Agreed here. If Aave is to win, why not chase the short/mid-term wins of tokenized stocks in RWAs? Especially with the bet of RWAs to unlock capital and how well the stock market and metals are doing. We can’t have Morpho eat that lunch for free.
Please first understand what AAVE Labs and Stani did to cause the AAVE community to lose trust in them before expressing your opinion.
Trust doesn’t arise from nothing; it stems from reliable actions. The community’s skepticism arises from a lack of trust. We previously supported AAVE Labs and Stani’s actions until they destroyed that trust.
In the recent vote, AAVE Labs, with its over 600,000 AAVE tokens, completely controlled the outcome—this is an obvious fact. If they voted to use 100% of AAVE DAO revenue for development, would you still support them? If they voted to make your tokens worthless, would you support them?
We support any strategy that promotes AAVE’s development, but it must be honest, rational, empathetic, and realistic. Otherwise, skepticism is reasonable and necessary.
If you really like AAVE Labs and Stani, you can donate your assets to help them, but you can’t ask AAVE token holders to do so. However, based on their current actions, I don’t think I can trust them yet; many people are disappointed in them.
3 Likes
Friends, I believe Aave DAO and Labs will eventually find a middle ground. The core framework of the proposal submitted last week was largely aligned with the direction a decentralized structure should take.
Labs has started communicating with the DAO and the community, albeit slowly. They are gathering feedback, accepting independent auditors, and supporting a parallel run for V3 and V4 with a natural transition process. These are significant wins.
If a reasonable compromise can be found regarding the spending details and the grant amount, I believe this proposal will be accepted by everyone. Labs communicating directly with the DAO and community leaders to address the remaining concerns would make the process much healthier. Ultimately, no one says “no” to a transparent, trusted, auditable, and decentralized structure.
1 Like
As several community members and token holders have pointed out, implementing a clear KPI framework would significantly improve accountability and transparency.
In addition, it would strengthen governance if AAVE Labs refrained from voting on proposals where it has a direct financial or power interest.
Addressing these two major points would meaningfully enhance fairness and trust in the proposal 
7 Likes
Unlocking 75,000 AAVE unconditionally and linearly monthly over a 2 year period is a hedgeable salary rather than long-term alignment.
1 Like
This proposal discussion has been incredibly productive in working towards clarity on several issues. I have several clarifying questions that I believe should be considered as we evaluate this framework.
1. Revenue Definition and Verification
The proposal defines revenue as gross product revenue minus partner revenue sharing, rebates, subsidies, and direct user incentives, all determined at Aave Labs’ discretion.
- What is the current estimated magnitude of these deductions as a percentage of gross product revenue? Even a historical or illustrative range would help the DAO assess what “100% of net revenue” actually means in practice.
- Will the DAO have the ability to set caps or approval thresholds on discretionary deductions (particularly user incentives), or would this remain entirely at Labs’ discretion?
- When this proposal mentions working with the DAO on “a solution to have a third party independently verify this data,” is there a proposed timeline or structure for this? Ideally, this would be operational before funds begin streaming.
2. Funding Structure and Treasury Impact
The total ask, $42.5M in stablecoins plus 75,000 AAVE, represents a significant share of the DAO’s reserves (roughly 42% of non-AAVE holdings and ~31% of total treasury). I understand the operational rationale, but a few points need clarification:
- The $25M primary grant is broken into ~65% product/protocol development, ~15% security/legal, ~10% GTM, and ~10% operations. Could this be further detailed per product or initiative? At this scale, the DAO benefits from granularity.
- Has there been any assessment been done on how this grant size will affect the DAO’s ability to meet the rest of its financial obligations, such as the Buyback Program?
- It has been noted that any unspent funds from Growth/Development Grants would roll forward into future funding requests. Would the same commitment apply to unspent portions of the primary grant, and how can the DAO gain insight into how funds were spent?
3. AAVE Token Allocation
The commitment that Labs will not use tokens received under this framework for governance voting is a very welcome development.
- If tokens are distributed to individual employees, does the voting restriction travel with the tokens?
- Given the community discussion around governance concentration, would Labs consider extending the vesting from 2 years to 4 years to align with market-standard equity/token vesting practices?
- Can Labs provide clarity on the total AAVE holdings currently under its direct or indirect control? This has been a recurring concern, and addressing it proactively would significantly strengthen the credibility of this proposal.
4. V4 Ratification and V3 Transition
I support the general direction of V4 development and understand the architectural benefits of the Spoke model. However:
- The proposal mentions pausing new features for V3 upon ratification. Could you clarify what “new features” means in this context? Would parameter optimizations, risk management improvements, or security enhancements by other service providers be considered “features” subject to this pause? Has the team also considered the effects on revenue by slowing down Aave V3 while V4 is not generating any revenue yet?
- The spoke revenue estimates reference protocols like Pendle and Fluid as benchmarks. Are there more detailed assumptions or models underlying these estimates that could be shared for the DAO’s independent assessment?
5. Foundation Structure and Brand Governance
The idea of a Foundation to hold and steward the Aave trademarks is sensible. However, the details are deferred to a follow-up proposal. Given how central the brand is to the entire framework:
- Would Labs consider making the Foundation operational (or at least having its governance structure ratified) before the funding streams commence?
- What mechanisms would ensure the Foundation’s independence from Labs in practice, particularly regarding board composition, appointment/removal processes, and conflict-of-interest policies?
6. Bundling Concern
I understand the argument that these components are interconnected. However, bundling revenue alignment, V4 ratification, Foundation creation, and a $42.5M+ funding request into a single vote means the DAO cannot express nuanced support, for example, supporting revenue alignment while requesting revisions to the funding terms.
Have Labs considered structuring this as sequentially linked proposals (where approval of the first unlocks the second, etc.) rather than a single omnibus vote? This would preserve cohesion while allowing the DAO to exercise more precise governance oversight.
4 Likes
We support the direction outlined in the Aave Will Win proposal.
We believe the proposal meaningfully strengthens alignment between Aave Labs and $AAVE tokenholders. The DAO participates not just in the growth of the core protocol, but also in the expansion of new consumer and B2B products across Aave App, Aave Pro, Horizon, and Aave Kit.
Aave is no longer competing solely against other DeFi-native protocols. It is increasingly collaborating with, and competing against, FinTechs, tokenization platforms, stablecoin players, and traditional financial institutions as assets move onchain. We believe Aave’s funding request is reasonable given the competitive landscape and the scale of opportunity the team is pursuing:
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Uniswap: $120MM annual grant (20MM UNI) at the time of passage in December 2025
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Sky: $75MM–$90MM annualized operating budget
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Morpho: $70MM+ raised since inception
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Superstate: $82.5MM raised in January 2026
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Rain: $250MM raised in January 2026
These are the types of organizations Aave is now competing with for talent, integrations, and distribution.
Labs has a strong product track record over the past six years. The next phase will require onboarding major FinTechs and asset managers, attracting top talent, engaging with regulators, securing licenses, and building the operational depth to compete at scale. That requires a well-resourced team with the mandate and support to move quickly.
To further strengthen the proposal, it would be helpful to see additional clarity on:
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Budget Allocation: Breakdown across product, business development, and operations
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Headcount & Hiring: Current team size, functional split, and planned expansion
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KPIs & Accountability: Clear annual performance metrics and milestones that allow the DAO to evaluate progress against product delivery, growth, and strategic objectives
Aave is operating in a far more competitive and capital-intensive environment than in prior cycles. With greater clarity around budget allocation, hiring, and performance metrics, we believe this framework can meaningfully accelerate Aave’s next phase of growth.
Disclosure: ParaFi holds $AAVE. This post reflects our views as of today for governance discussion purposes only and is not investment, legal, or tax advice, nor a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any asset. Forward-looking statements are inherently uncertain and may change.
4 Likes
Raising a few consideration points:
- V3 is revenue making and sunset/adjusting parameters should start between 12-18 months at the very least OR/AND when v4 reaches a milestone such as $15B deposits and a stress test (TBD) is passed.
- While a holistic temp check gives a strong overvirw of direction, each component is important (v4 ratification, DAO foundation, revenue grant etc). Therefore suggesting a separate proposal for each post this temp check.
- AAVE Labs has been mostly self funded till date. Acknowledging their efforts in making AAVE from ETHLend. New chapter ‘AAVE will win’ is an attempt to align DAO, token holders, service providers, AAVE Labs and future institutions and developers. The opportunity is huge for tokenization beyond Defi and AAVE Protocol is capable of absorbing RWA tokenization. Therefore like any other honest initiative, I personally look forward towards collaboration between DAO, token holders and AAVE Labs so all can be winners.
- Lets not get caught up in the NOW and lets not ignore the story: ETHLend → AAVE v1 → AAVE v2 → AAVE v3 → AAVE v4 → AAVE Store where Fintechs, Banks and Insitutions can spin up their own use cases and bring on RWA tokenization. Funding is required to achieve RWA by AAVE Labs, yes it may not be optimal at the moment, but the opportunity for RWA tokenization on v4 will require funds. With all $ coming to DAO, i suggest the DAO commits to the ask by AAVE Labs and fine tunes funds after a year. It may as well result in reduction of funds for the next year or vice versa depending on progression and achievements.
- I assume that institutions, banks and fintechs are interested in the direction the DAO takes for them to commit their resources and funds in future on AAVE Protocol.
Defi has won!
AAVE v1, v2, v3 have won!
AAVE v4 and beyond will win!
I agree with most of your message but the “AAVE Labs has been mostly self funded till date” part is very misleading.
AAVE Labs has mostly been funded by an ICO (so tokens holders) as well as the treasury of the DAO (token holders again)
6 Likes
I appreciate the detailed response from Labs. It moves the conversation forward. Let me address what it actually resolves and what it doesn’t.
Revenue deductions
The response says Labs needs “flexibility” for “sustainable unit economics” and proposes “independent third-party verification.” That sounds reasonable until you ask: who selects the third party? What’s the audit scope? What happens if the DAO disagrees with a deduction? The original concern was sole discretion over deductions. The answer is still sole discretion, now with a reporting layer. Reporting isn’t oversight.
AAVE tokens
Aave Labs will not use any AAVE tokens received as part of this funding package to vote in Aave governance.
Good. But the question this thread keeps asking isn’t about future tokens. It’s about existing holdings. I traced 663K votes to a single cluster connected to founding infrastructure during the COI vote. That hasn’t been addressed. Disclosing what you’ll do with new tokens while ignoring the question about current ones isn’t transparency.
V3 to V4
The response says “zero rush” and “V3 continues indefinitely.” The original proposal says pause new V3 features. Both can’t be true. V3 generates $142M/yr today. V4 is on testnet. The DAO needs a written commitments, not a forum comment that contradicts the proposal text.
The $17.5M in growth grants
These are framed as go-to-market costs benchmarked against “traditional fintech.” Aave isn’t a consumer fintech app. The comparison flatters the budget. $17.5M in milestone grants where milestones are defined as “product launches” means Labs decides when milestones are met. That’s self-grading.
“Minimum wage salary”
We’d like to also note that Stani takes only a minimum wage salary as the legal requirement, and does not receive AAVE tokens.
The framing is designed to generate sympathy. The public record paints a different picture. The founder controls 600K+ AAVE in governance voting power (traced on-chain during the COI analysis). He recently purchased a ~$30M property. He had enough disposable capital to acquire ~$10M in AAVE to influence governance votes. None of this is secret. I’m not here to judge anyone’s personal finances. But you don’t get to claim minimum wage with one hand and deploy eight figures in governance power with the other. The DAO evaluates entities, not personal narratives.
“Uncompensated since June 2025”
Labs’ V4 service provider contract was $12M GHO to deliver V4. Labs accepted that scope and that budget. V4 is still on testnet. That’s a delivery problem, not a funding problem. The DAO isn’t responsible for cost overruns on a fixed-scope engagement that Labs itself proposed.
During that same period since June 2025, Labs switched the aave.com swap adapter from ParaSwap (revenue to DAO) to CoW Swap (revenue to Labs-controlled address) and captured $5.5M in partner fees without a governance vote. By February 2026 the rate had accelerated to $510K/week ($26.5M annualized).
Labs wasn’t uncompensated. Labs paid itself. The “100% revenue to DAO” offer in this proposal is not a gift. It’s an offer to stop taking what was already flowing to the DAO before it was diverted.
The funding picture
The response frames this proposal as necessary because Labs has been underfunded. The public record tells a different story:
| Source | Amount | Reference |
|---|---|---|
| ICO raise (Nov 2017) | $16.2M | ICO Drops |
| 300M LEND dev fund (23.1% of supply) | Distributed 2017-2020 | ETHLend announcement |
| VC rounds (Framework, ParaFi, Blockchain Capital) | $32.5M | ICO Drops |
| Confirmed DAO payments | $31.93M | V3 retro $16.28M, V4 SP $12M, events $2.15M, V4 security up to $1.5M |
| stkAAVE held from V3 retroactive | ~82.5K stkAAVE (~$9M) | On-chain |
| Unapproved CoW Swap partner fees | ~$5.5M | TokenLogic dashboard |
That’s ~$95M+ in confirmed funding before any new ask. The “minimum wage salary” framing is about one person’s salary. It’s not about the entity’s capitalization.
The DAO has never received a transparency report from Labs.
Not once. No accounting of how $31.93M was spent.
No disclosure of current treasury, token holdings, or runway.
The proposal asks for $51M more on top of what has already been a generously funded operation by any serious standard.
We just published our own numbers:
ACI: Full Transparency Report | X article
$4.625M over three years. Every deliverable listed, every revenue strategy attributed, on-chain verified across 254 assets, 22 markets, 16 chains. The DAO can check every number without trusting us.
The largest funding request in Aave history should clear the same bar.
Publish a delivery report.
Disclose the treasury and voting power.
Account for the CoW Swap fees.
Then we can talk numbers.
19 Likes
I. Funding - Can we expect a report similar to ACI’s to support and legitimize Aave Lab’s funding request?
Seeing the direct impact of each dollar invested into ACI, Labs, or any other SP for that matter is exactly the kind of verifiable data we all need to inform our decision to support, request adjustment, or reject this funding proposal, and any subsequent ones, regardless of the party asking for funds.
II. IP, Assets, Fees, Revenue streams.
When it comes to restitution of IP and assets to the DAO (via DAO-Owned legal entity), this should take place before any further funding is granted to Labs in my opinion.
Furthermore, when it comes to the rerouting of fees and revenue streams that are flowing to Labs instead of the DAO, the new structure should be designed to remove such a broad and obscure agency given to Labs. Regardless of the all the arguments presented, 100% should mean 100%. If some of the revenue and fees need to be directed towards specific partners or programs, let it happen through governance approval. The main argument being put forth being remaining agile and being quick to move, how quickly are your decisions made? 24h? 72h? A week?… The last two months of involvement from everyone around here shows that things CAN move very fast if need be. Again in my world, 100% means 100%, no fine prints attached.
Lastly, on a personal note:
I’ve been around since beginning. I was there Pre-ICO, met a good part of the genesis team in person, and even put together a few community meet-ups to give presentations about ETHLend. The success of ETHLend, and subsequently Aave were one of the easiest things to foresee in my life… Now, what I couldn’t in a million years have imagined is that the communication and discourse coming from the same person whose main motivation for ETHLend’s creation was to “serve the unbanked”, and who seemed so transparent and benevolent only 9 years ago, would’ve evolved into the current ‘smokes-and-mirror,’ almost-patronizing tone that seems to be the new norm.
Please, moving forward, less B.S., half truths, and smokey write ups, just get to the point, all of us will understand you… and if we’re finally addressed in a direct and transparent manner, who knows..? It might help rebuild the trust that you obliterated in just a couple of months.
4 Likes
Dear Aave Community, Delegates, and the Aave Labs Team,
I strongly support the “Aave 2030” vision presented by Aave Labs and the technological leap that V4 will bring. However, the current financial request on the table ($25 Million Cash + 75,000 AAVE Token Grant) and the proposed Foundation structure exceed acceptable limits regarding the DAO’s long-term independence and fiscal discipline, and thus require revision.
The ACI transparency report has demonstrated what a small, focused team can achieve with reasonable budgets. With this “efficiency standard” now established, we demand a significant revision (reduction) in the budget and token amount requested by Aave Labs, alongside a transparent oversight process.
To ensure this proposal is accepted by the DAO and to avoid risking Aave’s future, the following core conditions must be met:
1. Budget Discipline and Request for Reduction
The requested $25 Million and 75,000 AAVE act as a “blank check” under current market conditions.
Revision: Aave Labs must revise these figures downwards. We do not want a “black box” labeled “Development Costs.” We request a line item breakdown and a leaner budget that does not strain the DAO treasury.
Token Vesting: 75,000 AAVE is not a simple payment. This amount must be reduced, and any tokens granted must be subject to a strict, long-term (4+ years) vesting schedule.
2. Foundation Structure: Full Independence and Checks & Balances
We cannot allow the proposed Foundation to become a “backyard” for Aave Labs or the founders. The Foundation charter must be based on the following principles:
Full Independence: The Foundation must be legally and operationally completely separated from Aave Labs.
Board Composition: The Board cannot consist solely of Labs appointees. It must include DAO representatives, elected delegates, legal experts, and ecosystem partners (Community Guardians). Stani or the Labs team must remain in the minority, or a “check-and-balance” mechanism must be established to prevent unilateral decision making.
IP Transfer Commitment: It must be explicitly declared that upon completion of funding or development, all generated Intellectual Property (IP) and Foundation assets belong unconditionally to the DAO.
3. Transparency and Accountability (Committee Oversight)
While the ACI report set a standard, a project of this scale requires tighter oversight mechanisms.
Reporting to the Foundation Committee: Instead of posting sensitive data directly to the public forum, we request that quarterly financial and technical audit reports by independent third-party firms be submitted to a Foundation Committee comprising DAO representatives, delegates, and strategic partners. Budget release approvals must be within this Committee’s authority.
Milestone-Based Payments: Payments must not be lump sum; they must be milestone-based. If V4 code is not delivered, security audits are not passed, or the Committee does not approve, the funding stops.
CONCLUSION AND CALL TO ACTION
Let’s be clear: Aave Labs is a vital part of this ecosystem, but the Aave Protocol is not anyone’s private property. As a Service Provider, Labs is obligated to adhere to principles of transparency and accountability towards the DAO, its actual owner.
Critical Warning:
Rushing this proposal to a vote in its current form and facing a potential rejection could destroy the momentum gained so far, create serious market uncertainty, and strengthen the hands of competitors.
Therefore, I invite Aave Labs and Stani to engage with DAO Delegates and Ecosystem Partners ( @EzR3aL @MarcZeller @ACI @TokenLogic @ChaosLabs @WintermuteGovernance @karpatkey_TokenLogic @Gauntlet @bgdlabs @AaveLabs @stani ) to revise the budget and integrate the “shared governance” conditions above before moving to a vote.
When the proposal becomes a “DAO Consensus” rather than a “Labs Imposition,” we all win.
Best regards,
Anyone else want to see Aave Labs go back to building instead of catering to an endless stream of demands from the DAO which has already been offered everything it asked for?
Let’s vote this in now, win again, and look to adjust with more voting later on.
We are writing to answer several follow-up questions from the community on the Aave Will Win framework. This post addresses the most frequent questions that were not covered in our initial response.
Will the foundation be operational before funding begins, and what will guarantee its independence?
The foundation is unlikely to be live during the timeline between now and the final vote on the Aave Will Win framework. However, we are open to time bounding the foundation creation according to what the DAO thinks is reasonable. We will first present a detailed proposal for the independent foundation’s structure, including its governance and board composition, for the DAO to ratify.
What specific KPIs will be used to measure success?
We will provide detailed quarterly reports to the DAO, and public, and will also be making individual posts for each growth/development grant with relevant details. These reports will track key performance indicators for each product. For new products, KPIs will include Total Value Locked, daily active users, transaction volume, and revenue generated for the DAO. For V4, we will track adoption, protocol integrations, and the growth of the spoke ecosystem. We are open to hearing additional KPIs that the DAO would be interested in tracking.
Will there be DAO-approved caps on revenue deductions?
We are open to establishing DAO-approved caps on discretionary revenue deductions, particularly for user incentives. That said, we suggest setting these caps on a product-by-product basis in future proposals. This approach allows for flexibility as we learn what drives growth best through A/B testing against real users, similar to how we grow Aave Protocol today. For now, we will provide full transparency on all revenue deductions in our quarterly reports.
When will independent revenue verification be implemented and who will decide who does the review?
Many of the revenue streams can be independently checked using publicly available data. For less visible data, we are investigating ways to transparently report revenue and arrange independent verification.
How will this grant affect the DAO’s other financial commitments?
Our internal analysis indicates the DAO can support this funding request while meeting its other obligations. The DAO’s treasury is not static and in the past month and a half it has made over $23 million. Also, if approved, the DAO would immediately inherit a revenue stream (via aave.com swaps) that could cover a meaningful portion of Aave Labs’ baseline request of $25 million. Additionally, we hope this structure will be embraced by other Service Providers who are looking to build additional products of their own on top of Aave.
Aave Will Win is a proposal to increase DAO revenue way beyond the Aave Labs’ financial requirement.
What are the next steps from here?
This proposal is a Temp Check. We are answering feedback as it comes in, and we intend to keep the proposal moving through this phase. After the Temp Check, we plan to incorporate finer details, time-bound commitments for items like the foundation, and other adjustments during the ARFC stage as part of the standard governance process.
5 Likes
The strategic direction here is correct and the community should recognize that. Revenue alignment, V4 as the technical foundation, and brand protection via a Foundation are all the right moves. That said, several issues need resolution before this should advance.
Revenue definition needs DAO control, not Labs discretion. “100% of revenue” minus partner rebates, user incentives, and vault yield redirections — all at Aave Labs’ sole discretion with no audit requirement — is not an enforceable commitment. The DAO needs an independent auditor and governance-approved caps on deductions before this headline means anything.
The budget is disproportionate to current treasury size. $42.5M in stablecoins plus 75k AAVE against a $160M treasury — 31% of total holdings to a single service provider in a single vote — is a structural risk regardless of how worthy the work is. The milestone grants are reasonable in concept but need real KPIs beyond “did the product launch.”
Unbundle the vote. Revenue alignment has broad consensus. The 75k AAVE grant does not. Forcing a single vote on four distinct proposals extracts maximum benefit from favorable sentiment on one item while bypassing legitimate scrutiny on others.
75k AAVE is governance power, not just compensation. With existing Labs-aligned wallet holdings already undisclosed and already dominating contested votes, transferring another 13.6% of DAO AAVE holdings to an entity that won’t disclose what it already controls is the most consequential governance decision buried in this proposal. Full wallet disclosure should be a precondition, not a future ask.
V4 ratification should not freeze V3. V3 is the $100M+ annual revenue engine. V4 is on testnet. Pausing V3 feature development in the same vote that ratifies an undeployed protocol is premature. Let V4 earn its ratification through a standalone proposal when it’s mainnet-ready.
Finally — and this is the question this proposal doesn’t answer — directing revenue to the DAO treasury without a clear value accrual mechanism for actual token holders isn’t token-centric alignment, it’s treasury accumulation. The existing buyback program is a start, but purchased tokens sitting in treasury and recycled to contractors produce near-zero net supply reduction. Committing a fixed percentage of DAO revenue to permanent buy-and-burn would give this framework real teeth for token holders and make the “token-centric” framing credible.
8 Likes
Still zero disclosure about Labs/founder voting power. You’re controlling the entire governance system through undisclosed wallets.
This must be addressed first—before anything else. If you want DAO funding and trust, you need to meet basic transparency standards.
10 Likes
I want to name the pattern in this response, because it isn’t new. This is how Labs has handled governance feedback for years.
The Pattern
The community asks for something reasonable. Labs says “we’re open to it.” The vote proceeds. The thing never happens. Five proposals, same playbook:
2022, V3 Retroactive Funding. The community asked for AAVE token lock-ups. Labs agreed: “50% of the AAVE tokens after a one-year lock up, the remaining 50% after two years.” BGD’s on-chain analysis found no programmatic lock was ever enforced. The proposal “simply transfers AAVE to the Aave genesis team account.” The tokens went to a Gnosis Safe with no lock. The community asked for accountability. Labs agreed. The vote passed. The lock-up never existed.
2023, Snapshot Space Transfer. TokenLogic proposed migrating Snapshot control to a DAO smart contract. Labs responded: “We support handing over the responsibility of the Snapshot Space to the Aave DAO.” Three years later, Labs controls both aave.eth and aavedao.eth. When aavedao.eth expired in December 2025, Labs re-acquired it rather than letting the DAO take ownership. The entity asking for $51M still controls the infrastructure where the vote on that $51M happens.
2024, V4 Service Provider. Labs promised: “V4 will be developed within the one-year timeframe specified. No other payments are being proposed to the Aave DAO for the scope.” That was June 2024. Twenty months later, V4 is still on testnet. Labs has since requested an additional $1.5M for V4 security and is now asking for $51M more. “No other payments” lasted until the next ask.
2025, Horizon. Labs proposed a new token with only 15% allocated to the Aave DAO. Community revolted across 108 posts. Stani wrote: “there is no interest from our team to push anything that the DAO does not feel right.” They dropped the token and agreed to a 50/50 revenue share. The revised Temp Check and ARFC passed. Then at the AIP stage, BGD raised serious governance concerns. Labs dismissed them as “surprising” and said they would “move forward as planned.” ACI voted no. Ignas voted no. Labs published the AIP on a summer weekend and launched anyway.
On-chain records tell the rest of the story. A wallet now identified as under Stani Kulechov control cast 333K FOR votes on the Horizon AIP. That’s 57% of all support. Without it, the vote fails: 250K FOR vs 378K AGAINST. The founder of the entity proposing the deal used his own voting power to push it through over community opposition.
2025, CowSwap. When the community discovered Labs had been diverting ~$5.5M in swap revenue without a vote, Stani acknowledged: “It should have been brought up for discussion and should have done in a transparent way. This is very fair feedback and something we should improve in the future.” This one isn’t a broken promise. It’s an open admission that changed nothing. The diversion continued. It accelerated. From ~8 ETH/week to 204 ETH/week ($510K/week). “We should improve in the future” meant nothing changed in the present.
Five proposals. Five accommodations. Zero follow-through. Acknowledge the concern, agree in principle, pass the vote, move on.
The Size of This Ask
That’s the track record behind a $51M funding request. Let me put that number in context.
The entire non-Labs service provider ecosystem costs the DAO ~$16.5M/yr. BGD ($4.4M), Chaos Labs ($3M), ACI ($3M), Certora ($2.6M), TokenLogic ($2.5M), LlamaRisk ($1M). At the proposed $17M/yr, Labs alone would cost more than every other service provider combined.
ACI has received $4.6M over three years. That bought $142.9M in attributed annualized revenue. 3.4 cents per dollar of revenue growth. Full transparency report published, on-chain verified. Labs has received $31.93M lifetime. Monthly activity updates, but no accountability report. No attributed revenue metric. No cost-per-outcome breakdown of any kind. The DAO has no way to evaluate what the last $31.93M produced, and Labs is asking for $51M more.
A budget this size deserves transparency this strict. The DAO has never been asked for this much by a single entity. The entity asking has never been asked to account for what it already received.
This Proposal
Now here’s post #66. The community has asked for specific things before this vote proceeds:
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Unbundle the vote
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Disclose existing wallet holdings and voting power
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Publish a delivery report
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Reduce the budget
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Establish the foundation before funding
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Define revenue caps before voting
Labs’ answer to every single one: later.
Revenue caps? “We suggest setting these caps on a product-by-product basis in future proposals.” Foundation? “Unlikely to be live during the timeline between now and the final vote.” Independent verification? “We are investigating.” KPIs? “We are open to hearing additional KPIs.” Wallet disclosure? Not addressed.
And then: “we intend to keep the proposal moving through this phase.”
Same playbook. The community asks for preconditions. Labs offers post-conditions. Once the Temp Check passes, the direction is locked and the leverage is gone. Every “future proposal” and “ARFC stage adjustment” happens after the DAO has already said yes.
A few specifics:
“The foundation is unlikely to be live during the timeline between now and the final vote.”
Then delay the vote. The foundation is the oversight mechanism for $51M in funding. Approving the funding before the oversight exists is backwards.
“We will provide detailed quarterly reports.”
Labs publishes monthly development updates. Those are activity logs: what the team worked on. They’ve never published an accountability report: what the money bought, what it cost, and what the return was. Every other SP does this already. “We will” isn’t a track record. Given the five examples above, “we will” is a pattern of promises that don’t materialize after the vote passes.
“Our internal analysis indicates the DAO can support this funding request.”
Affordability isn’t justification. The question isn’t whether the treasury can handle it**. The question is whether this team, with this track record, has earned this budget.**
ACI’s Position
I’ve laid out the concerns clearly. Other delegates and tokenholders have too. If this proposal moves to Snapshot with these issues unresolved, with the vote still bundled, with no delivery report, with no wallet disclosure, with no COI framework in place, ACI will vote NAY.
That’s not where I want to end up. I’d rather see a clean proposal that the community can support. But the DAO can’t keep approving blank checks based on promises that have a documented history of not being kept.
Before this moves to a vote:
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Unbundle. Revenue alignment, V4 ratification, foundation, and funding are four separate decisions. Let each stand on its own merits.
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Deliver a transparency report. What did the previous $31.93M produce? Every other SP can answer this. Labs should too.
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Disclose holdings and voting power. The DAO traced 663K NAY votes to founding infrastructure during the COI vote. That question remains unanswered. Full wallet disclosure should be a precondition for any funding proposal.
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Adopt the COI framework. The Mandatory Disclosures proposal failed by 85K votes, with 96.3% of NAY traced to a single cluster. The entity requesting funding should not be the entity blocking the transparency framework that would govern how that funding is evaluated.
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Define caps in the proposal text. Revenue deductions, incentive spend, and discretionary costs should be capped and governance-approved, not deferred to “future proposals.”
These aren’t negotiating positions. They’re governance minimums. Every other service provider already meets them. Labs should meet them before asking the DAO to trust them with $51M more.
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I want to thank Marc Zeller for reminding us all of these hard facts and bringing the on-chain receipts. He touched upon truly vital points that cannot be ignored.
When we look at the numbers and details, the reality is clear: an ask of $42.5M in stablecoins plus 75k AAVE tokens (totaling a massive ~$51M request) is on the table. As we clearly see in Zeller’s analysis, we are not just facing a large budget request; we are facing a years-long structural playbook of “promise first, pass the vote, forget later.”
Unfortunately, Labs posting “DeFi will win” on social media is not enough. True DeFi requires transparency, accountability, and on-chain verification. You cannot ask for a blank check larger than every other Service Provider combined without providing a delivery report for the $31.9M already received. I fully share Zeller’s concerns: vital issues like governance power (wallet disclosures), foundation setup, and revenue caps cannot be brushed off with “we will do it later” promises. The DAO and the community want to see them in Labs’ actions before the vote, not just in their words.
Our biggest concern as a community is this: the $42.5M budget and the 75k AAVE grant absolutely need a serious reduction. If Labs forces these distinct issues through a single “bundled vote” based purely on promises, the DAO will lose all its leverage. Once they get what they want, they could steer Aave and the DAO into a difficult, centralized point of no return.
Therefore, the only healthy path forward for Aave is for Labs to stop pushing the omnibus package, unbundle the vote, and meet the DAO at a reasonable middle ground regarding the budget.
4 Likes
@wlw is 100% correct.
This forum is a crypto-style demonstration of why companies choose to remain private for as long as possible. We are making it impossible for Stani to build.
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@1delta I agree that we haven’t yet reached Aave’s decentralized endgame. The reality is Aave Labs is still bootstrapping the ecosystem and supporting them is currently our best path forward.
Winning and decentralizing happen concurrently and gradually. Let’s not let either one get ahead of the other.