[ARFC] $AAVE token alignment. Phase 1 - Ownership

[dennisonbertram]

Hello folks, Dennison from Tally.xyz here.

I wanted to share a little bit of a perspective as a service provider that has worked with many of the leading organizations in the crypto space and seen from a privileged point of view many of the struggles that decentralization has to deal with.

The challenges here are not unique, but despite the principle that may be argued upon and the idea of what might be right or just or correct, there is a lot of practical danger here that should be considered.

Without addressing the points that many people have brought up directly in this thread, many of which are very valid and have lots of pros and cons. I wanted to just talk high-level from a practical point of view. Most often DAOs are the worst at doing practical decisions; many things end up hinging on principle, or emotion, debate, or committee.

The worst thing to happen to Aave would be the perception by the integrators of the traditional financial system that they do not have a reliable counterparty with which to deal.

No financial system wants to have a DAO as a counterparty. We’ve seen it over and over. The traditional corporate world wants to know exactly who they are speaking with. They want to have relationships directly with decision makers, they want a face to the organization they are doing business with. The last thing they want is a nebulous political organization as a counterparty.

While many of the points here are valid and salient, the discussion and potential outcome could put Aave in great peril. Aave exists in a highly competitive ecosystem with a large number of well-funded, very competent competitors who would take such an opportunity here to undermine Aave’s success. The DAO will need to make a decision around what is the right thing to do vs. what is the most effective thing to do.

Put simply, do you want to be right or do you want to make money?

I know that there will be many people here that believe strongly in the principle of decentralization and take great umbrage to the actions by labs which seem to potentially not be fully aligned.

I would hope for the sake of all DeFi and the sake of Aave that the discussion can put in place formal relationships and formal procedures that will give clarity to the Aave DAO, the relationship with service providers, and its relationship to the wider ecosystem of consumers of Aave products.

Speaking just from personal experience, I would highly suggest that the community as part of this process focus on a path of somehow enshrining Stani and Avara Labs as a key contributor, and representative of the AAVE DAO. I know this will come off as extreme fanboying, but I think AAVE faces a greater existential danger of being delegitimized in the eyes of the financial systems AAVE is integrating. I’m sure there are many integrators of AAVE who didn’t even realize Stani is not “CEO” of AAVE. And while that’s not a good enough reason defacto to make him such- there is great value in the bridges already built.

History is rife with organizations on the cusp of success only to fall to internal infighting. I personally suggest the community think deeply: “Is this a debate that has to happen now? Can we postpone the outcome in some way?" AAVE is close to winning, but it has not yet won, and it’s competitors will be conspicuously silent lest they “interrupt their enemy while they are making a mistake”.

I know this opinion will not be popular, but I think it’s important to share. The Aave DAO is one of the most successful and we all want it to stay a guiding light for DeFi. There are great dangers here which are largely unseen.

If the DAO succeeds on principle, but it’s winnings are a wider market perception that it is a highly political and capricious counterparty, will that not be a pyrrhic victory?

Again, this is not to make this discussion irrelevant, it is important, critical, and indeed representative of the wider struggle that organizations in the space are navigating (See Uniswap with the Unification Proposal). So it is timely. What I caution deeply against though, is a circumstance that feels more like revolution than evolution.

Also, I strongly urge the Aave DAO to seek counsel outside it’s own organization. Speak to it’s competitors or peers, talk with service providers who have been through the process with others, talk to other foundations and leaders of Labs teams on how they handled it. The discussion should also include token holders, investors and other market participants, perhaps make it a formal process that extends beyond the forum, and make it a slow, considered processes to be sure that all the impact of the decisions made here can be fully known.

Update: I figure out some wording that I liked better:

The DAO should IMHO see Stani and Avara as one of it’s greatest assets. The discussion might be helpful to see it from that perspective: “How might we leverage one of the DAO’s greatest assets? What resources should we allocate to one of our greatest assets?”

Dennison

[sid_areta]

Hi all,

Having closely observed the recent discussions on the forum, X, and all across the space, we (Areta) wanted to step in and offer a potential path forward as a neutral, objective party that is not a service provider to the DAO. Before we do so, I’d like to re-introduce myself and Areta to the community to provide some context.

Background & Context

Areta is a leading investment banking and strategy firm focused on the digital assets space. We partner with teams on M&A/capital markets transactions and commercial strategy projects; for example, we recently sold a leading prop trading platform, Breakout, to Kraken, supported Bridgepoint Group on its majority acquisition of ht.digital (the first private equity buyout in crypto), and also worked with Uniswap Foundation to develop up and operate larger builder-focused projects. More relevant in this case might be the work we’ve been doing with Aztec Network over this year on entity restructuring and enabling operational excellence. We were able to get a birds-eye view into the roles of Labs and Foundation, how they could work together to ensure the success of the network, and at the same time, enable operational excellence, clear execution, and accountability to all stakeholders, be they investors, team members, or contributors.

We have a long history with Aave. I (Sid) first led the Aave delegation for LBS Blockchain Society from October 2022 to February 2024, having maintained >95% voting participation, establishing ourselves as the most viewed delegate platform on Aave, and being selected in the first cohort of the Orbit program itself. I then moved our delegation over to Areta in February 2024, and we’ve been delegates and have consistently participated in the DAO ever since. We’ve maintained very good relationships with all service providers and contributors on Aave, as I’m sure EzR3aL, Chainlink, LlamaRisk, Aave Labs, TokenLogic, and others can all attest to. We are a truly neutral party that is not a service provider, and have demonstrated this in our voting history.

Current Situation

Given our experience, the current situation to us stems primarily from a lack of organisational and role clarity across the DAO. To expand further:

• The DAO is not clear about the assets it owns or indeed, whether it is even able to own any assets without a legal wrapper or entity.

• The roles, responsibilities, and expectations of service providers to the DAO is not granularly defined today. There are a loose set of expectations; however, nothing formal has been defined and therefore can be enforced. The key drivers for good behaviour of service providers in a way that is “aligned” to the Aave DAO are reputational risk and affinity with the DAO, which, for an entity the size and paramount importance of Aave, are inadequate. There needs to be explicitly defined role clarity that is set in stone.

• There is a clear lack of definition in how revenue is distributed to the DAO and service providers, and even to tokenholders. While there are a set of expectations as to how revenue should be distributed, granular definition is absolutely necessary and would invariably make the community and token stronger.

• The method for counterparties to engage with Aave is not especially straightforward today. The options are to reach out to Aave Labs, ACI, or any other growth service provider, but the process for how decisions are made in regards to, for example, deploying Aave on another chain, is not well-defined. This is not fit for purpose in a world of increasing institutional engagement, where institutions require clear counterparties to engage with. This lack of definition also leads to bureaucracy, harming Aave’s competitiveness.

While these are the most glaring issues, there are several more operational and organisational challenges faced by Aave as a whole. All of these issues have led to tension between parties that are all, from the view of an impartial, involved observer, aiming to achieve the best for the Aave ecosystem. This tension has led to suboptimal outcomes in all manners - it has given competitors ammunition in BD discussions, brought uncertainty to long-term investors, and added a blocker in conversations with institutions who are invariably wary of engaging with a protocol “in strife”. Overall, this series of events is untenable and must be tackled professionally, bringing organisational and structural clarity befitting the scale, reputation, and primacy of the Aave ecosystem.

Path Forward

It’s admirable how the DAO and service providers have already started to formulate solutions to this issue. However, it is of utmost importance to take this process one step at a time, clearly define all of the issues, identify potential legal and operational routes forward (i.e., setting up an entity for the DAO, granularly setting out the roles of service providers and other contributors to the DAO, defining how revenue is distributed, etc.), reach consensus on each and every one of these aspects with key stakeholders in the DAO, and then execute.

It is critical to be deliberate and not act rashly at this point in time. This will only serve to expose the entire community to additional legal, operational, and even security risks, ensure even greater bureaucracy, and diminish Aave against its competitors. It is necessary to take time and not just move proposals to Snapshot immediately because this is not a simple issue and will take time to untangle and structure professionally.

In our view, these kinds of structured, stakeholder-heavy coordination efforts are best led by a neutral, independent party with no direct stake in the outcome.

Of course, this is what we at Areta do best and would be privileged to offer our support to the DAO. That said, the broader point is that an entity that can steer this process and key stakeholders in a professional manner while consistently reporting progress to the DAO is necessary to ensure that the outcome is one unified, operationally excellent Aave.

[Codeknight]

@dennisonbertram

The worst thing to happen to Aave would be the perception by the integrators of the traditional financial system that they do not have a reliable counterparty with which to deal.

This is why the DAO should own its IP. A tradfi integrator is going to want the branding, incentives and protocol integration approvals to all come from the same entity. From their perspective, its riskier if control of the protocol, social media and brand is split among different entities

[dennisonbertram]

I think thats a totally valid point. I would frame it more like, “How do we make sure Avara Labs has certainty in it’s ability to use the brand and license it”.

[myriad]

as long as stani has a lot of aave tokens that are not borrowed against, he’s going to keep paying the dao. This proposal is not necessary. We don’t need a legal fight over something that has in practice not been an issue.

[r0mul0]

I don’t see the point of this proposal. AAVE is growing and continues innovating, there is no clear reason why things should change.

This seems more like the coordinated action of a bunch of disgruntled former employees.

[Jordan]

I think there’s a lot of confusion right now, and some people are trying to reframe this debate into a simplistic “for Aave Labs vs against Aave Labs” dichotomy.

That’s silly and below the level of discussion we should be having.

The core topic here is the next step in the DAO’s path toward decentralization, specifically around ownership and stewardship of the brand/IP.

Importantly, once the IP/brand is transferred to the DAO:

It’s obvious that Aave Labs remains the best-positioned contributor to continue its lobbying work and to remain the major marketing force for our ecosystem.
It’s obvious that AaveChan should continue to be able to use the Aave name in its branding.
It’s obvious that multi-party contribution will continue, with Labs collaborating with BGD and other service providers on internal work and future versions of the protocol.
But we just need to formalize it.

And to be equally clear:

This is not an emotional debate driven by grievances or personal attacks.
This is not an attempt to sideline Aave Labs, to the contrary.
This is not about disrupting what already works today.
But we just need to have it.

This is about one thing: putting the DAO in the correct long-term structural position.

In a normal world, this would be a largely procedural change, a formality even. If it hadn’t been blown out of proportion, most people wouldn’t even have noticed the transfer.

Now that there’s noise around it, it can actually become a strong marketing moment: a visible signal that Aave is maturing as a decentralized system.

And as Stani has noted, Aave Labs is the largest token holder. That means Labs could, in theory, sway outcomes in governance (I’m not implying they will, just stating the reality). So even if these assets move under DAO ownership, Labs would still retain meaningful influence through token voting power for years.

Finally, I want to emphasize that this discussion is only the beginning. We’re not debating the exact legal or operational mechanism for DAO ownership in this thread.

Once there are clear positive signals and broad alignment on direction, the DAO can evaluate the best structure(s) to hold and manage these assets. There are multiple viable options, and the relevant contributors and experts can study them in detail at the appropriate stage.

Even though this discussion was initially triggered by adjacent issues, which should be resolved separately, we shouldn’t let that derail the main point: this is about strengthening decentralization and clarifying long-term alignment.

[roelio]

This proposal mixes up governance with ownership. The DAO governs the protocol, but brand ownership was never clearly established and, realistically, that ship has sailed.

Without a real legal mechanism, asking the DAO to “regain” ownership is wishful thinking and risks weakening our position. We should focus on securing enforceable rights that match what the DAO actually is, not pretend we can take ownership now.

[MarcZeller]

To help keep expectations grounded while reducing speculation and noise, here is how we see it:

If implemented, this proposal will not impact the day-to-day operations of the Aave protocol, nor change the protocol’s risk profile. Avara can remain a service provider to the DAO, and we are not advocating for an abrupt operational change in how these strategic assets are managed.

What this proposal does is bring clarity on ownership and accountability. It creates a more stable, resilient, long-term alignment framework for service providers, the Aave DAO, and $AAVE token holders.

From our perspective, this is a net positive, additive step toward greater maturity: it strengthens governance, reduces ambiguity, and improves the balance of power without disrupting operations.

We invite everyone to remain focused on the core of the proposal.

[Ignas]

I support the DAO owning the brand and IP.

If contributors come and go, the assets stay with $AAVE holders. No single contributor should have outsized control over aave. com, social channels, naming rights, or distribution.

It also fixes the upside problem.

Token holders take the smart contract risk and fund growth. If there is ever an acquisition or IP sale, token holders should not end up like spectators while equity holders cash out. We have seen this movie in recent acquisitions like TNSR and Axelar.

It is also basic risk management.

If Avara ever decides to exit the DAO (I am not saying they will as they hold loads of AAVE tokens as well) the DAO should not be left exposed, forced to rebuild gateways and comms from scratch.

But ownership alone is not enough. Incentives still matter.

Right now incentives look mixed. The CowSwap fee situation was a red flag. If a worse user outcome can be chosen because fees flow to one party, that is a critical misalignment. It needs a clean fix so distribution decisions cannot be monetized privately.

Still, this is not personal or anti Avara.

Avara remains a critical contributor (and needs to be an incentivized contributor acknowledging their all contributions ).

We just need clarity on who owns what, and explicit, enforceable terms for how these assets are used.

Multi party contribution is the end state.

[r0mul0]

This is a violent direct attack on the people that created $AAVE and drove it from zero to where it is today. And yet for some people this is not enough for their ego and greedyness.

If a proposal like this goes through it’s gonna be game over for AAVE.

[Tor_GAINS]

There appears to be a misunderstanding, as reflected in all the off-topic comments you posted elsewhere on the forum

The sole objective of this proposal is to restore ownership of these assets to the DAO, which was always the intended and appropriate structure

This proposal does not alter Avara’s current operations (including social media management or the use of the “Aave” name in products such as the Aave App or Aave Horizon, etc.) provided those activities continue to align with and respect the will of the DAO

[topcat]

Hey folks. As was mentioned previously, something like this proposal should probably have happened in the past, though in reality, progress in business often happens as a reaction to a problem, rather than in pre-emptive anticipation of a problem. “Growing pains” - that’s exactly what this is. That this whole cowswapgate saga is happening speaks volumes for how well established Aave now is, and I’m confident we will move through and outgrow this issue.

I just wanted to come in here and express support for the proposal. Far brighter minds than mine have outlined the benefits of it, above. My only concern with it is this, quoted from FullTilt’s post above:
—
My concern is the SEC already came after DeFi, no regulatory body will allow a faceless (where faceless here is define as no easily accessible persons) DAO to operate in a heavily regulated space and where compliance is a must. They won’t risk it. They will just see DAOs as a shadowy group with little liability regardless of the fact that isn’t true.
––
Perhaps someone could address how this implication of the proposal would be handled.

[sakulstra]

I want to highlight sth in regards to ownership, as it seems like ppl lack a clear picture.

Here is a list of things the DAO currently owns, meaning being licensed to the DAO, released when and developed by whom.

• aave v3, aave labs, 2022
• aave v3.0.1, bgd labs, 2022
• aave v3.0.2, bgd labs, 2023
• aave v3.1, bgd labs, 2024
• aave v3.2, bgd labs, 2024
• aave v3.3, bgd labs, 2025
• aave v3.4, bgd labs, 2025
• aave v3.5, bgd labs, 2025
• aave v3.6, bgd labs, 2025
• aave v4, aave labs, 2025
• (aave interface, aave labs, bgd labs, aci, 2022), license changed from Aave to Aave Labs after retroactive funding in 11.23, mostly maintained by aave labs post 2024 ← the thing that started this discussion
• aave v2 to v3 migration, bgd labs, 2022
• debt swap, bgd labs,
• GHO, aave labs, 2022
• GHO stewards, aave labs, 2022
• GHO GSM, aave labs, 2022
• GHO remote GSM, tokenlogic + aave labs, 2025
• governance v3, bgd labs,
• governance interface, bgd labs,
• aDI, bgs labs,
• stataToken v1, bgd labs, 2023
• stataToken v2(wa), bgd labs, 2024
• stkAbptv2, bgd labs,
• stk abpt migrator, bgd labs,
• stkGHO, bgd labs,
• umbrella, bgd labs, 2025
• umbrella interface, bgd labs, 2025
• sGHO, kptk & bgd labs, 2025
• finance stewards, tokenlogic, 2025
• risk stewards, bgd labs,
• clinic stewards, bgd labs

This list is probably incomplete, and I was to lazy to lookup dates for things I did not know ad-hoc, but I think for the Aave Labs side it is quite complete.

Again the point of all of this is not to boot Aave labs.

This does not mean that Aave Labs should not run the interface - i think it should -, it just means it should be under mutual (Aave Labs & DAO) beneficial terms that cannot be changed at the whim of Aave Labs, like it just happened.

[stani]

Hi all,

First, I want to acknowledge the importance of this discussion. And I want to echo that this discussion is not, and should not be, an attempt to position service providers against each other or the DAO. This is an open dialogue, where we share a common mission.

The community’s questions about brand ownership and alignment are valid and the team has been diligently reading the discussions here. I also recognize that communication from Aave Labs has not always been perfect and we’ve heard the community’s feedback. We are 100% committed to improving that.

For eight years, we’ve focused on realizing my original vision with ETHLend, which now extends to Aave, aiming to make it the foundation for the $500 trillion global asset base. Aave Labs has spent the last several years focused on many core contributions that move us closer to that goal.

We’ve achieved a lot, but still have a long ways to go on a global financial scale. With Aave V4, Aave App, Horizon, and other products in the works, Aave Labs is executing a strong vision to onboard trillions of dollars and millions of users onchain to the Aave Protocol. Moving forward with this proposal, especially at this time, will certainly slow down and potentially derail what we’ve all been working towards for years. It is bad for Aave Protocol, the DAO, and AAVE token holders.

Furthermore, while the conversation about brand ownership and an improved DAO structure is essential, this proposal takes us in a direction that is not good for the Aave ecosystem. It forces a complex legal and operational issue into a simple yes/no, empty payload vote with no clear path forward. A complex issue like this deserves a dedicated, structured process and multiple Temp Checks with a concrete plan to achieve resolution.

For these reasons, and in the best interest of our shared mission and whats best for us as token holders, I will be voting no on this proposal. The Aave Protocol is well-positioned to be the backbone of all finance and our shared priority is continuing that trajectory.

[MarcZeller]

Stani,

Name one concrete thing Avara would be unable to do if the DAO owned these brand assets and licensed their use back to Avara under clear, enforceable terms.

[ApuMallku]

@stani

I will be voting no on this proposal.

Now we know why you bought 10M of AAVE tokens.

AAVE “alignment”.

[LlamaRisk]

LlamaRisk submits this memorandum in fulfillment of its engagement as a Risk Service Provider to Aave DAO, under a mandate that includes independent legal risk analysis and assessment of legal-related matters. The objective is to enhance the DAO’s understanding of the factual record underlying asserted claims of “effectuated protocol ownership,” including how these claims intersect with intellectual property title, licensing, and control.

This analysis is limited to the funding of specific workstreams approved by Aave’s governance (DAO) and evidenced in the cited governance materials, the referenced GitHub repositories and commits, the Terms of Service published for aave.com, and the available AAVE trademark evidence. In the absence of signed terms between Aave DAO and Aave Labs (or related entities), the DAO’s practical position appears to rest on a composite of governance mandates, implied permissions arising from the publication of deliverables in DAO-hosted repositories, and de facto control over certain distribution channels, rather than on a complete, contractually documented chain of title.

Key Findings from Governance & Technical Records

Based on a review of public governance proposals, technical repositories, and available legal documentation, the following facts regarding the relationship between the DAO and Aave Labs are established:

• Proprietary Control of the Interface Codebase: The licensing status of the Aave Interface repository has shifted from open-source to proprietary. Specifically, commit 47430b8 modified the repository to replace the previous BSD-3-Clause license text with a one-line notice stating “All Rights Reserved © Aave Labs”, and updated the README to mirror this restriction. Nonetheless, the Aave App Terms of Service explicitly state that the “Services” and content remain the “exclusive property of the Company” (Aave Interfaces Ltd), granting users only a “limited, non-exclusive, non-transferable, revocable” license.
• Development & Deployment Authority: Aave Labs retains primary control over the development and deployment of the user-facing applications.
  • In the Aave Labs Development Update for August 2024, Aave Labs confirmed it “rebuilt the aave.com website from the ground up” and “initiated the development of a comprehensive rebuild of the app at app.aave.com.”
  • Earlier records, such as the Aave Companies: Aave Development Update (March 2023), note that development work included “front-end development and UI improvements.”
  • Specific feature implementations, such as those detailed in the [ARFC] Launch GHO on Avalanche, are dependent on Aave Labs “updating the Aave Interface to facilitate GHO bridging … and manage GHO interactions.”
• Ambiguity in Brand Asset Licensing: While the ARFC for the one-year Aave Labs service provider proposal mandated that visual identity assets be “delivered and packaged in a GitHub repository accessible to everyone and hosted within the Aave DAO Origin organization,” the resulting licensing status is unclear.
  • Aave Labs confirmed the delivery of these assets into the Aave Brand Kit repository, which is hosted under the aave-dao GitHub organization.
  • However, an inspection of the repository file tree reveals that no explicit LICENSE file is present.
  • The ARFC text itself noted that the visuals would be “subject to and governed by the license specified in the approved governance proposal… (to be included… at a later date),” thereby leaving the actual usage rights of the DAO undefined within the repository itself.
• Trademark Ownership: Public trademark evidence indicates that the “AAVE” wordmark is not held by the DAO, but is associated with Quantum Swan OÜ (an Estonian legal entity) as the recorded holder.

Analysis by Workstream

1. Frontend & Interface Development

Current Status: Proprietary Licensing & Permission Dependency

• Shift to Proprietary Licensing: On November 13th, 2023, the Aave Interface repository transitioned from a permissive BSD-3-Clause license to an “All Rights Reserved © Aave Labs” notice, indicating a shift to proprietary licensing. This change removes the standard open-source grants that previously permitted copying, modification, and redistribution of the software. Consequently, third parties who fork or redeploy the interface now face materially higher infringement risks, and ecosystem participants must treat the codebase as proprietary unless a new, clearly articulated license grant is provided.
• Operational & Permission Dependency: Governance materials identify interface updates as a requirement for executing DAO initiatives. However, because the codebase is now proprietary in nature, this creates a “continuing permission dependency” rather than a purely technical one. Without signed terms or a clear license, the DAO cannot confidently demonstrate its right to operate, modify, or designate alternative maintainers for the interface, relying instead on Aave Labs’ ongoing consent.
• Ambiguity of Deliverables: While development updates confirm that the aave.com, and app rebuilds occurred, the available sources do not confirm that this work product was delivered into DAO-controlled repositories with licensing that permits broad reuse. There is currently no evidence in the record regarding the legal mechanics—such as ownership allocations or chain of title—that would allow the DAO to sublicense or enforce rights over the rebuilt code.

2. Brand Identity & Design Assets

Current Status: Operational Availability vs. Licensing Gaps

• Delivery Mechanism: The ARFC confirms that visual identity assets are delivered through a DAO-hosted GitHub repository. This delivery channel serves as a strong operational signal that the assets are intended to be accessible and usable within the Aave ecosystem.
• Lack of Explicit License: Repository placement alone does not constitute a complete legal license grant. The repository view available in the sources does not clearly expose a standalone LICENSE file.
• Usage Limitations: Consequently, the safer, conservative approach is for community users to treat the brand kit as usable only to the extent permitted by any embedded usage guidelines. If those guidelines are silent on scope, usage should be treated as limited to bona fide Aave-related purposes until an explicit license instrument is published.

3. Intellectual Property & Trademarks

Current Status: Third-Party Ownership & Authorization Dependencies

• Trademark Ownership: The evidence indicates that the AAVE trademark is held by Quantum Swan OÜ, not the DAO.
• Dependency on External Frameworks: Since the DAO is not the owner, its ability to authorize third-party usage depends materially on a documented trademark license and quality control framework provided by the trademark holder. Without such a framework, permissions and standards cannot be cleanly administered through DAO governance alone, rendering community usage legally fragile and enforcement inconsistent.
• Unconfirmed Rights: We have not been able to confirm on the provided sources whether a trademark license exists, the breadth of rights granted, whether sublicensing is permitted, or which actor is authorized to enforce brand standards on behalf of the mark owner.

Potential Issues

The central failure mode in this fact pattern is the misalignment between those who fund and mandate work, those who control publication and distribution, and those who hold enforceable intellectual property rights. Regarding the sources, Aave Labs describes substantial front-end build and rebuild work across aave.com and app.aave.com, while also outlining a DAO-facing delivery mechanism for visual identity assets into a DAO-hosted repository. In parallel, the Aave Interface codebase now presents as explicitly closed-source by virtue of the amended “All Rights Reserved” notice, and the production app experience is governed by the Terms of Service of Aave Interfaces Ltd.

Practically, in the absence of assignment language, copyright in software code generally remains with the authors—here, Aave Labs and/or the individual contributors acting through Aave Labs’ employment and contractor relationships—and the DAO’s usable rights are driven primarily by the license grants and restrictions actually applied to the relevant repositories and deliverables. The community may treat licensing as a governance-controlled perimeter, and licensing is indeed a powerful lever. However, licensing is not proof of ownership unless the licensor is the rights holder or has itself received sufficient rights to grant, relicense, and enforce those permissions against third parties.

With respect to the visual identity, there is language in the Aave 2030 temp check stating that the proposed new Aave Visual Identity will be “irrevocably licensed to the Aave DAO,” with broad rights to reproduce, distribute, and display for Aave-related purposes, alongside restrictions directed at malicious use cases such as phishing or impersonation. At the same time, the service provider (SP) ARFC states that the visuals and new visual identity are “subject to and governed by the license specified in the approved governance proposal … to be included … at a later date,” meaning the precise license text is not embedded in the SP proposal itself. On the public record, it is therefore reasonable to infer that the DAO was intended to receive, at a minimum, an irrevocable license grant to use the brand kit and related identity assets. Nonetheless, the exact legal mechanics—namely, the identity of the licensor, the operative license instrument, scope limitations, sublicensing permissions, and enforcement rights—should be treated as incomplete unless and until they are crystallized in a separate executed license or assignment, or in an authoritative governance publication that reproduces the final license terms in full.

This combination produces considerable operational and legal risk. Contributors may assume they can reuse “official” UI code and brand assets because they are publicly available in repositories. At the same time, the underlying permission set may be narrower, inconsistent across surfaces, or subject to unilateral change. Third parties may fork or deploy interface code based on historic expectations, without appreciating that the repository’s current license statements and permissioning terms have materially changed. The DAO may lack standing and a coherent authority chain to enforce brand standards or pursue takedowns. Finally, if a key mark is held by a third party such as Quantum Swan OÜ, the DAO may not be in a position to grant reliable trademark permissions to ecosystem participants without a documented trademark license that includes the quality control features necessary for sustainable brand governance.

Disclaimer

This review was independently prepared by LlamaRisk, a DeFi risk service provider. LlamaRisk receives funding from the Aave DAO and is also compensated by Aave Labs Ltd. for the risk services it delivers to Aave Horizon.

The information provided should not be construed as legal, financial, tax, or professional advice.

[9PashaE6ashu]

(27 likes in under 1 hour, most of which don’t even have an avatar and information about users is hidden)

There have been clear signs of inauthentic engagement, including newly created or low-activity accounts rapidly accumulating likes within a very short timeframe, as well as rage-baiting behavior from apparent alt accounts of Aave Labs employee. Alongside this, there has been a consistent pattern of shifting the topic of discussion and misrepresenting facts across multiple social platforms. Instead of providing clear answers to direct questions, the conversation has largely consisted of excessive rhetoric with no substantive responses. At the same time, various forms of pressure have been applied, ranging from veiled threats to intimidation tactics.

I do not want to invest in Aave only to have my position represented or spoken for by Aave Labs and this particular single individual. I want my voice to be heard just as the voice of the broader community should be. For the long-term health of Aave, the most constructive step at this point would be for you @stani to step back. Your past contributions are acknowledged and respected; however, recent actions have either failed to deliver the promised outcomes or have resulted only in new promises on paper, without tangible progress.

From the outset, this discussion was not framed as Aave DAO versus Aave Labs. However, the actions described above have led to a situation where virtually more than a half Service Providers and a clear majority of AAVE holders (not by amounts, but surely by holder numbers) stand on one side, while Aave Labs stands alone, supported primarily by bots, employees, or other interested parties who consistently try to amplify your position across all available channels, whether appropriate or not.

[eboado]

Hi @stani. Appreciate the participation, and of course, you have the right to vote against.

That being said, You mention this vote forces a “complex legal and operational issue into a simple yes/no, empty payload vote with no clear path forward”. This is not really the case.

This vote is about having a community decision on a principles topic, and it has no inherent complexity. Sure, a follow-up phase will require handling the legal and structuring aspects, but operationally has no immediate implication, zero. Aside from all parties at the moment properly signalling adherence to the principle, and abiding in practice to it. That includes Aave Labs and everybody else.

To be more precise, some examples of how operationally this has no complexity, and it boils down to the will of each party:

• Parallel channels to those like “aave” on X can be created for private endeavors. Of course, products related to Aave can be amplified on the main “aave” accounts from time to time, but the full focus should be on non-arguably Aave DAO-owned products: v3, v4 smart contracts, adoption numbers of the protocol, etc. While private products like “Aave App” or Horizon should not be the focus there.
• No advertisement at all of private products on “aave.com” as the main focus. Sure, there can/should be a section for ecosystem private products from Aave Labs, but other members of the ecosystem should be there, e.g., DeFiSaver, mobile apps/wallets integrating the Aave protocol, etc; there are hundreds.
• Just not misleadingly naming entities/products. E.g., if you create a product and call it “Aave X” while being private, it is obvious that people will think it is “official” Aave, no matter if private. To not create that confusion is as simple as just not doing it, or rebranding existing/planned ones.
• On the app.aave.com, simply put to vote for any “big” feature addition that has a direct implication on previous existing monetisation (or lack of, whenever features were free for users, frequently decision taken by the DAO itself). And abide by the vote. This doesn’t mean every single change should be like that, as it would create an operational mess, but I don’t think maybe one or a couple votes a year is a big deal if there is will.
• Etc, it is possible to go point by point.

Those aspects will need to be formalised towards the DAO down the line, but still, they initially bear no complexity.

In summary, my point is that it doesn’t really have any relation to the community signalling self-ownership.
Then if you and/or Aave Labs want to vote against it, of course, it is your right to do it.