Chaos Labs Risk Stewards - Supply and Borrow Caps Reduction Across Low Demand Assets on Aave V3 - 10.02.26

Overview

During the recent compression of the broader crypto market landscape in monetary terms, the observed lending activity has exhibited signs of relative compression, which is caused not only by the reduction of notional prices across a broad range of assets, but also compression of the on-chain yields on stablecoins, LSTs and LRTs, additionally, as 2025 has marked substantial increase in Aave deployments, a significant share of capital for no-longer incentivized markets has migrated to either more lucrative, or stable instances. Broadly, these factors have had a substantial effect on the composition and utilization levels of a set of instances, with a number of assets’ caps substantially underutilized. Given these conditions, prudent risk management requires adjustments to the underutilized instances as liquidity conditions tend to follow the overall utilizations. Hence, in order to materially constrain Aave’s exposure to tail risks associated with both assets and instances, we hereby propose a broad-scale reduction of the supply and borrow caps.

Methodology

While each market typically presents special considerations in terms of user behavior patterns, asset allocation, and risk, we have decided to take a unified approach to these recommendations and have identified markets that have exhibited long-lasting reduced utilization or have been trending downward for extended periods. While the approach is generalized, we aim to provide additional analysis covering instances and specific assets in order to balance risk constraints with potential market utility.

Primary Markets

As part of the cap reductions, we have identified the largest markets as Core, which include Ethereum Core, Ethereum Prime, Base, Avalanche, and Plasma. Fundamentally, the mentioned instances saw reduced utilization levels primarily due to yield compression and/or a lack of alternative yield-generating opportunities for the assets.

Ethereum Core

Supply-side utilization compression on the Ethereum Core instance has been driven by a broad decline in demand across several secondary assets, most notably ETHx, UNI, ezETH, as well as eUSDe and sDAI. As shown in the chart, the ezETH and ETHx markets have experienced sustained decreases in utilization over recent months, reflecting the unwind of leveraged positioning and a reduced appetite to deploy these assets on mainnet amid ongoing yield compression across LSTs and LRTs. Additionally, we infer that the drop in supply cap utilization is driven by increased competition for WETH borrowing, as lower-yielding LRTs are unable to maintain profitability as the spread between the appreciation rate and borrowing costs compresses.

For assets like UNI, crvUSD, and eUSDe, the decline in supply cap utilization is more variable. Specifically, sDAI formally migrated to stUSDS, while UNI saw a genuine decline in demand as collateral, and eUSDe is no longer producing yield due to the end of the Ethereal pre-deposit campaign.

On the borrow side, utilization remains structurally subdued, with only brief episodic spikes—such as the October tBTC increase—indicating temporary positioning rather than persistent demand. Importantly, wstETH has exhibited a substantial decline, reducing overall protocol revenue. As wstETH borrowing was primarily fueled by persistent restaking yields on a set of LRTs, the compression of the rate spread proved the strategy less efficient than a number of alternatives, decreasing the posted wstETH borrowing demand. A similar shift in BTC-derivatives can be observed: fBTC, WBTC, and LBTC have been exhibiting sub 20% utilization as staking yield for yield-bearing BTC derivatives declined. Overall, Ethereum Core now exhibits materially underutilized caps across multiple assets, suggesting a relative compression in borrowing demand and migration to alternative borrowing opportunities.

Ethereum Prime

The Ethereum Prime instance, which has historically been designed for WETH-related lending activity, including leveraged staking and restaking strategies, has lost a substantial share of both supply and borrowed assets as users migrated to the Ethereum Core instance.

Specifically, the majority of the assets, with the exception of GHO, have been showing decreased utilizations in the 0–20% range. With the migration of the LRTs and wstETH to the Ethereum Core instance, the demand to participate in WETH leveraged loops has decreased. This has had a network effect on the broader utilization across the instance, resulting in the utilization levels observed below.

Base

A supply-side decline in demand within the Base instances has been observed in ezETH, which has been used primarily in leveraged strategies against wstETH. Demand for wstETH declined as isolated restaking yields compressed, making the leveraged restaking loop unattractive. The decrease in wstETH borrowing observed has coincided with a reduction in ezETH supply, further supporting the previously outlined motivation. Additionally, we would like to note that while tBTC supply and borrow utilization have increased in the past five months, the demand is still relatively far from the caps, prompting a moderate reduction.

Avalanche

Stark examples of underutilized assets on the Avalanche instance are sUSDe and USDe, which were listed relatively recently but have yet to gain traction. Given the high utility of these assets, as evidenced by their presence across other Aave instances, we recommend a moderate decrease in the supply and borrow caps to balance risk with deployment utility.

Plasma

The Plasma instance is primarily exhibiting healthy utilization levels, with only WETH borrowing showing a consistent downtrend due to the lack of LRT-driven borrowing demand. This motivation is further exemplified by the underutilization of weETH and wrsETH caps, which are currently in the 5-20% range, prompting an adjustment of the supply caps.

Secondary Markets

Secondary instances have seen the sharpest utilization drawdowns, largely reflecting incentive expiries, fragmented liquidity, and the migration of activity toward deeper or more profitable Aave deployments. Given that persistently low utilization often implies a permanent migration of capital, we recommend more aggressive cap reductions in these markets to reduce tail risk while retaining minimal operational headroom where appropriate.

Linea

Lending activity on Linea has exhibited a broad instance-level decline in recent months. While this instance ranked as one of the largest during late summer and early fall of 2025, the aggressive incentivization of activity naturally resulted in a large-scale migration of mercenary capital; as a result, aggregate supply has compressed from $3 billion to under $200 million, while borrowing decreased from $1.5 billion to $50 million. Current cap utilizations on both supply and borrow sides are primarily below 15% across a wide variety of assets. As the incentives are not expected to be resumed in the near future, we recommend drastically reducing the supply and borrow caps across low-demand assets listed on Linea.

Optimism

The primary reason for the decline in supply and borrow utilization of USDC.e is the presence of the canonical USDC on the instance, prompting a transition to the newer version of the asset.

Sonic

Within the Sonic instance, WETH borrowing utilization is currently below 1% due to low demand for the asset. Generally, WETH borrowing within the instance presents minimal utility as it currently has no LSTs or LRTs.

zkSync, Metis, and Soneium

Due to the recent proposal to formally deprecate the Aave zkSync, Metis, and Soneium instances, we are recommending adjusting the supply caps to the current levels and reducing the borrow caps to 1 across all assets. The recommendation is made as a precautionary measure to reduce tail risk before the proposal is officially enacted.



Recommendation

Market-wide notional compression and declining on-chain yields across stablecoins, LSTs, and LRTs have driven a sustained drop in lending demand across several Aave instances. At the same time, the expansion in deployments and the expiry of incentives have shifted capital toward more lucrative or more stable venues, leaving many secondary markets structurally underutilized.

In this environment, oversized supply caps add limited user utility but meaningfully increase latent tail exposure, especially in thinly utilized markets where liquidity typically tracks utilization and can disappear quickly under stress (e.g., depegs, oracle shocks, and collateral demand gaps). Accordingly, we recommend broad reductions to supply caps (and selective borrow caps) across markets with persistent or trending-down utilization, right-sizing capacity to current activity while preserving reasonable headroom. For instances proposed for deprecation, we also recommend setting borrow caps effectively to disabled levels as a precautionary tail-risk constraint ahead of formal enactment.

Specification

In this post, we outline a targeted subset of the proposed cap adjustments, prioritizing the most time-sensitive reductions where utilization is persistently low or precautionary constraints are warranted ahead of instance deprecation. We will follow up with additional cap changes in a subsequent reply to this forum topic.

Instance Asset Current Supply Cap Recommended Supply Cap Current Borrow Cap Recommended Borrow Cap
Plasma weETH 240,000 80,000 - -
Plasma wrsETH 20,000 5,000 - -
Plasma WETH 160,000 30,000 80,000 25,000
Linea WETH 350,000 40,000 315,000 36,000
Linea ezETH 76,800 35,000 - -
Linea wrsETH 30,000 5,000 - -
Linea wstETH 19,200 7,000 4,800 1,000
Linea USDC 600,000,000 25,000,000 560,000,000 23,000,000
Linea USDT 512,000,000 25,000,000 460,000,000 23,000,000
Linea mUSD 20,000,000 5,000,000 18,000,000 4,000,000
Linea WBTC 160 100 8 1
zkSync wstETH 2,000 500 200 1
zkSync WETH 3,000 600 2,700 1
zkSync ZK 125,000,000 45,000,000 1 -
zkSync USDC 3,000,000 800,000 2,700,000 1
zkSync USDT 1,000,000 150,000 900,000 1
zkSync sUSDe 200,000 110 - -
zkSync wrsETH 700 1 - -
Metis m.USDC 10,000,000 400,000 9,000,000 1
Metis WETH 2,300 150 720 1
Metis METIS 600,000 80,000 1 -
Metis m.USDT 4,500,000 250,000 4,000,000 1
Metis m.DAI 200,000 25,000 180,000 1
Soneium USDC.e 8,000,000 1,300,000 7,200,000 1
Soneium WETH 800 600 720 1
Soneium USDT 5,000,000 30,000 4,500,000 1

Next Step

We will move forward and implement these updates via the Risk Steward process.

Disclosure

Chaos Labs has not been compensated by any third party for publishing this AGRS recommendation.

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.

Overview

In light of recent market volatility and specific on-chain observations regarding FBTC, LlamaRisk has conducted a due diligence assessment of the asset’s liquidity profile and concentration risks on Aave V3 Ethereum.

While the FBTC market does not exhibit signs of acute instability, observed secondary-market liquidity has been faltering, and concentration risk has emerged around specific large suppliers. Given these conditions, adjustments to the asset’s caps to better align with available exit liquidity are advised. Hence, to materially constrain Aave’s exposure to tail risks associated with concentrated positions and thin liquidity, we propose a reduction of the supply and borrow caps for FBTC on Aave Core.

FBTC Analysis

Liquidity & Redemption

On-chain analysis indicates that secondary-market liquidity for FBTC is relatively thin relative to current supply caps. Current depth allows for approximately $3.7M in stablecoin exit liquidity within a 7.5% price impact. During last week’s period of excessive volatility, sell-side stablecoin liquidity fluctuated, bottoming out near $2.5M.

Furthermore, the vast majority of sell-side liquidity is concentrated in a single Uniswap V3 WBTC/FBTC pool (approx. $6.23M WBTC + $0.71M FBTC).


Source: Dune, February 11, 2026

The DEX liquidity composition of the Uniswap V3 pool has remained stable at daily granularity over the past 6 months, indicating that the pool’s arbitrage remains effective.

User Positioning & Concentration

A specific risk factor identified is the concentration of supply. The largest supplier on Aave (associated with Sentora) currently maintains a Health Factor near 1.24 and holds an approximately $17.5M PYUSD debt position, accumulated largely throughout early February 2026, even as the BTC price experienced sharp downturns.


Source: Chaos Labs Community Dashboard, February 11, 2026

Operational Considerations

The total supply of FBTC on Mainnet is roughly 45% down from all-time highs in 2025, but no mass burns have been observed recently; the supply has rather been stagnant for the past three months.


Source: Dune, February 11, 2026

A notable operational event occurred on January 13, 2026, where five addresses were temporarily frozen and subsequently unfrozen. The users were:

While these addresses held minimal balances (<1 FBTC) and the action may have been for operational reasons, it highlights anomalies warranting further investigation.

Recommendation

To adequately size the capacity to current activity while anchoring the exposure in line with the available on-chain liquidity, we recommend a precautionary reduction of the Supply Cap to 350 FBTC and the Borrow Cap to 1 FBTC. This adjustment aims to limit additional exposure, specifically by preventing further origination of FBTC-backed loans, including concentrated positions. Minimal adverse consequences are expected for current users, in the form of losing the ability to add FBTC collateral to currently exisiting positions. Nevertheless, any other collateral asset can be added to the currently existing positions, including BTC-correlated assets.

Specification

The table below outlines the proposed cap adjustments.

Instance Asset Current Supply Cap Recommended Supply Cap Current Borrow Cap Recommended Borrow Cap
Ethereum Core FBTC 1,800 350 100 1

Next Step

This change will be included in the next Risk Steward caps update batch, as coordinated with @ChaosLabs.

Disclosure

This review was independently prepared by LlamaRisk, a DeFi risk service provider funded in part by the Aave DAO. LlamaRisk is not directly affiliated with the protocol(s) reviewed in this assessment and did not receive any compensation from the protocol(s) or their affiliated entities for this work.

The information provided should not be construed as legal, financial, tax, or professional advice.

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Overview

Following up on yesterday’s post, we outline an additional set of proposed cap adjustments, extending the effort to further limit the protocol’s maximum exposure to low-demand assets across multiple instances, including Ethereum Core, Base, Avalanche, and others. These changes continue to prioritize markets with persistently low utilization, and tighter supply/borrow headroom is prudent given current demand conditions.

Furthermore, we align with LlamaRisk’s assessment; recent on-chain observations suggest FBTC secondary-market exit liquidity is relatively thin as compared to the current caps, with supply meaningfully concentrated among a small set of positions. In that context, tightening FBTC supply and borrow caps presents as a prudent step to align protocol exposure with available liquidity and reduce tail risk from concentrated positions.

Specification

Instance Asset Current Supply Cap Recommended Supply Cap Current Borrow Cap Recommended Borrow Cap
Ethereum Core sDAI 5,000,000 1,000,000 - -
Ethereum Core fBTC 1,800 350 100 1
Ethereum Core LINK 20,000,000 - 13,000,000 1,000,000
Ethereum Core USDS 160,000,000 80,000,000 144,000,000 76,000,000
Ethereum Core tBTC 2,600 - 275 1
Ethereum Core wstETH 1,760,000 - 480,000 180,000
Ethereum Prime sUSDe 60,000,000 5,000,000 - -
Ethereum Prime ezETH 240,000 20,000 - -
Ethereum Prime wstETH 650,000 200,000 280,000 70,000
Ethereum Prime WETH 900,000 150,000 810,000 143,000
Ethereum Prime rsETH 15,000 5,000 - -
Base ezETH 7,200 5,000 - -
Base tBTC 130 30 13 1
Avalanche sUSDe 50,000,000 5,000,000 - -
Avalanche USDe 50,000,000 5,000,000 42,500,000 4,250,000
Optimism USDC.e 18,000,000 2,000,000 15,000,000 1
Optimism AAVE 18,000 10,000 - -
Sonic WETH 10,000 5,000 8,800 500

Next Step

We will move forward and implement these updates via the Risk Steward process.

Disclosure

Chaos Labs has not been compensated by any third party for publishing this AGRS recommendation.

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.

Overview

Following on the previous iterations, this post proposes the deprecation of a select set of assets whose utility has materially declined or whose risk profile has structurally worsened. In each case, we aim to prevent incremental exposure while allowing existing positions to unwind organically, aligning configured caps with the assets’ current relevance and liquidity conditions.

LUSD (Ethereum)

LUSD has exhibited persistently minimal demand, with the current supply reflecting a steady contraction over the past year. In parallel, secondary liquidity has continued to deteriorate, reducing the robustness of exit conditions under stress. Additionally, Chainlink has communicated that the LUSD oracle feed will be discontinued due to the shrinking market liquidity of the asset.

Given the limited size of the market and the fact that LUSD is not enabled as collateral, we do not see the need to force repayments. Instead, we recommend setting the borrow cap to 1, effectively preventing any new borrowing activity while allowing existing borrowers to repay and suppliers to withdraw in an orderly manner.

eUSDe (Ethereum)

eUSDe no longer serves a differentiated purpose following the launch of Ethereal’s product, the conclusion of the pre-deposit campaign, and the availability of the canonical USDe. This has been reflected in heavily declining usage over time, with the current supply on the market being minimal relative to prior levels. As eUSDe is not borrowable, there is no borrow-side activity to consider.

Given that the asset no longer provides incremental utility to the ecosystem, we recommend deprecating it by setting the supply cap to 1, preventing new deposits while allowing remaining suppliers to withdraw over time.

sDAI (Ethereum)

sDAI has consistently shown negligible utilization and has failed to demonstrate sustainable demand as collateral. Given the persistently low current supply and limited strategic relevance, there is little justification for maintaining an active listing.

While in the previous post, we recommended a partial reduction, we further recommend finalizing its deprecation by setting the supply cap to 1, ensuring that exposure can only decrease from current levels.

GHST (Polygon)

GHST is effectively already deprecated on the Aave markets as it is neither enabled as collateral nor borrowable.

We recommend finalizing the deprecation by setting both the supply and borrow caps to 1.

MaticX (Polygon)

The MaticX token has shown decreasing demand over the last year, aligning with the general direction of the Polygon instance. While it does not pose any outsized risks to the protocol we aim to reduce its supply cap to better allign with the market demand.

WETH and weETH (Plasma)

The Plasma team has communicated that WETH DEX liquidity on the chain is expected to drop drastically in the coming months. Additionally, the previously established liquidation backstop agreement for the Plasma instance is no longer in place. While the current supply and borrow positions for WETH and the current supply for weETH remain conservatively positioned, the deterioration in expected on-chain liquidity materially increases liquidation risk under stress scenarios.

In a low-liquidity environment without a dedicated backstop, large liquidation events could lead to elevated slippage and potential deficit accrual. To minimize incremental exposure while keeping the markets operational, we recommend setting the WETH supply cap to 8,500 and the borrow cap to 8,000, and the weETH supply cap to 52,000.

Specification

Instance Asset Current Supply Cap Recommended Supply Cap Current Borrow Cap Recommended Borrow Cap
Ethereum LUSD 7,000,000 - 5,000,000 1
Ethereum eUSDe 550,000,000 1 - -
Ethereum sDAI 1,000,000 1 - -
Polygon GHST 4,650,000 1 220,000 1
Plasma WETH 30,000 8,500 25,000 8,000
Plasma weETH 80,000 52,000 - -
Polygon MaticX 120,000,000 30,000,000 - -

Next Step

We will move forward and implement these updates via the Risk Steward process.

Disclosure

Chaos Labs has not been compensated by any third party for publishing this AGRS recommendation.

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.

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