Labs will submit an annual budget proposal to the DAO for the work it performs. Each year’s budget requires a separate governance vote, giving the DAO ongoing oversight of how funds are allocated.

5. What does “autonomy” mean in this proposal?

The proposal requests autonomy over certain operational and product strategy decisions. Building competitive products requires the ability to move quickly and iterate based on market feedback, which is difficult if every decision requires a vote. Accountability is central to this arrangement. Aave Labs commits to providing quarterly reports on progress, frequent updates on development, and continued open communication with the DAO. The DAO retains ultimate oversight through its control of the treasury and Aave Labs’ funding stream. If Aave Labs does not meet its commitments or perform effectively, the DAO can choose not to continue contributing to this budget.

6. What does ratifying V4 mean in this proposal?

This vote asks the DAO to agree on a strategic direction. Ratifying V4 in this proposal means committing to it as the core technical foundation for future development. It signals to all service providers that V4 is the priority, allowing them to align their roadmaps and development efforts. This coordination is necessary to build the features that will achieve the proposal’s goals. The subsequent vote to activate the V4 protocol will be a purely technical one, focused on the readiness of the code, launch parameters, etc.

7. Why is there compensation tied to milestones?

Launching and scaling products involves costs beyond core development work. This includes go-to-market execution, partnership development, and ongoing operational support around the time a product is introduced. The milestone-based payments are intended to support these activities at key delivery points, aligning resourcing with product rollout. As all revenue from these products flows to the DAO, funding this work supports execution that directly contributes to the protocol’s operational sustainability.

8. How does this framework impact other Service Providers working with the Aave DAO?

If the DAO ratifies this proposal, coordination among service providers will be important for efficient execution. Service providers funded by the DAO can align their work with this direction to maintain Aave’s competitive position. Those who prefer to focus on different priorities can propose adjusting their scope accordingly. Additionally, the increased surface area for revenue generation established by this proposal creates a framework that other service providers can consider for their own work with the DAO.

[anon40760803]

@AaveLabs

Growth/Development Grants:

Hey, thanks for submitting this temp check. I won’t comment on the budget aspect and will leave those questions and analysis to the DAO’s financial SPs, but it’s great to see things moving in a positive direction!

I just have two questions:

1. What is the objective of the “Primary Grant”?
Is it intended as compensation for transferring the IP/brand rights to the DAO and renouncing revenue from AAVE-branded products? I’m not fully clear on this point, especially since the “Growth/Development Grants” section appears to already cover operational costs

2. Could you provide more clarity on the current AAVE Labs structure?
Given that Avara and its side projects (Lens, Family) are being sunset or phased out, it would be helpful for the DAO to have a clearer breakdown of AAVE Labs as it stands today. For example:

• How many people are currently working there?

• How are teams structured?

• How would the requested funds be allocated across departments?

Appreciate the clarification in advance

[A_J]

Good start to DAO, AAVE Labs and revenue discussions.

On the face of it, all items appear cohesive and in interests of 1. DAO, 2. $AAVE holders and 3. AAVE Labs.

Personally really happy that the turmoil of revenue is behind us and a new chapter begins. Kudos!

[MarcZeller]

I’ll post a more detailed answer tomorrow touching proposal substance, but I want to cut through the attempted gaslighting now concerning funding and “Decentralization”.

Aave Labs created a problem and extracted roughly $5.5M of potential Aave DAO revenue.

Since then, we’ve seen roughly $1.5B wiped from $AAVE market cap and a real, lasting hit to reputation.

Now Labs is back with a $50M “solution”, presented as “for the good of the DAO”, after zero prior coordination with delegates or service providers.

Instead of engaging directly with the people who actually run governance day to day, the strategy has been to shape the narrative through KOLs and proxy accounts. That’s not how you build legitimacy. That’s how you manufacture it.

We’ve seen this playbook before: open with egregious terms, absorb backlash, then reframe a smaller ask as “the reasonable middle ground” while still extracting a massive amount.

And at this point, there’s not much left to debate: Labs has now shown, repeatedly, that when a decision touches its own interests, it will vote its $AAVE accordingly. That’s their right as holders. But it also means the “discussion” is largely theater when one party can reliably enforce its preferred outcome with voting power.

Let’s be honest about where we are: Labs is acting as if it can impose outcomes regardless of governance process. If token holders are comfortable with that, so be it, but I’m not going to pretend this is healthy governance.

At this point, the fox controls the henhouse, and the incentive is clearly to maximize extraction.

Good luck, friends.

[Gross]

The real question we need to ask concerns the validity of your claim that you have self-funded all these products. We are forced to ask where this capital actually originates. Apart from the Aave protocol and the DAO treasury what independent revenue streams have you generated to fund such extensive development? You already exert enough dominance in voting and manipulate governance processes as you see fit. This request for 75k AAVE will simply cement that control. Moving the brand to a foundation on paper changes absolutely nothing because at the end of the day you will still retain the power to unilaterally force any rule you want through on chain voting.

Stani, to be clear: no one is asking you to leave. We want you to keep working for Aave, earning for yourselves while generating value for the protocol. However, these requests and potential gains must remain reasonable and acceptable. The general framework of this proposal is solid, and if we can find common ground on the grant specifics and a few other items, I believe this would pass with broad support. The only real misstep here has been the lack of prior engagement with community leaders and DAO delegates.

[ApuMallku]

@Gross

We are forced to ask where this capital actually originates. Apart from the Aave protocol and the DAO treasury what independent revenue streams have you generated to fund such extensive development?

This is the critical question: where does this capital actually originate?
This is my core concern: complete lack of voting power transparency. We’re witnessing real-time governance capture—Labs wielding 600K voting power plus unknown hidden wallets.
Requirements before this proposal has credibility:

1. Full disclosure of all wallets under Labs/founder control
2. Complete budget breakdown showing funding sources
3. Transparent accounting of capital deployment

I’m glad the hidden front-end fees discovery forced this proposal. But the cost? Over $1 billion in market cap destroyed through entirely avoidable drama.

Reality check: Full disclosure should happen before Snapshot. But this will pass regardless—Labs controls governance. That’s the problem we’re documenting in real-time.

[_LP17]

From my perspective, this proposal makes a lot of sense and shows a strong alignment around the token and the long-term vision of the ecosystem. Directing product revenues to the DAO, strengthening V4 as the core foundation, and structuring growth in a more coordinated way is strategically coherent.

That said, I believe additional steps and clarifications are necessary, especially regarding the size and structure of the requested budget, which appears quite significant for Aave Labs.

First, do we have a clear breakdown of the internal architecture of Aave Labs? More transparency on operational structure, cost centers, and resource allocation would help the DAO better understand how funds will actually be used. Are there detailed cost estimates per product, per team, or per initiative? At this scale, granularity matters.

Second, the request for stablecoins is understandable and logical. Stable funding allows for planning, hiring, and execution without exposure to volatility. However, I am less convinced about the request for AAVE tokens. What is the precise objective of allocating AAVE to Labs? If the intention is compensation, incentives, or treasury alignment, this should be explicitly detailed.

There is also a legitimate concern about potential selling pressure on the AAVE token if large allocations are unlocked over time. Even with vesting, this creates structural risk. It could also introduce governance dynamics where token allocations might indirectly influence voting power. Would it not be safer and more neutral to structure the funding purely in stablecoins, at least for operational expenses?

Another point: the fact that multiple budgets are set at similar levels (Labs, App, Pro, Card, Kit) raises questions. These products likely have very different complexity levels, timelines, and market strategies. It would be beneficial to see a more detailed justification of why these allocations are equal or comparable, with clear KPIs, expected ROI, and milestone-based release logic.

Despite these concerns, as a personal holder of a significant amount of AAVE, I believe the direction is correct. There is a real alignment around the token and the long-term positioning of Aave as a core financial infrastructure.

However, budget discipline is critical. At this stage, the priority should be to grow revenue and strengthen buyback mechanisms. Increasing recurring protocol income and reinforcing buybacks is, in my opinion, one of the only reliable ways to protect the AAVE token from market pressure, volatility, or potential manipulation.

Today, the overall valuation of AAVE feels disproportionately low compared to the scale of assets secured, the revenue generation potential, and the strategic ambition of the protocol. This disconnect is not just surprising — it can become structurally dangerous. When a protocol of this size and importance is valued too low relative to its fundamentals, it can make the ecosystem more vulnerable.

So yes, the proposal is directionally strong and aligned with the token. But tighter cost control, more transparency on spending structure, clearer justification for AAVE allocations, and a stronger focus on revenue growth and buybacks would make the framework significantly more robust and protective for token holders.

[aleks-larsen]

Disclosure: I’m a general partner at Blockchain Capital, a venture firm with a large, long-term $AAVE position. I want to share our thoughts on this proposal.

First, we’re very happy to see this proposal from Aave Labs (“Aave Labs” or “Labs”) and think it represents an important step in the Aave ecosystem’s evolution towards a mature DAO. For many reasons, it’s tricky to navigate the relationship between labs companies and DAOs and we genuinely don’t have good precedents to go off of here, so we’ve been thinking about this from first principles.

At a basic level, DAOs are good for aligning stakeholders in a decentralized system and deciding how the resources of the DAO are used and allocated. Companies are good for execution: building products, taking them to market, exploring partnerships, interfacing with the legal system, etc. What we want to aim for as token holders is a healthy relationship between the DAO and the companies that operate in service of it.

This requires balance. If the DAO micromanages companies, the companies won’t be able to make much progress; if companies don’t have the right checks and balances, then the DAO may end up ceding too much control to the companies. The goal is to find a way to enable companies that work inside of the DAO to execute at a world class level in a competitive environment while making real commitments that keep value and ultimate authority at the governance level.

This proposal looks like a mature effort to define that balance. Sending 100% of Aave-branded net product revenue to the DAO is a very clear way to align incentives and represents a full commitment from Labs to the DAO. It also makes sense to pair that with a clear funding model for the team doing the work: if the DAO owns the economics of the product layer, the DAO should fund the development, go-to-market, security, and operations needed to grow it. The milestone-based funding and streaming payments feel like the right approach in that they give Aave Labs enough stability to plan and execute while maintaining clear, enforceable governance checkpoints.

We also think the brand and trademark section is a necessary step toward a more professional setup. Since the DAO isn’t a legal entity, someone has to hold and defend the trademarks. Moving stewardship to a foundation that must operate within DAO-approved rules is a good direction, in our view, as long as the follow-up proposal adds clear safeguards, e.g., transparent licensing rules, conflicts-of-interest policies, regular reporting, an appeals process, and a clear way to replace the steward, or those managing it, if needed. If the DAO can get those details right, it could help protect users from scams and confusion while maintaining the brand as a community-governed ecosystem asset.

Putting implementation details aside, the only real alternative to this direction is that Aave Labs pursues independent business models and funding. That might still drive some value to the protocol, but as token holders, we think it’s in our best interest to do what we can to fully align Aave Labs within the DAO, and, from our read, that’s what this proposal represents.

Our view is that the question that should be asked when considering whether or not to grant this kind of funding proposal is whether this team/company has the track record, plan and alignment to warrant a large investment from the DAO. Our view at Blockchain Capital is that Aave Labs unequivocally has a track record that warrants our full support, and we think the most productive thing for the DAO to do is to work with this proposal in an effort to position the Aave ecosystem for success. We’re excited about the products Aave Labs is building and believe that this could be a high ROI investment for the DAO to make. We also believe it is far better than Labs seeking independent funding. If successful, this can stand as a template for future proposals from other companies that want to be part of the DAO and contribute to the Aave ecosystem. In 10 years, hopefully the protocol has dozens of talented, competitive teams that are aligned towards growing the protocol. This could be an important step towards getting there.

With that said, we think there’s a handful of details that need to be worked out, such as clearly defining net revenue. The spirit of this makes sense: product builders who choose to work in the DAO need to be able to be competitive. Normal companies get to re-invest their revenue into growth. The DAO needs a mechanism for Aave-aligned companies that matches this, but it should iron out the guardrails and set a framework for how this changes over time. It is also important to discuss allowing a prospective labs team to have reinvestment flexibility. This could be accomplished by adding a simple policy with thresholds, below which, the team can move fast; above it, governance has visibility or approval authority.

With some additional discussion and guardrails, we think this proposal is an excellent step forward for all participants in the ecosystem, and we hope to work collaboratively towards an operating framework that positions the Aave protocol for long term success.

Disclaimers: Blockchain Capital holds the AAVE token but is not otherwise affiliated with the Aave Protocol and is in no way affiliated with Aave Labs. Blockchain Capital does not hold equity in Aave Labs or any of its affiliated entities. Neither Blockchain Capital nor the author guarantees the accuracy, adequacy or completeness of information provided in this post. No representation or warranty, express or implied, is made or given by or on behalf of Blockchain Capital, the author or any other person as to the accuracy and completeness or fairness of the information contained in any post and no responsibility or liability is accepted for any such information.

Nothing contained in this post constitutes investment, regulatory, legal, compliance or tax or other advice nor is it to be relied on in making an investment decision. This post should not be viewed as current or past recommendations or solicitations of an offer to buy or sell $AAVE or any other digital asset, any securities, or to adopt any investment strategy. This post may contain projections or other forward-looking statements, which are based on beliefs, assumptions and expectations that may change as a result of many possible events or factors. If a change occurs, actual results may vary materially from those expressed in the forward-looking statements. All forward-looking statements speak only as of the date such statements are made, and neither Blockchain Capital nor the author assumes any duty to update such statements except as required by law.

[tsips1267]

The funding request here seems a little excessive compared to the revenue the DAO would get back from the Cowswap fees. AAVE Labs is requesting $25M/year in stables and 75000 AAVE (which would be worth almost another $25M not that long ago) and only gives $10M/year back in revenue from the swap fees. Unless the AAVE App grows to be a particularly large success, I can’t see how this would be profitable short term to the DAO to get $10M and lose almost $50M.

EDIT: Ultimately I’d rather AAVE Labs get a significantly lower sum of $10M/year in stables without any AAVE tokens and to remove all fees from the Cowswap integration altogether. These fees are purely extractive and unnecessary to the functioning of the interface, and long term drive users away from the interface to third party interfaces and potentially even competing lending platforms.

[dabit3]

All product revenue flowing to the DAO is the right call. Labs getting funded directly in exchange is a clean structure, they receive the needed runway to compete and the DAO retains oversight through governance.

Fintechs and institutions are entering DeFi with serious capital and aggressive distribution, Aave can’t afford to move slowly while these players build on competing protocols. This seems like a great path for both the DAO as well as the tokenholders. Nice work!

[MarcZeller]

The DAO Won, but the Deal Isn’t Done

---

This proposal is a victory for the Aave DAO.

Back in December, @EzR3aL, a truly independent delegate, posted a revenue question that kicked off a broader community conversation about revenue alignment, governance transparency, and the relationship between Aave Labs and the protocol. Today, Aave Labs is offering to direct 100% of product revenue to the DAO treasury, ratify V4 as the shared technical foundation, and create a Foundation to hold the brand. That did not happen by accident. It happened because governance worked.

The direction is right. I have been publicly advocating for exactly this kind of token-centric alignment. The destination is correct. The route needs work. Here is what the community should understand before voting.

Read the Fine Print

The headline is “100% of Aave-branded product revenue to the DAO.” A genuine and welcome commitment. Proof that decentralized governance produces real outcomes.

Governance also means reading the details.

“100% Revenue” Needs a Definition the DAO Controls

Revenue is defined in this proposal as gross product revenue minus partner revenue sharing, minus revenue rebates, minus revenue subsidies, minus “additional direct user incentives.” All deductions are at Aave Labs’ sole discretion. No independent audit. No cap. No DAO approval threshold.

The proposal also states: “Aave Labs retains the discretion to redirect a portion of product inflows, such as vault yields, directly into user incentives.”

100% of revenue is a powerful commitment. The DAO needs to define what revenue means , not the entity being funded from it. An independent auditor verifying the number and DAO-approved caps on discretionary deductions would turn a headline into an enforceable commitment. A small change that makes the entire proposal credible.

The Treasury Cannot Absorb This Ask

The Aave DAO treasury holds $160.9M, down $44.8M. Of that, $100.6M is non-AAVE assets and $60.2M is AAVE tokens.

This proposal requests $42.5M in stablecoins ($25M primary + $17.5M in milestone grants) and 75,000 AAVE. The stablecoin ask alone is 42% of the DAO’s non-AAVE reserves. The total ask of roughly $50.7M is 31.5% of the entire treasury. For a single service provider. In a single vote.

No funds or tokens should transfer until enforceable commitments are in place.

V3 Built This House

Aave V3 generates over $100M in annualized protocol revenue. The most proven lending infrastructure in DeFi. More than 95% of all Aave DAO historical revenue comes from V3 and its predecessors.

This proposal frames V3 as “approaching its architectural limits” and asks the DAO to ratify V4 as the replacement. Buried in the maintenance plan: “It also makes sense to pause any new features for V3 if this framework is passed.”

V4 may well be the future. Today, it is on testnet, has some completed audit, and has generated zero revenue. The right approach is parallel-track: protect the V3 cash engine while accelerating V4 validation on its own timeline. Ratifying an unshipped protocol while freezing the $100M per year revenue engine in a single bundled vote is premature. V4 should earn its ratification through its own proposal, on its own merits, when it is ready for mainnet.

Unbundle the Vote

The FAQ states: “Voting on these items separately could result in a fragmented and unworkable plan.”

This is four proposals in a trenchcoat. Revenue alignment, V4 ratification, Foundation creation, and a $50M funding request are four separate decisions with different risk profiles and different levels of community consensus. The community broadly supports revenue alignment. It may also support V4 ratification and a Foundation. It has serious questions about the funding size and terms.

Bundling them means accepting everything or rejecting everything. If these components stand on their own merits, they can be voted on separately. Let the community say yes to alignment while demanding better terms on funding.

75,000 AAVE Tokens Are Governance Power

75,000 AAVE at today’s price of $109 is roughly $8.2M and represents 13.6% of the DAO’s AAVE holdings (~550,000 tokens). AAVE tokens carry voting power.

Yesterday I published on-chain analysis showing wallets connected to Aave Labs infrastructure voted to defeat the Mandatory Disclosures proposal , a proposal requiring wallet disclosure and conflict-of-interest abstention. That vote is still active and currently losing.

This proposal asks the DAO to transfer 75,000 additional AAVE tokens to an entity whose existing governance holdings remain undisclosed. The DAO should know what governance power the recipient already holds before transferring more. Any entity receiving AAVE tokens from the DAO should meet the same disclosure standard we would expect of any service provider.

What I Support

I support the direction of this proposal. Revenue alignment is correct. A Foundation holding the brand is correct. V4 as a long-term technical direction is correct. The DAO should recognize this moment: engaged governance produces results.

What Needs to Happen First

Direction is not execution, and a Temp Check is not a blank check. I propose the following sequencing:

1. Unbundle the vote. Revenue alignment, V4 ratification, Foundation creation, and funding should be separate proposals. Each stands on its own merits. The community can support what it agrees with and refine what it doesn’t.

2. Truly independent Foundation. An independent Foundation holding all Aave IP, trademarks, and brand rights should be operational and verified before any funds are transferred. “Independent” means exactly that: a board and governance structure that is not controlled by Labs-aligned members. With voting power concentrated around Labs and the unresolved COI questions, an entity that is independent on paper but aligned in practice cannot serve as a safeguard. How Foundation independence is guaranteed is a question worth asking before any money moves.

3. Full wallet disclosure. Any entity requesting DAO funding and receiving AAVE tokens should disclose all wallets under its direct or indirect control. These standards apply to every service provider equally, including ACI.

4. Independent revenue verification. Revenue flowing to the DAO should be defined and verified by an independent auditor, with deductions capped or subject to DAO approval. “100% of revenue” must mean something the DAO can verify.

None of these require rejecting the proposal. They require improving it. These conditions can be met in weeks, not months. If they are already planned, formalizing them in the Temp Check costs nothing and strengthens community confidence.

Once these are met, the DAO can evaluate a funding proposal on fair terms, with a real Foundation in place, transparent governance holdings, verifiable revenue, and each component voted on individually.

Good day for Aave governance. The community pushed for alignment and got a response. Now make sure the response is real, enforceable, and fair.

---

Disclaimer: I am the founder of the Aave Chan Initiative, a delegate platform and service provider to the Aave DAO.

[JesusCryptoPlaza]

Comment: Revenue Alignment Is Not Enough — We Must Address Value Capture and the Agency Problem

First, credit where it is due: governance worked. As Marc pointed out, this proposal did not appear in a vacuum. Community pressure around revenue alignment, transparency, and structure has clearly influenced the direction. That is a positive signal for Aave.

It is also important to recognize the leadership that brought Aave here.

Aave did not reach 60% lending market share by accident. Over multiple cycles, the team has delivered V2 and V3 as industry standards, built one of the strongest security track records in DeFi, expanded across chains, generated over $100M in annualized protocol revenue, and maintained institutional credibility through complex regulatory environments. That competitive edge has been earned. Execution quality has been a defining strength of this protocol.

For that reason, this discussion should not evolve into reflexive distrust. Aave Labs has demonstrated competence and resilience. That trust has been built through performance — and it matters.

However, there is still a major dimension missing from this debate: value capture for AAVE holders.

We are discussing:

• The definition of “100% revenue”

• Whether deductions are at Labs’ discretion

• The size of the $50M funding request

• The 75,000 AAVE token transfer and its governance implications

• Whether V4 should be ratified now or later

• Whether the vote should be unbundled

All legitimate concerns. But none of them address the core economic question:

How does this translate into structural value accrual for the token holder?

If 100% of product revenue flows to the DAO treasury, that is a meaningful structural improvement. But revenue flowing into a treasury is not the same as value flowing to token holders. Treasury growth without a capital allocation framework can easily become undisciplined spending.

This proposal is clearly growth-oriented. Significant stablecoin funding. Large token transfers. Expansion into new verticals. Acceleration toward V4. That may be strategically sound — and Aave’s leadership has historically executed well — but growth without value capture creates an asymmetry:

• The ecosystem grows

• The operational footprint expands

• Costs increase

• But token holders remain structurally residual and indirect beneficiaries

At some point, we must define whether AAVE is meant to behave like productive capital or purely like governance utility.

We must also acknowledge the agency problem structurally embedded here.

We are in a situation where entities closely connected to product development may also be governance participants and potentially significant token holders. In other words:

• Investors

• Service providers

• Governance actors

may overlap.

This does not imply bad faith — and Aave’s leadership has earned credibility. But strong leadership does not eliminate structural agency risk. It makes it more important to design safeguards that protect the system long term.

Independent revenue verification, full wallet disclosure for funded entities, and clear boundaries around discretionary deductions are not expressions of distrust. They are governance hygiene in a maturing protocol that is scaling economically.

At the same time, we must avoid the opposite risk: turning governance into a coordination bottleneck.

Aave’s competitive advantage has always been its ability to move decisively while maintaining credible decentralization. We should be careful not to penalize that edge. Other protocols have shown how excessive procedural friction, fragmented votes, and political gridlock can weaken even technically superior systems. Governance should protect the protocol — not paralyze it.

Introducing clearer value capture mechanisms for token holders would actually reduce tension in this system. Beginning to return part of the value — whether through buybacks, staking yield, or structured fee capture — would introduce capital discipline without undermining execution speed. It would require prioritization. It would reduce the risk of over-optimization: deploying capital across too many fronts, expanding aggressively in multiple directions, and gradually losing strategic focus.

Many organizations do not lose competitiveness because they underinvest. They lose it because they overextend.

Aave V3 is a $100M+ annualized revenue engine. V4 may well be the future. Product expansion may unlock significant upside. This is precisely why now is the moment to define the long-term economic model of the token.

Revenue alignment is necessary.
Governance safeguards are necessary.
Preserving execution advantage is necessary.
But structural value capture discipline is equally necessary.

If we institutionalize growth without institutionalizing value accrual, we risk building a larger system that does not proportionally reward the capital base that secures and governs it.

This is not an argument against the proposal’s direction.
It is an argument for completing it — responsibly, strategically, and with long-term alignment in mind.

[Emereb]

This is a good first step, and I’m glad to see Labs explicitly align on the principle that 100% of Aave-branded product-layer revenues should flow back to the DAO. That said, I agree with @MarcZeller we need a clear, auditable definition of what “100%” means in practice.

Concretely, before this can be considered “done”, the DAO should have:

• a public revenue & permissions map (all product-layer streams, recipient addresses, who can change what, and under what process),

• regular reporting (quarterly at minimum) with verifiable numbers, and

• an independent audit / attestation for the major revenue streams.

On the budget side, I’ve said it before, Aave Labs has been doing excellent work, and I’m supportive of funding OPEX, growth, and user acquisition, but with standard governance hygiene, a clear budget breakdown, measurable KPIs, and milestone-based releases (especially for launch grants).

On the 75k AAVE ask, this is not just compensation, it is governance power. Market-standard alignment is typically 4-year vesting, not 2 so I’m asking Labs to be compliant with market practice, and to avoid recreating today’s legitimacy “soft governance” concerns that @stani said, the DAO should require governance guardrails around that stake (e.g., fixed/neutral delegation and strong COI recusal norms, with consequences tied to mandates/funding), so voting legitimacy is preserved.

If Labs is aligned with these principles, clear definition of “100%”, transparency/auditability, budget accountability, and long-term/low-risk token alignment, I believe we all win over the long term and we restore confidence in the token’s utility and valuation.

[JonahSkycatcher]

very good to see, great direction. lead vision like this has been needed.

A few key things that would be worthy additions - posting for community consideration:

1) ROIC Framework - A Return on invested capital framework for all grants, in particular growth spend could be implemented and administered by a 3P SP like TokenLogic. This way all DAO spend is made against an accountable to framework that allows DAO & voters to allocate more capital according to expected return (and track record of returns). Good for everyone.

2) DAO Spend Plan - As part of this, audit of DAO spend plans probably in order. 3P SPs providing financial accounting / audit services and risk services probably still makes sense. But on things like development etc, how much will Labs be doing here vs what DAO is also paying for elsewhere?

3) Contractual Terms - Think we need contractual terms that suitably enforce these terms for DAO / Token Holders. Technological details as well. The hole deal is better off for it, incomplete without it.

4) Larger AAVE allocation thats KPI Based - The proposed allocation of AAVE tokens is actually quite small (less than 1% of total supply?). So this part of the deal actually costs very little for each token holder. As such, I’d be in favor of higher allocation of AAVE tokens if a KPI-based vesting framework was implemented. Extra capital to invest in / incentivize RWA-focused BD efforts, for example, passes the expected ROIC sniff test. Esp if we can guarantee the expected business KPI / outcome.

Overall excellent to see this and think this deal is well structured. Would like to see these 4 things added and then will certainly be voting yes.

[Gross]

We cannot afford to waste months in debate and paralysis analysis. We have lost enough time already and we need to take action now. While we argue over details, institutional giants like BlackRock and major players are looking for entry points into DeFi. If we don’t resolve this uncertainty quickly, they will choose other protocols and we will lose our competitive edge. I am confident that Stani and the team are reading these comments and taking the community’s feedback to heart.

Looking at the bigger picture, everyone agrees that this is a positive, logical proposal with the right vision for Aave. There is no fundamental disagreement here. The community really only has four specific concerns. If these valid points are addressed, I believe this proposal will pass with 100% support.

Bridging the gap on these four points is entirely achievable.

1-The 75,000 AAVE allocation is the biggest friction point. The community finds the amount excessive and worries about the governance pressure it creates. Stani needs to meet us in the middle here. If this number is reduced to a reasonable 35-40k AAVE and vested over a standard 4-year period, I don’t think anyone would oppose it. This balances team incentives with DAO security.

2-There needs to be flexibility regarding the $25M budget. No one is against Aave Labs developing products and being profitable, provided that the revenue and expense structures are transparent. As long as we have clarity, the funding won’t be an issue.

3-We should keep V3 active. No one opposes the development of V4, but the majority wants V3 to remain the backbone until V4 has proven its security and stability. V3 is currently a cash cow generating significant revenue, so shutting it down prematurely is an unnecessary risk. Migration to V4 can be driven by incentives over time, allowing for a planned and safe transition.

4-Transparency and verification are essential. Directing brand revenue to the DAO is a great move, but we need independent verification of what constitutes “revenue” and how funds are deployed. This is simply good governance hygiene.

If we make these adjustments, we clear the path for approval. Let’s fix these points and move forward so Aave can secure its position as the leader in this space.

[Figue]

It’s great to see that issues previously highlighted are being addressed.

Obviously Aave Labs should be paid for their work, but I worry that this is an omnibus proposal. There’s a lot to cover, between revenue being forwarded to the DAO, the creation of a foundation, the introduction of new products, the focus on v4, as well as the multiple grants. The density of the proposal makes it lacking on the details, especially on the grant part. There are 33m$ to be granted with no explanation for the work behind them, and 17.5M$ to be awarded with “was the product released” as sole KPI.

While comparing to traditional financial institutions can make sense, it is important to remember three things:

1. Aave has close to no compliance costs, which often represent up to 20% of a bank’s spending;
2. We are entering an age of exponential productivity in tech, with both software development costs and speed expected to change dramatically. AI-assisted development is already reducing engineering costs across the industry by 20-40%, which should be reflected in forward-looking budgets rather than backward-looking benchmarks.;
3. Historically Aave was led by multiple Service Providers (Aave Labs, BGD, ACI, TokenLogic, Chaos Labs, Llama Risk…) which means that the total DAO budget is either way above 50m$, or solely managed by Aave Labs;

All in all, we should celebrate that Aave Labs is open to safeguarding the DAO’s sovereignty but we should be careful of what seems to be the DAO’s biggest payment, by far.

[Ioannis]

I’ve studied the AAVE Labs proposal and the surrounding arguments, and my take echoes Marc Zeller’s sentiment: The DAO Won, but the Deal Isn’t Done!

In reality, this deal could turn into value extraction—it all depends on unknowns like future revenues from RWAs and GHO. From my perspective, the best outcome for both sides is a structure that gives AAVE more room to grow without choking liquidity or innovation.

That said, AAVE Labs’ promise of a 100% revenue shift to the DAO is no small concession; it’s exactly what the DAO has been pushing for. We need to build on that to find the “happy exit” deal.These aren’t easy balances, but luckily our voting mechanisms can iterate toward results. Labs has tabled their vision—now let’s see a refined counter from the DAO side to bridge the gaps.

Since I don’t consider myself a financial or technical genius, and because I believe that AAVE is something much more valuable than what the markets are willing to appreciate at this point, I want only to ask both sides to reconsider their proposals and fight the uncertainty by giving more room to AAVE for innovation and growth. Importantly, we need to move fast: Prolonged governance drama has already contributed to price volatility, and with uncertainty lingering, delaying resolution risks further harm to token holders.

[setaavefree]

The DAO is getting everything it asked for. The biggest risk at this point is moving too slowly by subjecting the proposal to endless debate and micromanagement. Why not ratify it now and course-correct with more voting in the future when we find a problem?

[kberg]

Hey all!

For sake of keeping this thread in the loop, we’ve been gathering all the feedback and questions and are working on a thorough follow up. Thanks to everyone for sharing thoughts and ways to improve the proposal.

Will circle back ASAP.

[Gross]

The communication step from Labs is definitely a positive start. The consensus across the forums and X is clear: The majority supports the general framework and vision of the proposal. We are essentially 80% there; the deal is largely acceptable.

However, time is ticking. ETF narratives, institutional interest, and market cycles won’t wait for us. We need to resolve this uncertainty not by writing endless essays, but by taking action. To bring holders and big players back to Aave with confidence, let’s iron out the wrinkles in these 4 points and get this passed with 100% support immediately:

1-Revise the 75K AAVE Grant: This amount is causing valid concern. Please reduce this to a more reasonable level and spread it over a standard 4-year vesting schedule. This restores long-term trust.

2-Development Budget & Transparency: No one objects to Labs and partners making money or funding operations; it’s necessary for sustainability. However, the requested expenses must be transparent and executed with DAO oversight. As long as it’s accountable, the budget won’t be an issue.

3-Safe Transition from V3 to V4: V3 is our cash cow and working perfectly. It should not be shut down until V4 has fully proven itself and its security is established. The transition must be gradual, not rushed.

4-Full Transparency: When revenue definitions, expenses, and governance processes are structured simply and transparently for everyone to understand, I don’t believe anyone will oppose this vision.

Let’s make these adjustments and get back to business.