[ARFC] $AAVE token alignment. Phase 1 - Ownership

Governance
1

Title: [ARFC] $AAVE token alignment. Phase 1 - Ownership
Author: Ernesto Boado (co-founder @bgdlabs)
Date: 2025-12-16


Summary

This is an Aave Governance proposal for AAVE token holders to request receiving control of Aave’s brand assets (domains, social handles, naming rights, etc), on a DAO-controlled vehicle (defined at a later stage) with strong anti-capture protections.
Hence, asking for any party controlling them at the moment to deliver them both in ethos and in practice, no matter who that party is.



Motivation

Aave’s origins and long-term direction have consistently been framed around decentralization: a project initially funded via a decentralized mechanism (ICO), to be owned and governed by token holders through a real DAO, ideally self-sustainable, with both value and accountability expected to be inherent to the Aave DAO itself.

For years, the community has operated under the implicit expectation of alignment between contributors (e.g. Service Providers) and the DAO. In practice, for example, Aave Labs has been implicitly considered as a good-faith steward of communications channels, or important gateways such as aave.com on behalf of the broader ecosystem. Or BGD Labs, has been acting as implicit steward of others like the aave-dao Github organisation, where multiple contributors maintain different repositories.

But that implicit understanding, no matter who the third-party is, is not a healthy or beneficial for $AAVE long-term, as the fact of making the delegation stewardship explicit, is un-doubtfully only positive to $AAVE. Moreover, recent events have raised concerns on other community members in these forum, that these brand assets are being used to enable private monetisation and to support products the DAO has no practical say on, and is not the main value-recipient.
This proposal is therefore intended to bring explicit clarity and DAO control to how Aave-branded assets and intellectual property are, first, owned, and second, can be used, and the terms for it.


Additional context & principles

The following is a list of facts, and I would say pretty reasonable opinions, on the legitimacy of this proposal:

  • In relation to the usage of aave.com, subdomains, communication and marketing channels, or other online representation aspects (Github, package managers, etc) by any non-DAO third-party, whether for private monetisation purposes or not: a private party, regardless of its past or present role in the community, should not have unilateral ownership and control over them. Consequently, the DAO should request those parties via governance vote to deliver to AAVE token holders those assets; more precisely to any necessary legal setup or SPV, with strong protections.

  • In what regards app.aave.com, the claim by Aave Labs that the software application hosted on app.aave.com is their product is, potentially legitimate. And similar to any private software, it is up to the private party to dispose of it as desired. However, ownership and control of the software have no relation to ownership and control of app.aave.com. By any neutral analysis, the ability of a third-party to engage in monetisation of the software is enabled by brand recognition and by the gateway effect of aave.com, including its role as a primary entry point to app.aave.com.

  • Private entities clearly separated from the DAO should not be allowed to unilaterally attribute to themselves, implicitly or explicitly, the name “Aave” or the status of “being Aave”. With a plural organisation like the DAO and the lack of a direct mechanism of self-representation, another entity doing so outside a service agreement or other model (e.g., franchising) weakens the DAO’s ability to control its own representation. It also creates a principal-agent scenario where the agent can decide, at any point, to prioritise its private interests over those of the DAO. These applies for any entity to have a important role in the community, for example Service Providers.

  • Not having a resolution on this issue is an existential threat to the DAO model, including but not limited to the involvement of all Service Providers. All service providers are independent third parties who have created, or are actively trying to create, sustainable businesses while contributing to the Aave DAO and being compensated on equal conditions based on merit.

    • Example: my company, BGD Labs, was created in 2022 and has been contributing to Aave since then, being a major development contributor during that period. But that did not give us any legitimacy to be called “Aave”, or to promote ourselves as “Aave”. We are an important contributor to the Aave DAO, we are generously compensated, and that’s it.

    If a single party can control soft assets like brand, marketing channels, gateways, and “Aave” attribution, all other contributors become de facto subordinated to that party. This undermines neutral incentives to contribute to a common good, namely the DAO and $AAVE.

  • The Aave DAO does not need hand-holding. It is a system that requires continuous improvements, simplifications, and changes. But I don’t believe it requires anymore any implicit agreement with a third party that the third party itself argues is required “for Aave” or “for everybody”. Those decisions are not for any third party to make.

  • Compared with many other tokens and DAOs, there is a strong argument that, in substance, AAVE token holders should have control and ownership over the Aave name (e.g., trademark), gateways, and communication channels.

    To claim that the brand itself does not belong, in substance, to AAVE token holders, given those circumstances, is, in my opinion, dubious both from a practical and high-level perspective.


What this is NOT about?

Other threads and comments are, in some cases, highly adversarial against specifically Aave Labs due to precedents. But this proposal tries to be neutral, defending what I really think are the legitimate interests of a healthy Aave ecosystem, and doesn’t apply exclusively to Aave Labs, but for any other entity, including the one I’m part of, BGD Labs.

So the following is important to keep in mind:

  • This is not a discussion or governance procedure suggesting that Aave Labs should not be a contributor to the DAO, or that it lacks legitimacy or capability to do so. Those are totally independent topics, and the contribution of Aave Labs is completely legitimate in my opinion, but even if applicable:

    1. They do not remove constraints associated with the role of contributor, and
    2. they are decisions for the DAO to make, as it has always been done with compensation agreements or others.

  • This is not a discussion exclusively about the previous swap features thread. That is in my opinion merely a realised instance of the high-level problem: any party being able to have control over from “Aave” attribution, gateway control, or marketing.

  • This is not a discussion about potential legal blockers of creating an entity (foundation, SPV, etc.) that allows the DAO to exercise ownership and control rights over domains or communication channels.

    Those are practical aspects that must be addressed, but they do not change the core question of AAVE token holders signalling a mandate to deliver control and ownership.

  • This is not incompatible with Aave Labs, in the future, being a candidate to manage gateways or communication channels in practice. That is one option among others, but it is secondary to ownership and control of those assets, and self-protection if the task is delegated.



Specification

The proposal to vote is simple: should the Aave DAO and AAVE token holders regain full control over Aave’s brand, naming rights, and associated assets? With any third party currently controlling these assets (Aave Labs, BGD Labs, anybody), transferring them to the DAO via an appropriate DAO-controlled legal wrapper

These “assets”/rights include but are not limited to:

  • The DAO deciding on “Aave” naming rights for products and organisations, not any third parties.
    • Examples: Usage of “Aave Labs”, “Aave App”, “Aave Web App”, “Aave Pro” or “Aave Horizon”.
    • This also includes representational titles, such as using executive titles of Aave (e.g., “CEO of Aave”) without proper clarification of separation.
  • The DAO having ownership and control over all communication channels using “Aave” or implicitly associated names. This includes but is not limited to the “aave” handle on X, the Aave Discord, “aave” on Instagram, and any other social or public channel.
  • The DAO having control and ownership over domains, including but not limited to aave.com, and any others with direct association (e.g., onaave.com).
  • The DAO having ownership over online organisations, including but not limited to GitHub or npm. Example, “aave” and “aave-dao” Github organisations, “aave” npm, etc.

Additionally, this proposal approves the intention to establish strict mechanisms so that no third party can misuse these assets or privately benefit from them, implicitly or explicitly, with legally enforceable recourse by the DAO if such a situation arises.

And to seek legal advice if any of the counterparties don’t facilitate the process of ownership transfer.

This practical setup should be implemented by a provably neutral third party, independent from all Aave Service Providers, and legally accountable to AAVE token holders’ interests.


Additional aspects

  • For obvious reasons, I believe entities with direct conflicts of interest should not participate or vote Abstain on the voting phase. However, voting on Aave is (and should always be) permissionless, so anybody can obviously do as they think, rightfully so.
  • This proposal doesn’t include any executable programmatic payload, so either a single Snapshot or on-chain voting is perfectly enough. I propose an on-chain vote with empty payload, as there is no cost of voting anymore on the current governance on-chain system, hence maximising participation.


Disclaimers

  • I’m not presenting this proposal on behalf of anybody.
  • I’m an AAVE token holder.
  • I was part of the original Aave Labs, but totally independent after 2022.
  • I’m an active contributor to the DAO via BGD Labs, on technical and security aspects. Also a partial owner.
  • All information I reference is totally public.
  • My company BGD Labs has been collaborating with Aave Labs in the past years as Service Provider to Service Provider, and I have no issue continuing to do so if applicable in DAO projects. I deeply believe that multi-party providers to the DAO is a model that has future, but under equal terms for everybody.
  • I think it is my implicit responsibility as token holder to try to improve aspects I believe deserve so.
  • I think without the DAO having full and exclusive control of all its assets, there is no future for the idea of a decentralised autonomous organisation where multiple parties contribute based on merit.

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived under CC0.


Links


Next steps

  • Collect community feedback in this forum thread.
  • Escalate to vote.
52 Likes
Aave Cowswap Integration- Tokenholder Questions
Aave Cowswap Integration- Tokenholder Questions
2

A much needed proposal, looking forward to have this conversation. Thanks @eboado for making this happen

5 Likes
3

Hey, solid proposal overall. I agree with most of the underlying points

Let’s be clear: who owns AAVE? Avara? Aave Labs? No. The token holders. Full stop. Owning AAVE means owning the Aave Protocol. That part isn’t debatable

Avara / Aave Labs is a major Service Provider to the DAO. There’s a very straightforward path here: license specific branding and naming rights from the DAO (e.g. Aave App, Aave Pro, Aave Horizon) under clearly defined, DAO-controlled, and revocable terms. DAO retains ownership, operations continue, everyone knows where the lines are. This really doesn’t need to be complicated

The real issue here isn’t control, it’s clarity, alignment, and communication. Fix that, put proper agreements in place, and move forward

15 Likes
4

Very good to see this prop coming, thanks for that. Well documented, straight to the point with overal softer tone which is perfectly welcomed considering the ongoing conversations.

Shared and followed :+1:

9 Likes
5

Excellent proposal. Token holders/DAO funded EthLend and Aave from the start.

It is natural to believe there would be additional products developed in the future to drive additional income to the DAO.

No enterprise is static just as Amazon doesn’t any longer generate most income from selling books. These Aave-branded and promoted products need to benefit the DAO.

DAO should have some control and alignment with all service providers that are using the Aave name or using the main front-end application to access Aave.

7 Likes
6

Hello @eboado and thank you for your proposal.
I think this post can somehow be seen as a well formulated and clear defined proposal that is coming out of my post, from a couple days ago, but already including all the points and facts AAVE tokenholder have mentioned many times.

It is clear to me as a tokenholder myself and Aave DAO delegate, that everything im doing which include tasks like commenting, forum management & improvements, voting, as well as helping teams to guide thorugh the DAO, that im doing it to grow the DAOs treasury ultimately. My tasks are soley focused on bringing the most value to the protocol and its tokenholder. As it should be for everyone being active in the DAOs governance or working as a SP for the DAO.

By having all AAVE related brand assets on a DAO controlled legal wrapper, whatever this may look like, the DAO can protect itself against anyone trying to harm it in any way.
I want to be clear, there is no one trying to harm it right now, but this could happen and we need to look for solutions to make sure that whenever someone decides to leave or harm the DAO for whatever reason, that all DAO related assets are protected, at any time.

Additionally, if all assets are protected from individuals and can only be controlled together based on DAO made decisions there is only one ultimate goal, which essentially is to grow marketshare and grow revenue for the DAO, cause it would be the one entity paying everyone that is part of the DAO.

Aave is such a strong brand and protocol that it must be protected at all costs. It must be able to survive even if everyone decides to leave and a completely new team would show up.

Over the last few days I have been talking to people and reading many great examples of how to protect a DAO with a legal wrapper from API3, Lido to even Morpho.

The DAO is now so mature, that its time to protect it and I think @eboado did a great write up here from the other discussion.
We may should have thought about this a longer time ago, but better now than never.

Although this post already has most of it covered and only looks like the first version of several proposal, i would like to add something else important to it.
The name of the proposal is “Aave token alignment”, so I would like to propose that when the DAO finally has its legal wrapper that the DAO needs to have contracts with DAO SP & Delegates that add important aspects like:

  • No other token will ever be introduced to govern products within the Aave ecosystem, not current ones and no future ones.
  • Anyone being on the payroll of the DAO confirms to not work with any competitor, only if it has been approved by the DAO
  • Main goal is to maximize the revenue for tokenholder
  • Other points may be added if the DAO approves it via voting

Again, thanks for summarizing and writing this proposal, which I would have done myself as well.

25 Likes
7

Decentralisation only works when it’s real, not just in code, but in culture, in governance. Governance has played an important role consistently in the past years to help aave become the leaders in defi space by a margin.

Also agree with adding that no other token will be associated with aave protocol.

Full support moving forward with to build an Aave protocol that truly belongs to all of token holders.

6 Likes
8

Thanks for the proposal. I believe this proposal reflects the minds of the AAVE community. This should have been done long time ago, but yea glad that we are doing it at least now. Looking forward for this conversation.

9 Likes
9

I completely agree with the core premise and motivation of the proposal. The move from implicit stewardship by Service Providers to explicit and legally enforceable ownership and control by the AAVE token holders via the DAO is a crucial step for achieving genuine decentralization and mitigating systemic risk. I think it’s a necessary evolution for a mature DAO to formalize brand, domain, and communication channel ownership, ensuring that all contributors operate on equal terms and that the primary value-recipient remains the token holders. And if I understand correctly, the current model rely on the good faith of any single entity. It’s indeed an existential risk that must be addressed for long-term health and credibility.

The challenge

While I agree with the intent of establishing a DAO-controlled legal wrapper and transferring ownership, the most significant challenge lies in the practical and financial implementation of the “DAO-controlled legal wrapper” and the ongoing oversight mechanism.

The proposal requires the assets be transferred to an “appropriate DAO-controlled legal wrapper” managed by a “provably neutral third party, independent from all Aave Service Providers.”

This presents a few issues that need clear resolution in subsequent phases:

  1. Cost and Efficiency of the Legal Structure: Creating and maintaining a robust, decentralized-friendly legal entity (like a foundation or SPV) can be complex and expensive, involving significant legal fees and annual compliance costs. Will the long-term benefit of formal ownership outweigh the ongoing administrative and financial burden placed on the DAO’s treasury, especially when compared to a simpler, contract-based licensing model?

  2. Defining “Provably Neutral”: The proposal delegates the management to a “provably neutral third party.” In the decentralized space, identifying a party that is truly independent, has the necessary legal and operational expertise, and is willing to take on this fiduciary duty for the DAO, while being legally accountable to AAVE token holders, is a non-trivial task that could become a bottleneck or a new source of governance contention.

  3. The New Centralization Point: Although the intent is decentralization, establishing a single legal entity and appointing a single management body (the “neutral third party”) effectively creates a new, high-value, centralized point of legal/operational control. While it’s legally accountable, the DAO must have flawless, low-friction mechanisms to audit, replace, or directly command this entity and third party, or it risks simply substituting one steward for another.

Therefore, while the mandate for ownership transfer is right, the community must be highly prescriptive about the type of legal wrapper and the fee structure for the neutral third party to ensure the solution doesn’t create excessive overhead or introduce new governance complexities during Phase 2 implementation.

6 Likes
10

AAVE got 60%+ lending TVL, it’s so important what we do here.

We must get these “horizon”,”paraswap” and similar affairs in control.

3 Likes
Aave Cowswap Integration- Tokenholder Questions
11

Is the path forward for decentralized entities for them to look and act more like centralized entities? Do we expect a private company to continue thriving after contorting it and artificially rearranging its incentives? Is increasing complexity the right solution? How about composability instead?

The Aave protocol, as a series of smart contracts governed by a DAO, is unconventional. But because it interacts with the conventional world it must rely on at least one conventional entity which has historically been Aave Labs. Aave the protocol and Aave Labs each have a separate job to do and evidently they are each doing them incredibly well. Aave is special for only one reason: it has succeeded where others have failed. We should be extremely cautious about forcing changes to the naturally arranged set of incentives and the symbiotic relationship that has brought us here.

Should tokens/DAOs control private companies? Has that ever led a company to success? Aave proves beyond any doubt that tokens/DAOs controlling smart contracts works. Let’s embrace composability and let each form of organization do what it does best. Aave the protocol doesn’t need to own a website, a domain name, or even a brand. It exists in perfect and pure form without any of those. Anyone can launch a website and build a brand and hook into the Aave protocol and the protocol benefits when they do. Let’s not manipulate the benefit the builders also naturally realize so that they are incentivized to build.

I think at least part of this backlash is due to tokenholders assuming that the token would own and control all aspects of Aave. I thought so and I was deeply disappointed when I read the news. But as I thought about the bigger picture I realized that through luck or skill or some combination, Aave has found its way into a very natural and highly-functioning state that should not be uprooted and manipulated. Having said that, I personally think there is some historical basis for tokenholders to have felt that Aave Labs was holding some of its assets for their benefit and I think Aave Labs should offer the DAO a meaningful settlement without introducing complexities.

4 Likes
12

I believe a Cayman Ownerless foundation will cost you around 20-40K USD to set up (everything included) and probably less than 5K a year to maintain the entities. The foundation can have subsidiary entities and generally it’s recommended that all IP is held in a wholly owned (by the foundation) Ltd.

The foundation can do everything a normal entity can do, and can act as the DAO’s legal arm/wrapper. Directors can be independent, and mandates can be such that they only act in accordance with governance proposals. You would also have a cost per director. I reckon in the range of 20-60K USD per year (generally less expensive also per director if you have more as responsibility and workload decreases), or USDC and AAVE. Depending on their workload, their skillset and their credentials. There could be also non-independent director(s), or one completely independent, one from AAVE community and one from Aave Labs. As long as at least one is Cayman resident, or resident in the chosen jurisdiction and there is sufficient substance there.

So lets say setup 30K ±
Yearly cost (directors included): 75K ±

None of it is cheap, but I think the value it gives is more than worth it.

You could also use a trust structure. Costs should be similar.

I think its best if Aave Labs takes the initiative here, they should’ve already ensured a holistic structure was in place, given how mature and large the protocol is.

Ultimately we should do this with them. They have been integral to Aave’s success and the protocol is best served with them involved and aligned.

Some small alignment issues and mistakes, does not make them incompetent or malicious. I believe ultimately they also have the DAO’s best interest at heart. These are simply some things to be adjusted and corrected, for an even brighter future together.

3 Likes
14

We don’t live in a world YET, where an organization can be completely autonomous without a legal identity.

Parts of it can, and more and more parts of it will in the future. But in todays world, a legal wrapper matters. If adding complexity is your main concern, I think trying to be 100% autonomous is way more complex.

What kind of settlement do you envisage? The only settlement that repairs the current situation is a transfer of all IP. That, the brand, is where most value and power lies. For that, the DAO needs a legal entity.

And yes anyone can built on Aave and own a website, but Aave Labs is not anyone. Aave Labs, is Aave protocol. What they built, should be for the DAO and the DAO should compensate them very well for it, but transparently.

5 Likes
15

Thanks @eboado for this proposal, much needed after the heated discussion on the Cowswap Integration Post from @EzR3aL .. :slightly_smiling_face:

And I’m fully supportive of this proposal. The DAO treasury should sit at the center of the Aave ecosystem. If the DAO does well and the treasury grows, everyone benefits - simple as that. That’s like the strongest form of alignment we can have.

I also don’t see this as being against any service provider at all. The current setup is clearly working, and this proposal doesn’t change how service providers operate, only how core assets are owned and governed. Aave is leading the market for a reason; there’s no need to change that.

It’s more of a safety measure than anything else. Ensuring core assets like the brand and domains are under DAO control helps avoid misalignment as the ecosystem continues to grow. It keeps incentives pointed in the same direction: clear ownership, clear incentives, and no room for confusion later on.

5 Likes
16

Hi everyone,

First, thank you to @eboado for this proposal and @EzR3aL for opening this discussion. I believe it is the natural next step in Aave’s decentralization, especially now that DeFi benefits from far more regulatory clarity than in prior cycles.

Disclosure: I was COO of Aave from 2017 to 2021, and left shortly before v3 was released. I’m sharing this context because I worked closely with many of the people and teams being discussed.

1) On the “Labs vs service providers” narrative

I want to address some of the comments suggesting that service providers “don’t respect” Aave Labs, or that include personal attacks against Labs from frustrated token holders.

Service providers, whoever they are, have also contributed meaningfully to the protocol. They should not be expected to pay endless tribute to Aave Labs. When any entity is funded to deliver work, the community should expect them to meet their obligations, and debates should stay focused on performance and alignment, not personal grievances.

What’s often missing from this conversation is that several founders of the most important service providers originally came from Aave Labs, and left specifically to work for the protocol and the DAO. That is not an accident, it reflects what many of us saw as the original and most viable long-term vision: a protocol stewarded by a truly decentralized DAO.

  • BGD Labs was co-founded by Ernesto, who served as CTO of Aave Labs for a long time and was one of the key architects of the Aave protocol. Several of his co-founders and team members were also instrumental in Aave v1, v2, and v3.

  • ACI was founded by Marc Zeller, who previously led developer relations at Aave Labs and played an important role in integrations, partnerships, and broader strategy.

  • I will not name them all, some are delegates, some others are working with other service providers but whether ex employees, or long term community members, it is good to remember who we are talking about when using these abstract names.

I know these things firsthand because I worked with them and I don’t know anyone more committed to the DAO and health and growth of the protocol. It genuinely pains me to see the discussion reduced to “Labs built everything” or to see contributors dismissed. Aave Labs did contribute tremendously, especially in stewarding the brand and helping Aave become what it is today, but it’s also true that the protocol’s progress has been the result of many hands over many years.

2) Alignment: the growing divide

Lately, the divide between Aave Labs’ equity-holder incentives and AAVE token-holder incentives has been growing in ways that make some of us uncomfortable. The potential Horizon token and the swapgate are the main reasons why I see this proposal and the broader “ownership/alignment” discussion as so important.

Even today, when this proposal is posted (in my view one of the most important DAO discussions in DeFi), it hasn’t been reposted by the main Aave X account, while other items (like Stani’s personal purchase and a 3 month old SEC letter) were amplified. My expectation is that official channels should promote major governance discussions neutrally and invite participation. That would be far more straightforward if the DAO ultimately had control of key communication channels.

Eventually we should not have to fear that the implicit steward of the brand may at any point leverage that brand for their own benefit without it directly benefiting the DAO and especially not without DAO consent.

3) Brand and IP: why this matters

Long-term, I agree that Aave may simply become infrastructure powering finance—many users may never interact with an “Aave-branded” front end.

Still, brand and IP matter today, and I believe the DAO should eventually reach a point where it can license the Aave brand on clear, DAO-defined terms.

A simple thought experiment:

If tomorrow a major institution, say JPMorgan, decided to buy the Aave brand/IP from Aave Labs, what happens?

  • It could be framed as a “win” because it might increase institutional participation in the protocol.

  • But the acquisition proceeds would go to Labs (and its equity holders), while token holders would have effectively lost ownership and leverage over a key asset.

  • Even if the deal required the buyer to acquire some AAVE for optics, the core economics of the IP sale would not flow to the DAO.

I’m not saying we should sell the brand to anyone. The point is: if value is being created from assets funded and bootstrapped by the community since the ICO, the DAO should not be structurally sidelined from that value. If anything like that ever happened, I would strongly prefer that the DAO, not a separate equity entity, receive the corresponding upside.

This is why I believe now is the time to act.

4) Returning to the original ICO vision

Finally, it’s worth remembering: Aave was funded in 2017 via an ICO by token holders, not VC. The original ETHLend whitepaper stated that the project would relocate to Zug and “shall use a Swiss Foundation or Swiss LLC depending on” the regulatory status quo. The status quo made it that Labs operated as a company but time has changed.

In my view, the regulatory status quo is now far more supportive of decentralization than it was in earlier years. We have an opportunity to follow through on the vision we committed to at ICO: a brand ultimately owned and governed in a way that reflects the DAO’s role and responsibilities.

(PS : In the context of the Interop Labs acquisition i truly believe we have a great marketing opportunity both for Labs, Stani and the DAO to show everyone how its done)

(PS2 : If it was not clear I am in obvious support of this proposal).

35 Likes
18

I have been an Aave holder since it was called Lend. But my two cents are the following:

  • I see 3 parties here. Aave Labs, DAO and Aave token holders. Lots of good comments about alignment between Aave Labs and the DAO but not much about the DAO and Aave Token holders. I feel some of the comments and the arguments being made by the DAO are to the benefit of the DAO and not Token Holders.

  • It seems to me that the DAO failed to secure an agreement for the funds they were receiving and up until this point Aave Labs had allowed the DAO to keep the funds as good will but not something that was promised. I am not sure that the same DAO that has caused this mess has the tools and skills to do anything more than they were before. Running domains, social handles, naming rights, etc if not done by a company with a full team is going to leave you open to security risks and vulnerabilities. Unless the DAO creates a company but then do you have a DAO for your DAO?

  • In the end a DAO is just a special interest group/cabinet/committee

  • We came this far with the way Aave Labs has been running things, I don’t see Token Holders worrying because it didn’t affect them it affected the DAO who shouldn’t have relied on Aave to fund anything more than what they had going

  • Also it took this long for the DAO to notice $10million (isn’t even the real number but no one wants to talk about that) being missed but they want the responsibility to do more? Yeah not in favour at all. I don’t see how the DAO has the maturity to run anything more than it’s current remit without jeopardizing the brand.

9 Likes
19

Great take on this discussion. There are two possible paths from here:

  1. Full abstraction: minimize DAO complexity by focusing solely on managing on-chain smart contracts. Everything remains on-chain, and there’s no need for regulatory intervention.

  2. Hybrid model: transform Aave DAO into a hybrid organization with a presence both on-chain and in the real world. I actually think this model will become common for most public companies in the future.
    However, core on-chain organizations like Aave still have the opportunity to remain fully on-chain with minimal complexity, and in my opinion, this opportunity should be fully utilized.

1 Like
20

Full abstraction. I feel anyone who decided to be apart of the DAO did so understanding their remit. Taking on responsibilities beyond that is risky in the sense that now the DAO is now responsible for things beyond their expertise. The responsibility should have only ever been on-chain.

Being a larger holder of Aave and seeing how Aave is performing in these current conditions means we are on the right path. A path that is being battle tested and has been battle tested. Why not continue down this path?

From being a long time lurker. I see a lot of unnecessary resistance from the DAO which might have explained why Aave Labs decided to make certain changes. Blame lies on both sides in terms of comms.

4 Likes
21

We need to figure out GHO and Horizon as well. Aave DAO paid to develop those products. Aave Labs can take credit for doing the dev work but they are currently claiming ownership of them after being paid.

Also we may want to request the ETH Core Devs and Foundation intercede. They are not going to like the idea of Founder they funded/work with/invite to events blackmailing their own DAO for cash. In the end ETH is going to be on the side of DAO’s so while the law may be on Aave Labs side, if ETH is on ours they’ll be blacklisted from the industry.

Not to mention Stani just got finished being investigated by the SEC so if we report he sold us tokens then rugged the benefits maybe they’ll come back. We talk about how Aave DAO is at Avara’s mercy because we don’t own our brand assets legally, but let’s not forget that Stani has to care about his moral and ethical reputation plus has to worry that the SEC will make an example of him. Let us not forget that Trump’s World Liberty owns Aave tokens so Stani is stealing from the US president’s here.

1 Like
22

Yep, I have seen similar costs. Directors only need to meet a handful of times a year. The Foundation has very little actual work unless someone is infringing, and then you are happy to have it to enforce IP rights.