We don’t believe that this qualifies as as shortfall event considering all the steps taken to ensure the safety of the funds deployed and the outcome.
Thank you for your input, but with due respect, allow me to propose an analogy to adequately illustrate the nature of the situation we’re dealing with here.
Consider the AAVE protocol as a vehicle moving on a fast-paced highway of the decentralized finance environment, and the users as its passengers. Suddenly, a fault in the vehicle’s system is detected — a potential danger lying ahead. The “airbags” – the safety measures you’ve implemented – deploy timely. The severity of the accident is averted – no fatal losses occur.
However, does the deployment of airbags signify that there were no damages? No bruises or minor injuries? I believe we can agree that despite the airbags’ deployment, there can still be passengers who have suffered shock or minor bruises. Under normal circumstances, any passenger, irrespective of the extent of their injury, will be entitled to a claim. Such is the nature of protection measures - they’re designed to mitigate, not nullify, the potential damage.
Similarly, even though the major flaws were managed swiftly, some of the users have suffered. They may not amount to a significant number or their losses might not be substantial, but they were affected nonetheless.
Considering this incident as a shortfall event is recognizing those minor yet impactful “bruises” that some of the users endured. By denying them the rightful compensation that have been promised under the governance rules, you compromise not just on the safety measures you promised but on the very principles this decentralized environment is built upon - equity, fairness, and transparency.
I vote for NAY because funds lost are not related to the vulnerability, but too much risk taken on health factor before the incident and I prefer to let the safety bag in a real case funds lost in case of hack.
As mentioned earlier in this post, there is a governance process, where If there is sufficient consensus on this issue, a TEMP CHECK will be created, and feedback will be collected from the community to determine what should be done in this situation and the subsequent steps to be taken.
However, I would like to point out that the concept of the Safety Module and its usage should not be invoked lightly, as it is a very restrictive term. A strict criteria must be established to avoid unnecessary and inefficient use. In this case, after analyzing all the provided information, we still think the impact does not have sufficient magnitude to activate the Safety Module. Nevertheless, we will make sure all voices are heard and that the process is followed, no matter it’s direction.
Upon deep reflection and consideration of the recent discourse, particularly the insightful points raised by Raphael, I find myself compelled to advocate for the activation of the safety module in response to the incident.
It is imperative to recognize that, in decentralized finance, the strength of our protocols lies not just in their technical robustness but in the unwavering adherence to our governance principles. The issue at hand, though seemingly minor in terms of financial impact, poses a significant question about our commitment to these principles. Raphael’s arguments highlight a crucial perspective - the magnitude of loss should not dictate our course of action, but rather the principle that all users, irrespective of their stake, deserve equal protection under our governance.
This incident, while limited in scope, provides a pivotal opportunity for us to reinforce our community values. It’s a matter of principle, respecting the governance rules we have collectively agreed upon. Ignoring the losses, however small, sets a concerning precedent and could erode trust in our ecosystem. Our response to this situation will be a testament to our commitment to fairness, transparency, and the rule of law within our community.
In conclusion, while I understand and respect the differing viewpoints, particularly the cautionary stance taken by respected community members like MarcZeller, I firmly believe that the activation of the safety module in this instance aligns with our long-term vision and the foundational values of AAVE. It is a proactive step in maintaining the integrity and trust of our platform, ensuring that all members of our community feel equally valued and protected.
Vote is based on how many Aave and stkAAVE you have. A user can have 10M$ in assets but only 5 AAVE, those will be its voting power. On the other half, a user can have 20$ assets but 1000 Aave, so its voting power will be bigger compared to the other user.
That’s not accurate, users who deposit or borrow may also have Aave token or stkAAVE as well, and therefore, their opinion is also being represented.
If users of the protocol (as you say, people who deposit or people who borrow) want to be active members and get their voice represented in Governance, directly or indirectly, they are free to do so, by holding Aave token or stkAAVE and activelly participating in this Forum, as well as by voting proposals etc, or by delegating those to delegates who will work on their best interest.
You have been answered when asked about Aave token and governance. This is not a debate rather a statement about how governance works, and you can have your opinion and share it, which you did, but this thread is not to discuss this topic, as its for other matters. Thank you @martymcfly
If someone wanted to buy enough tokens to “manipulate” AAVE, the price would go parabolic (+ they would most likely be unwilling to make their tokens worthless by exploiting the protocol)
On the other hand, you’re telling us it would be fairer for a billionaire having nothing to do with the DAO / not holding any AAVE to simply supply 10B to take over the protocol and rekt everyone
That’s common sense, the protocol can obviously not be designed this way
