*First, let me state how disappointed I am in the AAVE community that it doesn’t really seem to be possible for most of them to come up with a proper proposal for anything. As seen with Harmony recovery, it seems to take a long while to get from bickering about losses (“Give me my money back!!!111one”) to a point where the proper proceedings for an action by the DAO can be activated. *
*This mostly, in my opinion, stems from the fact that most users do not even have a bit of a clue what they put their money into or who “controls” the protocol they put their money into. Ignorance is bliss, I guess. *
Anyway, that’s a topic for another time.
This proposal comes fast but with an incredibly low effort.
First, my opinion: compensation for users that were locked into high interest rates, because they could neither pay back their loans nor did liquidity providers have the option to supply more liquidity to get the interest rates lower again, is a valid claim.
This obviously only goes for paused assets, as in freezing periods it is still possible to repay a loan.
This is also not a task that is too hard, as the markets are literally paused and we have the documentation on chain of who had how much debt during the pausing period. From that, it’s easy to determine who would be eligible.
But we also need a baseline. Users choose the variable debt option because they see 3-4% and think “well, that’s way cheaper than the stable rate, I’ll take it!” but they’re also choosing the riskier option. A choice that needs to be considered when talking about compensation for high interest rate periods outside of their control. Because they may have chosen the option with the believe that they could either switch to a stable rate or repay the debt quickly to forgo high interest rates.
But everyone should agree that users that chose the riskier option need to take personal responsibility for that action and they can not expect to be repaid in full for a risk they were aware of from the start.
So my proposal would be to set a baseline at 5% over the average stable rate over the past 365 days calculated individually for any given market. (i.e. if the average stable rate was 7% over the last year, 12% should be an acceptable interest rate for variable debt positions in an emergency situation).
I would also propose that the AAVE safety module should not be triggered for this. I agree that the function of the module is also for cases like these but the losses are not immediate and the trust of the stakers should not be broken by this, fairly small, loss for users.
The compensation should be paid by fees that go into the treasury over the course of one year, paid out every 3 months as claimable stkAAVE, so that the compensation for the individual wallet could either be claimed quarterly, as it becomes available, or after 12 months in full.
This way the AAVE community will be whole again, the ecosystem will be further secured and the AAVE treasury will have time to “soften the blow”.
From what I see in protocol revenue over the last few weeks, the cost for this proposal would be less than 500.000$ (this is a back of the napkin calculation, please correct me if you have better numbers).
Please discuss and please look at the bigger picture and the good of AAVE when considering this.
For the other proposal, i.e. compensating for fees caused by liquidations, I have not and do not see any evidence up to now to support that this was a protocol issue and not individual decisions that led to said liquidations. In every example I’ve heard up to now the cause was excessive risk taking by the individual, while ignoring the special situation the protocol was in at the time. Paused markets can’t be liquidated. Frozen markets can be repaid, thus there should not really be liquidations if you’re aware of what’s happening.
Show me the evidence and I may reconsider, but I doubt it.