The Uncomfortable Question: Does the DAO have a "Plan B" (Contingency Strategy)?

[Gross]

Recent governance events have clarified one thing: The Community and Aave Labs have significantly different visions regarding autonomy and asset ownership. While the “NO” vote was a strong signal, the subsequent silence creates a dangerous uncertainty.

As we wait for Aave Labs to propose a new structure, we must address the “Elephant in the Room.” Hope is not a strategy, and waiting is not a plan.

The “Two-Headed” Risk

Aave is currently operating under a dual-power dynamic (DAO vs. Labs) that naturally creates friction. If this misalignment persists, or if the upcoming proposal from Labs is another “take it or leave it” offer, we risk entering a permanent gridlock that stalls innovation while competitors move fast.

I am asking the Delegates and Service Providers (ACI, BGD, Chaos, etc.) the following critical questions regarding our Risk Management:

1. The “Walk Away” Scenario

If Aave Labs refuses to cede the IP/Brand to a neutral Foundation or demands terms the DAO cannot accept:

Do we have a contingency plan to operate completely independently?

Is the DAO prepared to migrate to a new brand/platform identity if the current one is held hostage?

2. Operational Continuity

If the partnership with Labs dissolves:

Are our current Service Providers (BGD, ACI, etc.) capable of taking over the full development and frontend maintenance immediately?

Is there a “Shadow Frontend” or alternative access point ready to be deployed if aave.com becomes restricted or divergent from DAO interests?

3. The Alternative Path

Does the DAO have a roadmap for a “Plan B” where we rebuild the interface and user acquisition channels from scratch, without reliance on the current entity holding the IP?

Why I am asking this:

This is not to spread FUD, but to ensure Anti-Fragility.

A DAO that relies 100% on a single vendor’s good will is not decentralized; it is captured. Knowing that we have a Plan B is actually the best way to ensure we never have to use it, as it strengthens our negotiation position.

We need transparency not just on what we hope happens, but on what we will do if the worst happens.

[Emereb]

I agree with the core point, the DAO needs clear risk management and a credible contingency plan. At the same time, I wouldn’t frame the “NO” vote as simply “Labs refusing” this is a complex, foundational topic and it’s normal that any ownership/alignment change requires clarity on scope, execution, and safeguards.

That said, we should avoid drifting into a permanent grey area. A pragmatic next step is to set a clear process and deadlines, if we don’t have a concrete, detailed proposal by end of February, the DAO should publish a precise calendar for next steps (who drafts what, by when, and how it gets validated).

In the meantime, we can make the discussion more actionable by asking for a few concrete deliverables that improve anti-fragility regardless of the final structure:

1. a public inventory of critical “Aave” assets (domains/ENS/handles/orgs/admin permissions) and who controls them today,

2. a revenue & permissions map for Aave-branded surfaces (what revenue streams exist, recipient addresses, and who can change parameters),

3. an operational runbook for critical governance assets (renewals/monitoring/emergency procedures), similar to the recent ENS rescue.

I also think it’s important to recognize recent positive signals, the aavedao.eth rescue and the fact it’s not being claimed as private property, Eboado’s effort to clarify principles and execution paths, and the push to improve governance process around proposal escalation. These are good steps, but markets will only stop pricing uncertainty once the guardrails are explicit and enforceable.

The goal isn’t to escalate it’s to remove ambiguity and protect the DAO long-term while keeping builders moving fast.

[Gross]

This is an exceptionally constructive take. I fully agree that we shouldn’t frame this as a conflict, but as a necessary maturation of our operational security.

Your suggestion of a “Public Asset Inventory &Permission Map” is the perfect immediate next step. We cannot protect what we have not defined.

However, creating this inventory leads to the inevitable question: “Once listed, where should the ultimate legal ownership of these critical assets reside?”

This brings us back to the structural gap. An inventory is just a list until it has a secure home. This reinforces the need for the Parallel Model (Foundation as Legal Shield) discussed earlier.

[FREDY]

I am still trying to understand this scenario as it is confused to me that how could it be a “dual-power dynamic” as mentioned because I see the DAO is always above anything. DAO is sovereign and should be governing anything. Aave Labs should be seen as a contractor to the DAO that provides services and can be replaced anytime by decision of the DAO via its token holders.

At the end token holders putting their assets at risks are the ones who decide for the DAO and whatever decision anything under the DAO umbrella (including Labs) simply must follow.
There should be no question that everything naturally belongs to the DAO and it may choose to delegate to some thrid-party or contractor, but must be able to take that back whenever token holders find necessary.

If I misunderstood something please correct my view. Thanks.

[Gross]

Strengthening the Alliance: Why a Legal Shell Enables Better Collaboration

I appreciate your perspective on the DAO’s sovereignty. While I agree that the DAO is the ultimate decision maker, I want to reframe the goal here.

This isn’t about preparing to “replace” Aave Labs. On the contrary, Aave Labs is our strongest builder, and their success is the DAO’s success. The goal is to ensure we can work together without structural friction.

The Friction in the Current Model

Currently, because the legal assets (IP, domains) are held by the service provider (Labs), every negotiation feels heavy. The DAO worries about “what if we lose access,” and Labs carries the burden of “centralization risk.”

This “Dual Power” dynamic creates unnecessary tension, not because we want to split, but because the architecture is unbalanced.

How the Parallel Model Fosters Collaboration

The “Foundation” I proposed is not a weapon to fire contractors; it is a bridge for healthy partnership.

1 Clarified Roles:

Aave Labs: Focuses on what they do best innovation, code, and V4. They remain the powerful “Execution Engine.”

The Foundation: Acts as the passive “Legal Shell” holding the keys safe for the DAO.

2 Removed Leverage: When the IP is held neutrally, the “hostage” fear disappears. The DAO can fund Labs confidently, knowing the assets are safe.

3 Long Term Alignment: This structure allows Labs to be a massive, long term partner to the DAO, but based on performance and shared vision, not just because they hold the keys.

4 Fair Economic Terms (Crucial):

I want to emphasize this strongly: No one in the DAO opposes reasonable revenue sharing. We want Aave Labs to be highly profitable.

However, we sincerely hope the upcoming proposal does not present an imposing, “take it or leave it” structure or an unacceptable Foundation model. A proposal based on mutual respect will pass easily; a proposal based on imposition will not. We are ready for a fair deal, not a dictate.

Conclusion

We don’t want a master/servant relationship in either direction. We want a Symbiotic Partnership.

The Parallel Model (Separating IP from Execution) is the industry standard to achieve this. It protects the DAO’s assets while empowering Labs to build aggressively without legal overhead. It’s a win-win for growth.

[Millesimillia]

Thank you. As a general rule: what is offered to Aave Labs should also be offered to other service providers. Aave Labs owners (and other providers) can the boost their total return by holding Aave tokens on top of receiving DAO revenues for provided services.

[Gross]

I agree. The goal is not competition, but seamless harmony where Aave Labs and the DAO work as one.

To achieve this, we need a Fast and Dynamic Mechanism designed for speed:

Simple & Transparent: No complex bureaucracy. Clear rules that everyone understands.

Dynamic Execution: A structure that moves as fast as the market, allowing Labs to execute without friction while keeping the DAO aligned.

This ensures a partnership that is agile, transparent, and united.

[Nandy.eth]

Interfaces like DeFi Saver - Aave state that this interface is quite advanced and permits likely the same as aave.com. Some peripheral functions are only available on aave.com, and some integrations, like display of LST and LRT tokens, are available on this interface and not on aave.com.