Foundation (Brand / Governance)
Regarding the new foundation, I believe this deserves a dedicated discussion thread focused solely on its structure and governance model.
In my view, the foundation should not be controlled @stani / @Aave . I would suggest a structure that includes:
-
A representative from Labs (e.g., Stani or a designated leader),
-
A representative from each major DAO-funded service provider (@ACI, TokenLogic, etc.),
-
And at least one truly independent, community-elected member.
The goal should be a consensus-based governance structure that prevents excessive concentration of power between Labs and service providers, while creating a clear bridge with the community.
The foundation should act as a balance mechanism — not as a unilateral control entity.
KPIs and Quarterly Reporting
Quarterly KPI reporting is not optional — it is essential.
We need as many objective performance metrics as possible to assess the real impact of product and protocol development. In addition to the proposed KPIs (TVL, DAU, volume, revenue), I suggest adding a strategic KPI:
A direct efficiency comparison between V3 (or V3.7) and V4.
If V4 is positioned as the next major technical foundation, we must be able to measure:
Without structured benchmarking, we cannot objectively determine whether V4 actually improves value creation.
Incentive Caps
On incentives, strong clarification is required.
Today, V3 operates with relatively limited structural incentives. I do not see why V4 should automatically require higher or structural incentive budgets.
Incentives should be voted product by product, with:
-
A clear cap,
-
A defined duration,
-
Associated KPIs,
-
Mandatory re-evaluation.
There should be no blank-check approach to incentives.
Independent Revenue Verification
For independent verification, it would be healthy to mandate either an external auditor or an existing DAO provider.
@TokenLogic would be a strong candidate, given the quality and transparency of the buyback dashboard. They clearly have the technical capability to perform robust on-chain verification.
Revenue verification should not be self-declared. It must be independent, recurring, and publicly accessible.
Financial Impact and AAVE Allocation
On funding: stablecoins — yes. AAVE allocation — no.
Labs already holds significant governance influence. Allocating additional AAVE would increase power concentration and weaken the perception of decentralized governance.
We must avoid a situation where:
-
An operational entity accumulates disproportionate voting influence,
-
Or can indirectly shape governance outcomes.
Additionally, the prior redirection of swap revenues (via Cow swap), which historically flowed to the DAO via Paraswap, should not be framed as leverage within this proposal. Reintroducing them conditionally could be perceived as implicit pressure.
The strongest long-term approach is transparency, acknowledgment of past misalignments if any occurred, and a clear alignment around the $AAVE token and its long-term value.