[TEMP CHECK] Aave Will Win Framework

AAVE Labs and Stani are harming the interests of everyone in the AAVE ecosystem. Do you want them to continue doing so?

  1. DAO’s revenue has been secretly stolen, and the new plan demands 30% of all DAO funds, clearly treating DAO as an ATM and completely ignoring the feelings of all other service providers.

  2. BGD Labs’ contributions have been ignored. Their meticulously crafted V3 version contributed the vast majority of AAVE’s TVL and revenue, but AAVE Labs intends to replace it with V4. BGD Labs has already decided to withdraw from the partnership with AAVE.

  3. Due to the conflict of interest with DAO, the price of AAVE tokens has plummeted, causing significant losses for token holders.

Currently, those supporting AAVE Labs on the forum are all small accounts registered in December 2025, clearly AAVE Labs’ shills.

Warning: AAVE DAO must unite, fundamentally remove AAVE Labs and Stani, and completely terminate its partnership with AAVE Labs. It must maintain an open and transparent cooperative attitude with other partners; otherwise, the greed of AAVE Labs and Stani will drain everyone dry!

If AAVE Labs persists in its course of action, completely disregarding the DAO’s opinions and ignoring ACI’s requirements, everyone must unite and vote against it. Otherwise, AAVE is finished, and you’ll all be wiped out!

If Stani and AAVE Labs could destroy Lens, they certainly have the power to destroy AAVE!

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Kudos to Stanislav and @AaveLabs. You haven’t just overseen a $1.5B loss in market cap; your passive-aggressive leadership and strategic incompetence are actively alienating the backbone of this ecosystem. Seeing BGD Labs leave is more than heartbreaking—it’s a massive failure of governance.

From this point forward, I will oppose every proposal you put forth until there is a clear plan to rectify this mismanagement. Aave deserves better than this. Shame on you.

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@setaavefree @samandrewNIV @wlw @andy1

These accounts were first registered in December 2025, after the dispute between AAVE labs and DAO. These accounts illogically express support for the proposal and AAVE labs, clearly indicating they are hired trolls and alt accounts. Please think independently and don’t be swayed by them.

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I really hope Stani and AAVE Labs take a more proactive approach here. The longer the ambiguity lasts, the more likely we are to lose other valuable service providers, and that’s a risk we shouldn’t take.

Every day this situation remains unresolved, the DAO grows a little weaker. Even if, in the short term, less resistance might make it easier for AAVE Labs to push proposals through, that’s not a healthy dynamic for the DAO long term.

Please move quickly, revise the proposal, genuinely incorporate the community’s feedback, and help restore clarity before it’s too late.

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great points. at what point does the DAO get a lawyer to help us defend ourselves?

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@wlw what changed your mind on Stani from just a few hours ago?

Respectfully, what exactly is Aave Labs doing for ecosystem growth that independent builders could not?

At this stage, this no longer looks like bootstrapping.

Once this level of vertical integration is built out, meaningful ecosystem decentralization becomes structurally unlikely.

The current main app is basic. Many capable teams could have built it better and at lower cost. Its traction appears driven primarily by brand trust and distribution, not by uniquely differentiated product execution.

Similarly, most integrations could have been delivered by external teams, likely more efficiently and with stronger ecosystem spillover.

Their large internal bets such as Family and Lens have also not demonstrated strong outcomes.

If Aave DAO would start an ecosystem fund, hundreds of strong teams would start building on Aave, and add 10x the capital through external investors, while building a neutral financial infrastructure.

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Friends, a lot of progress has been made. Now, it is a bit like any relationship coach would advise: stop texting, starting talking. Is there any regular physical Aave developer/governance conference planned or in place? If not, would that maybe be an idea to resolve the remaining challenges? Warm regards, Samuel

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Have any big success stories come out of an ecosystem fund in the past?

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I, an independent Swiss technology investor, studied the “Aave Will Win Framework” by Aave Labs as well as the subsequent discussion.

“Perfect is the enemy of good.” meaning progress and workable drafts sometime matter more than unattainable perfection.

In the current case I believe this is a very meaningful contribution to the future success of Aave. Yes, more work is needed and I thank all involved for their engagement and contributions. Based on this I have increased my already significant personal Aave position.

Let us now reunite and continue working together in an open and constructive way. Aave will win!

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The Aave DAO is effectively an ecosystem fund.

Ecosystem funding is not the issue. Concentration is.

Funding Aave Labs is technically ecosystem funding, but in a highly centralized form. That is structurally different from fostering a broad, competitive builder network.

Decentralization is not about who receives capital, but about how many independent actors can win.

Aave Labs has not yet demonstrated consistent product breakout beyond the core protocol. The frontend remains functional but not differentiated. Prior expansions (e.g., Lens, Family) have yet to show ecosystem-scale outcomes.

The larger concern is incentive alignment.

Once Aave-branded products enter the market, external builders face implicit competition from the protocol’s core development entity.

Why would a company like Revolut build on Aave if it risks competing with Aave-branded vertical products?

Neutral infrastructure attracts partners. Vertical competition repels them.

The Aave protocol’s greatest long-term growth vector is neutrality.

Revenue should emerge from ecosystem expansion and protocol usage, not from vertically integrated products that risk cannibalizing the very builders the DAO should empower.

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Foundation (Brand / Governance)

Regarding the new foundation, I believe this deserves a dedicated discussion thread focused solely on its structure and governance model.

In my view, the foundation should not be controlled @stani / @Aave . I would suggest a structure that includes:

  • A representative from Labs (e.g., Stani or a designated leader),

  • A representative from each major DAO-funded service provider (@ACI, TokenLogic, etc.),

  • And at least one truly independent, community-elected member.

The goal should be a consensus-based governance structure that prevents excessive concentration of power between Labs and service providers, while creating a clear bridge with the community.

The foundation should act as a balance mechanism — not as a unilateral control entity.


KPIs and Quarterly Reporting

Quarterly KPI reporting is not optional — it is essential.

We need as many objective performance metrics as possible to assess the real impact of product and protocol development. In addition to the proposed KPIs (TVL, DAU, volume, revenue), I suggest adding a strategic KPI:

A direct efficiency comparison between V3 (or V3.7) and V4.

If V4 is positioned as the next major technical foundation, we must be able to measure:

  • Revenue per unit of TVL,

  • Capital efficiency,

  • Incentive cost per dollar of growth,

  • Net revenue generated per dollar of liquidity.

Without structured benchmarking, we cannot objectively determine whether V4 actually improves value creation.


Incentive Caps

On incentives, strong clarification is required.

Today, V3 operates with relatively limited structural incentives. I do not see why V4 should automatically require higher or structural incentive budgets.

Incentives should be voted product by product, with:

  • A clear cap,

  • A defined duration,

  • Associated KPIs,

  • Mandatory re-evaluation.

There should be no blank-check approach to incentives.


Independent Revenue Verification

For independent verification, it would be healthy to mandate either an external auditor or an existing DAO provider.

@TokenLogic would be a strong candidate, given the quality and transparency of the buyback dashboard. They clearly have the technical capability to perform robust on-chain verification.

Revenue verification should not be self-declared. It must be independent, recurring, and publicly accessible.


Financial Impact and AAVE Allocation

On funding: stablecoins — yes. AAVE allocation — no.

Labs already holds significant governance influence. Allocating additional AAVE would increase power concentration and weaken the perception of decentralized governance.

We must avoid a situation where:

  • An operational entity accumulates disproportionate voting influence,

  • Or can indirectly shape governance outcomes.

Additionally, the prior redirection of swap revenues (via Cow swap), which historically flowed to the DAO via Paraswap, should not be framed as leverage within this proposal. Reintroducing them conditionally could be perceived as implicit pressure.

The strongest long-term approach is transparency, acknowledgment of past misalignments if any occurred, and a clear alignment around the $AAVE token and its long-term value.

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I have also recently increased my position in AAVE, as I believe the renewed focus is gonna be very beneficial for the growth of the protocol.

It is sad to see important contributors leave, but at the same time I believe that the hatred and discontentment expressed by some service providers, combined with the attempt to spread false narratives and information, has really crossed the line and it does not make sense to be in the same project at this point.

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Thanks to the Aave Labs team for putting together a comprehensive and thoughtful framework. Overall, this proposal feels directionally sound and aligned with where the protocol and the broader market are heading. Ratifying V4 as the core technical foundation, aligning product revenues with the DAO, and investing at a scale that matches the opportunity all make sense if Aave intends to remain the leading onchain liquidity layer over the next decade.

From Mantle’s perspective, we are very supportive of Aave V4 and excited about the innovation it enables. The Spoke-based architecture, faster experimentation, and expanded revenue design space are all meaningful improvements over V3, and we see clear potential for new use cases and deeper integrations as V4 matures.

That said, we want to make sure we fully understand the practical ramifications for existing V3 markets and liquidity during the transition period, especially for long-lived deployments that have accumulated significant TVL and integrations over time.

A few areas where additional clarity would be helpful:

V3 Market Continuity and Incentives

  • For V3 markets that are currently healthy and well-utilized, how should ecosystem partners think about their medium-term role once V4 launches?

  • Beyond pausing new features, are there plans to adjust incentives, risk parameters, or capital efficiency on V3 in ways that would materially change user behavior prior to the “Legacy Support” phase?

  • How much discretion will governance retain in maintaining V3 markets that serve specific ecosystems or chains particularly well?

Fractional Liquidity and Migration Dynamics

  • One concern with version transitions is liquidity fragmentation across V3 and V4 during the overlap period. How does Aave Labs envision managing this, especially for assets and markets where deep liquidity is critical?

  • Are there design elements in V4 (or planned Spokes) intended to reduce fragmentation or make migration more organic rather than incentive-driven?

  • Should partners expect a gradual, market-led shift, or a more deliberate push once V4 reaches maturity?

V4 Rollout Roadmap

  • Could the team share a high-level sequencing of what V4 adoption might look like in practice (e.g., initial flagship deployments, priority use cases, or chains)?

  • How should ecosystems that are supportive of V4 today best position themselves to participate early and meaningfully?

We appreciate the explicit commitment to a non-rushed migration and the acknowledgement that V3 remains stable and battle-tested. For ecosystems like Mantle that are long-term aligned with Aave, understanding how V3 and V4 will coexist—and how liquidity and integrations are expected to evolve over time—is critical for planning and coordination.

Overall, we are encouraged by the direction of this proposal and look forward to continued dialogue as the roadmap becomes more concrete. Mantle is excited about what V4 unlocks and is keen to support its success in a way that strengthens both the protocol and the broader ecosystem.

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We have heard the feedback about the transition from Aave V3 to Aave V4. While we think it is important for the DAO to align strategically behind V4 as part of this proposal, the timeline is up for discussion. We will remove the timeline from the proposal and adjust the section accordingly.

Aave V3 is a battle-tested protocol, and it will continue to operate as a core part of the ecosystem for as long as the DAO decides it should.

  • No changes to risk parameters, incentives, or capital efficiency are planned that would materially alter user behavior on V3.

  • Existing incentive programs and planning around V3 markets will not be affected. Governance retains full discretion here.

If a V3 market serves a particular chain or ecosystem well, the DAO has the authority to keep it running indefinitely. As V4 gains its own track record, initiatives can move over progressively, at whatever pace the community is comfortable with. V4 also brings new use cases and opportunities that do not exist on V3, which we expect will drive adoption on its own terms. Similarly, partners can decide on their own time whether or not they want to migrate their ecosystem to V4 and coordinate with the DAO accordingly.

On liquidity fragmentation, every previous version transition at Aave has bootstrapped new liquidity successfully, and users have migrated organically over time as they moved toward better features and efficiency. We expect the same here and there will be no forced migration.

After V4 launches, we will release migration tooling so users can move positions at their own pace. One feature worth noting is V4’s reinvestment capability, which allows liquidity on V4 to be directed back into V3 markets (or other yield opportunities) if the DAO decides that is necessary. That creates a bridge between the two versions rather than a competition for deposits.

The sequencing for the V4 rollout is still to be determined by the DAO and will depend on risk assessments form service providers for each chain and use case. Ecosystems interested in early V4 adoption should work with their closest service provider partner on integration planning and connect directly with Aave Labs for a technical compatibility analysis.

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Any comments here or are you gonna keep playing hide & seek?

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Thank you to everyone who has contributed feedback so far. We have moved the proposal to Snapshot for a Temp Check vote. To be clear, this is a Temp Check, the first step in the governance process, meant to gauge community sentiment on the overall direction.

We are still reviewing and responding to the discussion in this thread, and the proposal will continue to be refined throughout the ARFC stage. You can find our responses so far here:

Alongside the vote, we’ve posted a detailed Aave Labs contribution report that covers Aave Labs’ work and major contributions over the past eight years in order to inform token holders before the vote. You can read it here.

If you have outstanding questions or concerns, keep sharing them. We will address them as things progress.

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This :index_pointing_up:

If we truly want “AAVE To Win”, then the DAO deserves full transparency

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This is a step in the right direction. Thank you for listening to the feedback. It was simply impossible for the entire community, service providers, and delegates to all be wrong at the same time.

​If our ultimate goal is to grow Aave’s TVL and generate revenue for the DAO, it shouldn’t matter whether that capital flows through V3 or V4. Attempting to artificially sunset or force migrations away from a perfectly functioning system that serves as the DAO’s primary revenue engine was a flawed strategy from the start.

​If V4 is truly as innovative and feature-rich as claimed, it will organically attract new capital and users from the market entirely on its own merits. There is no need for forced migrations. Instead of badmouthing and cannibalizing V3 under the same roof, I don’t think anyone in this DAO would ever oppose the introduction of new products that genuinely bring additive value and revenue to the ecosystem.

​Aave’s growth should be driven by organic adoption, not ultimatums. We expect this commitment to V3 to be permanent.

​The DAO and the community clearly want V3 to keep running. Now, let’s drop the political correctness and speak openly, because everyone is fully aware of what is going on: BGD Labs decided to leave due to the friction and tension created by Aave Labs.

​So, here is the open question: Who is going to handle the security, maintenance, and development of V3 now?

​I can state this with absolute certainty: If we were to poll 100 top business executives and explain this exact situation shutting down a product that generates ~$150M in annual revenue, or frustrating its core developers to the point of quitting do you think they would call it a good business decision? It is blatantly obvious that the vast majority would say absolutely not. I am willing to bet $100,000 on that.

Let’s get it done and win.

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