Almost everyone here seem to like the CRV tokenomics (i do as well, just to be clear). But to keep the discussion going i want to play the devil’s advocate and emphasize what I think are some weak points on which its potentially possible to improve:
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the inability to unlock the tokens for such a long time (4 years) reduces the incentives for participants to vote for the long term health of the protocol. The bribing system incentivizes to vote for short term gains. Imho there should be the ability to exit at any time, with a penalty (that can eventually be burned or redistributed to other stakers). This would ensure that participants can ragequit/exit at any time, which should help aligning incentives for the long term health of the protocol and the governance.
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Single sided stacking becomes problematic and can slow down growth and participation when the staked percentage of the total supply becomes too high. The asset becomes too illiquid and volatility increases (one single whale exiting could massively crash the price if the orderbooks are too thin). This could be improved by introducing a locking mechanism where not only the native token but also LP shares can be staked, similar to the current implementation of stkAAVE/stkBPT.
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There is currently no way of boosting rewards on networks that are not ethereum. Staking should be available on all the networks where the protocol is available. This would work well in Aave’s case as the community has signaled multiple times the demand to stake on different networks.