ARFC: GHO Genesis parameters

Governance
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GHO Genesis Parameters

Aave Companies’ Risk Team has investigated historical data to guide the launch of GHO, leading to the following recommendations for the genesis parameters of the asset.

Borrow Rate (BR) stkAAVE Discount Rate (DR) Facilitator Bucket Capacity DEX liquidity pool 50/50 GHO/3Pool
Launch BR 2% to 2.5% DR 25% T=4 max 25% of GHO supply for stakers minimum of 50M or 25% of active borrows on V3 Ethereum Market Need to seed DEX liquidity ⇒ Target stable liquidity pool of $15M GHO

Supply

The GHO supply includes all GHO minted through DAO approved Facilitators. Each Facilitator is granted a specific minting cap, with the resulting amount of GHO minted by each Facilitator dependent on demand. The market availability of GHO is therefore directly influenced by these minting caps, which can be adjusted to balance the supply and demand. For instance, if the token price exceeds its peg, minting can increase the supply, which creates downward pressure on the price.

Rates

The net minting rates of GHO compete with the Ethereum DeFi Dollar Borrow Index, a measure of stablecoin borrow demand across DeFi. Currently, the average cost of borrowing a stablecoin is around 1% after accounting for stablecoin borrow rates, collateral supply yield, and incentives. Based on the yield of assets supplied to Aave Protocol, the recommended rate range for GHO to remain competitive is between 1.5% and 2.5%.

defidollarborrowindexNETofSUPPLY_exPSM20230217
defidollarborrowindexNETofSUPPLY_exPSM202302173000×1800 445 KB

The GHO minting rate has a direct impact on the demand and can be recalibrated as a peg stability tool. A cautious approach at launch could be to set a higher rate, at 2% or above, which can be later adjusted as needed. This also gives some margin for adjustments which would create new data to validate assumptions on user behavior and fine-tune rate choice.

Staking

To incentivize and reward community members for protecting the Aave Protocol, AAVE stakers are eligible to mint GHO at a discounted rate. This 25% discount gives AAVE stakers a highly competitive net borrow rate compared to other markets.

To promote decentralization of GHO token holders, it is proposed that a maximum of 25% of the GHO supply should be minted by AAVE stakers. In the current market conditions, this would enable each $stkAAVE to mint 4 $GHO. In case the minting cap was to increase over time, while the number of $stkAAVE was to remain stable, stakers would be able to to mint more $GHO tokens.

Redeemability

To maintain GHO’s stability, a dedicated Stability Module should be established to pool backstop liquidity. While utilizing the Aave V3 eMode or direct minting and redemption may provide some degree of stability, GHO will benefit from a tailored approach.

This module has the potential to become a major Facilitator, much like Maker’s PSM, which accounts for over half of the minted DAI.

Liquidity

Liquid secondary markets are critical for leading stablecoins, typically with 15-30% of their supply on exchanges. As GHO aims to become a resilient stablecoin, it will require a significant share of liquidity on DEXs, although this share can decrease as supply levels rise.

The Aave DAO has amassed 300k BAL in governance power through Balancer. To bootstrap liquidity, these holdings could be used to incentivize a Balancer GHO pool providing attractive yield opportunities for GHO liquidity providers.

Progressive growth

As the operations of Aave Protocol make GHO successful in the long term, it is crucial for the DAO to prioritize risk mitigation. Additionally, market conditions have meaningfully changed since the launch of prior stablecoins which necessitates validating underlying assumptions through observations. Therefore, we support adopting a slow growth plan to contain risks until GHO contracts are thoroughly battle-tested, and the market for GHO is highly liquid.

Borrow Rate StkAAVE Discount Rate Facilitator Bucket Capacity DEX liquidity pool 50/50 GHO/3Pool
Launch BR 2% to 2.5% DR 25% T 25% of supply minimum (50M, 25% borrows) Need to seed DEX liquidity ⇒ Target stable liquidity pool of $15M GHO
After 1 month BR 1.5% to 2.5% DR 25% T 25% of supply minimum (100m; 25% borrows) ⇒ Target stable liquidity pool of $25M GHO
When DEX liquidity pools reach previous target BR 1.5% to 2.5% DR 25% T 25% of supply 250M ⇒ Target stable liquidity pool of $50M GHO
When DEX liquidity pools reach previous target BR 1.5% to 2.5% DR 25% T 25% of supply 500M ⇒ Target stable liquidity pool of $100M GHO
When DEX liquidity pools reach previous target DAO Review 1B ⇒ Target stable liquidity pool of $400M

GHO Stability Toolbox

The primary characteristic of GHO is its stability, and any deviation from its peg could lead to a loss of trust in the stablecoin. It is crucial for the DAO to take measures to maintain the stability of GHO. We have identified several tools that can be utilized to safeguard the peg of GHO, and we welcome input and suggestions from the community.

Tools Depeg Risks Notes
Overcollateralization Over/Under peg N/A This arbitrage has not proven sufficient for DAI’s stability in volatile market conditions → before PSM it went significantly over peg in deleveraging situations
Deep DEX Liquidity Over/Under peg N/A Many stables have attempted to reach escape velocity via liquidity, maybe the winner is FRAX
Interest Rate Management Over/Under peg In GHO’s case, slow Significant monetary policy changes are slow and need governance to get involved
GHO Borrowable on Aave (eMode) Overpeg Possible non-GHO stablecoin liquidations → Need time to unwind positions, actors need to be willing to take time risk, the only people that can actually do the trade are people with positions open on AAVE, there could be an issue in the beginning if borrow cap are met 97% LTV ~ 30x leverage for arbitrage
GHO Collateral on Aave (eMode, isolation) Under peg Couple of quarters before GHO can be a collateral GHO liquidations if GHO:STABLE falls → Need time to unwind positions 97% LTV ~ 30x leverage for arbitrage GHO as collateral could be risky in the near future. Further, we would not recommend it as collateral on the market it can be minted on. Still, cascading liquidations on Aave are less likely due to $1 hardcode
Custom Stability Module Over/Under peg Depends on the design A new facilitator offering redeemability between newly minted GHO and stable assets.

Conclusion

In conclusion, GHO has the potential to become a leading stablecoin and a valuable addition to the Aave ecosystem. To ensure its success, the DAO must consider uncertainties, focus on risk mitigation, and validate assumptions with a cautious approach to growth. The stability of GHO is critical, we have identified several tools to strengthen the peg, including a stability module and minting rate adjustments.

The full research and analysis can be found here.

The aim of GHO is to be reliable, secure, and accessible to all, and working together as a community is the best way to achieve this goal. We encourage the community to share their thoughts, ideas, and concerns on GHO. We have provided a range as a basis, and count on the community responses to this post to align on specific rates and growth targets.

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I am very interested in how this will work. Would it operate like MakerDAO’s, where people could exchange 1:1 with another major stablecoin like USDC?

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We are currently researching designs for a potential GHO Stability Module (GSM), and would be excited to share more at a later date!

In practice though, any stability module would likely share similarities to what has been implemented for DAI.

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We would like to thank @AaveLabs for writing this ARFC. We agree that creating strong secondary liquidity is the most important aspect of launching a stablecoin. However, we believe that the proposed genesis parameters are simply not fit for a launch, as they appear to be too conservative.

The Borrow rate in current market conditions would make GHO minting at best as expansive as borrowing other stablecoins, limiting its attractiveness significantly.

The bucket capacity is also too conservative; even with 100% of the 50M cap minted and provided in stableswaps, the secondary liquidity of GHO might not be good enough.

In the early days of a stablecoin launch, scalability is the most important factor in order to reach secondary critical mass. It’s more important than peg-resilience (by design, there’s incentives to profit from underpeg GHO and only over-peg is a likely scenario) and it’s more important than protocol revenue.

While the ACI thinks that a fixed fee model is simply a bad design and will only lead to risk teams, Llama, and ACI publishing AIPs every other week to adjust the rate and lagging behind the free market, we acknowledge that a low fixed fee model is a good Kickstarter for a stablecoin to reach the secondary critical mass needed before switching to more efficient models such as an interest rate strategy curve model. However, these benefits can’t simply happen if the fixed fee is equal or superior to the competition rate. As the ACI, we think that 1% should be a maximum pre-StkAAVE discount. For bucket capacity, we think that anything below 150-200M$ is too conservative. For DEX liquidity pool targets, we would like to query the opinion from DAO risk service providers such as @ChaosLabs & @Pauljlei to define what stableswap liquidity levels allow for significantly important exchanges to happen with minimum slippage impact.

Lastly, for the StkAAVE discount rate, as stated earlier, protocol revenue should not be the early days’ priority, and the DAO should favor attractivity over revenue. We kindly encourage AaveCompanies to reconsider their genesis parameters, opting for a more efficient approach that would better facilitate GHO’s successful launch. We appreciate the hard work and dedication that AaveCompanies have demonstrated thus far and believe that, together, we can create a more effective launch strategy for GHO to thrive in the DeFi ecosystem.

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We agree with the importance of reaching critical mass and finding ways to facilitate this. While reaching critical mass is the primary concern, maintaining the peg may also play an important role in achieving this goal under the current environmental settings.

Since the increase in bucket size depends on pool liquidity targets, we believe it will not hinder growth, as it can increase quickly, given that there is pool liquidity. Therefore, we support starting with the second tier, i.e., a bucket size of $100M, originally planned one month after launch, or even $150M. This way, it can facilitate initial growth, and as mentioned, it is designed to grow quickly. The bucket size will increase once pool liquidity hits the set target.

Given the current interest rate environment, the upper limit of the proposed borrow rate (2.5%) may be less attractive. We recommend setting the borrow rate at 1.5%, which will provide a good balance between an attractive borrow rate and a sustainable one, especially in the current global market setting of growing interest rates.

Finally, regarding DEX liquidity, the proposed amounts by Aave Companies for the corresponding buckets are adequate. We will happily follow up with pool parameter recommendations once the initial bucket size is agreed upon.

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we appreciate Chaos Labs’ input and find their proposed parameters to be a good consensus position between AaveCompanies’ and ACI’s suggestions.

The balance between being conservative and attractive is essential for the GHO token to achieve its goals.

We support Chaos Labs’ recommendations and look forward to collaborating with them to optimize the protocol’s parameters for the benefit of the entire ecosystem.

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Gauntlet Risk Analysis

Simple Summary

  • Gauntlet recommends that DEX stable pools increase the target balanced DEX concentration by 10% at each bucket level
  • There are several risks Gauntlet would like to highlight for the community, that will need to be proactively managed
    • If GHO < $1 and lending pool liquidity for assets used to mint GHO is low (i.e. utilization for those assets is high), then GHO repeg can slow or be difficult, especially for the set of GHO minters that are looking to completely close their position.
    • Usage of emode minting GHO to restore the peg if GHO > $1 could lead to premature GHO supply explosion, especially when DEX size is not sufficient.
    • Loss of liquidity in the GHO PSM, or devaluation of the assets in the GHO PSM (as seen during the USDC depeg) can lead to a significant depeg in GHO.

Gauntlet Analysis

From a risk perspective, Gauntlet recommends that DEX stable pools increase the target balanced DEX concentration by 10% at each bucket level. The initial analysis notes that usually, 15-30% of stablecoin supply is usually in DEX. However, GHO has many novel components. The fixed borrow fee, the interplay between the GHO markets and the regular lending markets (given that Aave v3 Ethereum will be the first facilitator), and the fact that GHO is a completely new market, increase the risk of extreme GHO depeg and GHO manipulation without sufficient DEX liquidity.

The community should decide at what speed is appropriate to scale GHO and determine the necessary bucket sizes and borrow rates.

We would also like to call to attention several key risk factors - particularly with regards to GHO liquidity. The community should be aware of these risks and discuss, if necessary, how to mitigate these risks.

  • Aave v3 Ethereum as the facilitator.
    • The interplay between GHO minting and the lending markets. Collateralized assets used to mint GHO will flow to the lending pool. Suppose GHO is trading < $1, then GHO minters can buy GHO externally to repay on the Aave v3 lending markets, helping to repeg. For those repayers that are looking to close their position as well and redeem their collateral through the facilitator, if there is insufficient liquidity on the lending markets for this collateral (i.e. the collateral has high utilization), then they may not be able to repay the GHO. An example of this is when a GHO minter needs to flashloan other assets to purchase GHO externally and needs their collateral to close out the flash loan. This could hurt the repegging.
    • Because of this interplay, fixed and static fee (that requires governance to change) could lead to unmitigated GHO minting → dump when GHO is abnormally < $1. If the peg restoration mechanism is failing, then sophisticated traders can mint up to the remaining bucket capacity at the fixed rate and market-sell the minted GHO to further depress GHO prices. Until the redemption mechanism recovers and liquidity is restored we can expect GHO price to continue to fall (as seen with USDC). The trader can then buy back the GHO at a much lower price to close their position.
    • Usage of emode minting GHO to restore the peg if GHO > $1 could lead to a premature GHO supply explosion, especially if DEX liquidity has not caught up. As mentioned in the initial analysis by Aave Companies, the maximum supply of GHO can be increased to bring GHO back down to par. The proposed emode implementation, at the current LT of 97.5%, enables less capitalized users at ~30x leverage to affect peg restoration greatly. The end result is that the pool will be rebalanced at the same TVL, but the global GHO supply will have expanded, decreasing the DEX GHO / GHO supply ratio. Without a PSM, GHO at this increased supply may be more susceptible to price manipulation.
  • Usage of idle proposed PSM liquidity. As the initial review has indicated, a majority of DAI is minted through the Maker PSM. Recently, Maker governance has voted to onboard $100M USDC into Yearn. As such, idle liquidity in the proposed PSM for GHO will need to be managed carefully and prudently, given that yield strategies have associated inherent risks (smart contract, market, etc). Loss of liquidity in the PSM, or devaluation of the assets in the PSM (as seen during the USDC depeg) can lead to a significant depeg in GHO.

The above is assuming GHO is only released on mainnet Ethereum. Proposed GHO deployment on L2 could introduce further risks, which Gauntlet is continuing to study. We note that without more visibility into the PSM, we do not have full confidence about the pegging mechanism and consequent stability. As such, it is difficult/too early to provide more parameter suggestions for risk levers without the details on the overall mechanism.

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Dear Aave community, after receiving valuable feedback from multiple parties, including ACI, Chaos Labs, and Gauntlet, The ACI is proposing a consensus solution for GHO’s launch (Genesis) parameters. This Amended Aave Request for Comments (ARFC) presents the revised launch parameters for the GHO stablecoin, aimed at creating a more attractive, scalable, and effective launch strategy for GHO while addressing key risks and maintaining peg stability.

Title: Launch Parameters ARFC for GHO Stablecoin

Summary

In response to the valuable feedback from the Aave community, this Amended Aave Request for Comments (ARFC) proposes revised genesis parameters for the GHO stablecoin. The goal is to create a more attractive, scalable, and effective launch strategy for GHO while addressing key risks and maintaining peg stability.

Proposed Launch Parameters

  1. Borrow Rate: Set the initial borrow rate at 1.5%, striking a balance between attractiveness and sustainability in the current market environment.

  2. Bucket Capacity: Begin with a higher initial bucket capacity of $100M to facilitate early growth. As pool liquidity targets are met, the bucket size will increase, allowing for scalability.

  3. StkAAVE Discount Rate: Prioritize attractivity over protocol revenue in the early days of GHO launch. Implement a lower fixed fee model, with a discount rate of 30% for StkAAVE holders compared to the borrow rate, up to a limit of 25% of the total GHO bucket size. This will help GHO reach the critical mass needed for secondary liquidity.

Recap Table

Parameter Value
Borrow Rate 1.5%
Bucket Capacity $100M
StkAAVE Discount Rate 30%
Discount Limit 25% of total GHO bucket size

Conclusion

By incorporating the collective feedback from the Aave community, this Genesis Parameters ARFC aims to establish a more effective launch strategy for GHO to thrive in the DeFi ecosystem.

We want to emphasize that this Genesis parameters, define Launch parameters, and evolution of these parameters will need to be managed by the Aave DAO, following launch.

It is crucial to continue monitoring the market conditions and adjusting the parameters as needed to ensure GHO’s successful integration and growth within the Aave platform. We appreciate the engagement from the community and look forward to further collaboration.

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We agree on the need to launch efficiently while minimizing risk. However, without further details on the GSM, it is too early to provide robust parameter parameters for the Launch. Gauntlet is continuing to conduct analysis and is leaning towards parameters that are more conservative than what is being proposed. We will keep the community posted on Gauntlet’s updated analysis but wanted to note that these initial parameters are likely too aggressive from a risk perspective in the case that GHO launches without a GSM.

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Gauntlet Recommendations

Summary

At this time and with assumptions discussed below, Gauntlets supports:

  • The growth plan for the bucket facilitator capacity values (apart from the initial bucket capacity)
  • The initial Borrow Rate (this is highly sensitive to borrower elasticity, which needs to be monitored closely)
  • The stkAAVE discount rate model

However, Gauntlet recommends that DEX stable pools increase the target balanced DEX concentration by 5%-25% at each bucket capacity level and to initialize with a bucket size of the previously suggested 50M. Understanding how much liquidity will be introduced to DEXs shortly after launch could allow for faster bucket growth. If the DEX liquidity in the first 10M GHO issued is proportionately added to DEXs, we could potentially propose raising the bucket capacity sooner than 1 month, but before that data exists, the growth and risk trade-off would support a smaller initial bucket capacity. In addition, Gauntlet will give specific stability ranges that should be targeted given market risk considerations.All of the recommendations below can change if new details about the GSM are released or the growth plan changes.

Key Risk Factors

There are several risks Gauntlet would like to highlight for the community, that will need to be proactively managed

  • Low liquidity and usage: If GHO < $1 and lending pool liquidity for assets used to mint GHO is low (i.e. utilization for those assets is high), then GHO repeg can slow or be difficult, especially for the set of GHO minters that are looking to completely close their position.
  • Emode compounding supply: Usage of emode minting GHO to restore the peg if GHO > $1 could lead to premature GHO supply explosion, especially when DEX size is not sufficient.
  • GSM design uncertainty: Loss of liquidity in the GHO PSM, or devaluation of the assets in the GHO PSM (as seen during the USDC price deviation) can lead to a significant price deviation in GHO. We will discuss our recommendations with specific assumptions around the GSM below.
  • Hard-coded 1 price within Aave V3: This could lead to increased liquidations on the Aave V3 protocol as the market and oracle price of GHO could follow USDC (see DAI during March 11-13). These liquidations would be incorrect as well as adverse (does not help the protocol prevent insolvencies).

From a risk perspective, Gauntlet recommends that DEX stable pools increase the target balanced DEX concentration by 10% at each bucket level. The initial analysis notes that usually, 15-30% of stablecoin supply is usually in DEX. However, GHO has many novel components. The fixed borrow fee, the interplay between the GHO markets and the regular lending markets (given that Aave v3 Ethereum will be the first facilitator), and the fact that GHO is a completely new market, increase the risk of extreme GHO price deviation and GHO manipulation without sufficient DEX liquidity.

The community should decide at what speed is appropriate to scale GHO and determine the necessary bucket sizes and borrow rates.

We’d also like to call to attention some key risk factors - particularly with regards to GHO liquidity. The community should be aware of these risks and discuss, if necessary, how to mitigate these risks.

  • Aave v3 Ethereum as the facilitator.
    • The interplay between GHO minting and the lending markets. Collateralized assets used to mint GHO will flow to the lending pool. Suppose GHO is trading < $1, then GHO minters can buy GHO externally to repay on the Aave v3 lending markets, helping to repeg. For those repayers that are looking to close their position as well and redeem their collateral through the facilitator, if there is insufficient liquidity on the lending markets for this collateral (i.e. the collateral has high utilization), then they may not be able to repay the GHO. An example of this is when a GHO minter needs to flashloan other assets to purchase GHO externally and needs their collateral to close out the flash loan. This could hurt the repegging.
    • Because of this interplay, fixed and static fee (that requires governance to change) could lead to unmitigated GHO minting → dump when GHO is abnormally < $1. If the peg restoration mechanism is failing, then sophisticated traders can mint up to the remaining bucket capacity at the fixed rate and market-sell the minted GHO to further depress GHO prices. Until the redemption mechanism recovers and liquidity is restored we can expect GHO price to continue to fall (as seen with USDC). The trader can then buy back the GHO at a much lower price to close their position.
    • Usage of emode minting GHO to restore the peg if GHO > $1 could lead to a premature GHO supply explosion, especially if DEX liquidity has not caught up. As mentioned in the initial analysis by Aave Companies, the maximum supply of GHO can be increased to bring GHO back down to par. The proposed emode implementation, at the current LT of 97.5%, enables less capitalized users at ~30x leverage to affect peg restoration greatly. The end result is that the pool will be rebalanced at the same TVL, but the global GHO supply will have expanded, decreasing the DEX GHO / GHO supply ratio. Without a GSM, GHO at this increased supply may be more susceptible to price manipulation.
  • Usage of idle proposed GSM liquidity. As the initial review has indicated, a majority of DAI is minted through the Maker PSM. Recently, Maker governance has voted to onboard $100M USDC into Yearn. As such, idle liquidity in the proposed PSM for GHO will need to be managed carefully and prudently, given that yield strategies have associated inherent risks (smart contract, market, etc). Loss of liquidity in the PSM, or devaluation of the assets in the PSM (as seen during the USDC price deviation) can lead to a significant price deviation in GHO.

The above is assuming GHO is only released on mainnet Ethereum. Proposed GHO deployment on L2 could introduce further risks, which Gauntlet is continuing to study.

Assumptions

The initial stability module will resemble the current Maker Peg Stability Module (PSM). This implies that the GSM enables GHO-USDC swaps at a 1:1 fixed ratio and backs minted GHO with deposited USDC.

The initial DEX liquidity will be in a pool with this specific parameterization: Amplification parameter A = 200, fees = 0.04%, pool is 50/50 GHO and 3pool.

We will use the bucket capacities put forth in the initial post as a baseline for our DEX liquidity recommendations. Note that this methodology could change with bucket capacity changes, but we agree with the growth plan at this current moment in time.

Assumptions: Current GHO parameterization

Risk Appetite: Trade-offs and target stability ranges

We will use this graph built from the assumptions above to guide the conversation about risk. The graph shows the you could trade through around 54% of the pool size and see the price change by 1%. We will use the expected price movement against trade size to bound the desired price deviation of GHO. In this case, we will assume that during a potential price deviation scenario, up to 10% of the circulating supply of GHO will be sold (this value is chosen because on March 10th, approximately 3.4B USDC was trade of the 30B circulating supply on Ethereum). This allows us to calculate the liquidity under worst case scenarios to be calculated; for example, the DEX liquidity target for a price range of [0.95, 1.05] will be 6.25M = 50M*0.1/0.8, where 50M is the max supply, and 0.8 is the intersection on the graph with 0.95.

GHO price target [0.999, 1.001]* [0.995, 1.005] [0.99, 1.01] [0.95, 1.05]
DEX liquidity target (at launch, capacity = min(50M, 25% borrows)) ~all GHO issued 15.7M GHO 9.4M GHO 6.25M GHO
DEX liquidity target (after 1 month, capacity = min(100M, 25% borrows)) ~all GHO issued 30M GHO 18.8M GHO 12.5M GHO
DEX liquidity target (when DEX liquidity pools reach previous target in cell above, capacity = 250M) ~all GHO issued 70M GHO 47M GHO 31.3M GHO

*Note: this seems to imply that the price distribution will be centered around 1, but that assumption might not hold.

We recommend the [0.995, 1.005] target range, which would require these levels of DEX liquidity: 15.7M GHO at launch, 30M GHO after 1 month, and 70M GHO to facilitate a capacity size of 250M.

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Given there has now been ample time for community discussion, we intend to move this proposal to Snapshot to confirm the community’s preference for GHO’s initial parameters.

We appreciate the varied input from the DAO’s risk providers and the ACI regarding both the parameters and relevant risk factors.

Given there is still some discussion around trade-offs between scalability and managing risk in terms of how aggressive the initial parameters should be, we believe it is best to take two options to Snapshot, option A as proposed by the ACI in consort with Chaos Labs, and option B as proposed initially by Aave Companies. The DAO’s preference can then be expressed clearly.

For option A, the following parameters are proposed in line with the ACI and Chaos’s recommendations:

Parameter Value
Borrow Rate 1.5%
Bucket Capacity $100M
stkAAVE Discount Rate 30%
Discount Limit 25% of total GHO bucket size

For option B, as proposed by Aave Companies and in line with Gauntlet’s recommendations, the following parameters are proposed:

Parameter Value
Borrow Rate 2%
Bucket Capacity $50M
stkAAVE Discount Rate 25%
Discount Limit 25% of total GHO bucket size

Both options will be taken to Snapshot on 28/04/2023.

Regarding the mentioned GHO Stability Module (GSM), this will not be introduced at launch and therefore shouldn’t be taken into consideration for GHO’s initial parameters.

[29/04/2023] Edited to include Gauntlet’s support for Option B

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The Snapshot for this proposal has been queued and will be live for voting in 24-hours.

You can find it here: Snapshot

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The Snapshot vote for the GHO Genesis Parameters has been concluded successfully, with the Aave community voting in favour of Option A.

As a clarification, it should be noted that the recommended Discount Limit detailed in the Genesis Parameter Analysis document will be treated as a target, affected primarily by adjusting the Discount Rate and the GHO Discount per Discount Token parameters.

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