[TEMP CHECK] - Add support for fUSDC on Ethereum v3 Pool
Vote Result: YES
Rationale
Although Ondo Finance is a well respected institutional DeFi player, Flux Finance is a relatively new protocol. The proposal makes no mention of contract audits (notwithstanding that this is a Compound v2 fork with minor amendments). The market cap of the token is very low at around $7M. No risk parameters have been proposed yet but we consider that these should be commensurate with the low liquidity of the token.
While fUSDC is not a traded token, it can be minted and burned by deposit and withdraw of the underlying USDC token. This makes secondary liquidity unnecessary since the redemption mechanism is such that it can be redeemed 1:1 for USDC in all situations, unless the underlying Flux Lend platform is compromised, which is difficult since it is a KYC’d platform. The fUSDC oracle also uses the USDC price at all times, further tightening the link between the two tokens and ensuring that it is, by proxy, as liquid as USDC.
We will vote YES in favour of this proposal, but with two caveats: validation by the risk providers and appropriate caps set, and audits of the underlying Flux Finance contracts being completed. Without these being completed, we will vote NO in any AIP.
[TEMP CHECK] Add ARB to Arbitrum Aave v3
Vote Result: YES
Rationale
Listing the ARB token on Aave would be a sound growth strategy with minimal risk. Moving forwards, it will bring additional revenue opportunities to Aave as well as improve user experience, which contributes to building a more vibrant Aave v3 Arbitrum market. As a result, we are in support of the proposal and will vote YES.
Fix Rate Strategies Issue on Aave v2 Polygon
Vote Result: YES
Rationale
This proposal is a fix for the issues that have resulted from AIP 224 passing, with the new interest rate strategy contracts applied to WETH, WBTC, USDT, and WMATIC not allowing users to perform actions involving those assets. Given that all funds are safe and there is no extraneous impact of the fix, it is sensible to pass this AIP and resolve the issues. Therefore, we will vote YES in favour of this proposal.
wMATIC Supply & Borrow Cap Increase Polygon v3
Vote Result: YES
Rationale
There is a need to increase the wMATIC supply cap since it is at 100% utilisation. There is a missed opportunity for Aave to earn revenue if the caps are not increased, given the strong deposit flows from the Balancer bb-a-wMATIC integration, the continual growth of the yield maximising strategy, and the significant demand for borrowing wMATIC. There are 21.65M units of wMATIC that are likely to be deposited into Polygon v3, and space needs to be made for these units. Moreover, both Chaos and Gauntlet are in favour, and Chaos’ worst-case simulated scenario would result in a potential loss of $80k, which is acceptable. Therefore, we will vote YES in favour of this proposal.
[TEMP CHECK] FlashMinter Facilitator Approval
Vote Result: YES
Rationale
FlashMinting is an important tool in maintaining GHO’s peg and is therefore necessary to enable, given the efficient arbitrage and refinancing it would enable. The requested facilitator capacity is 2M GHO which seems sensible at the moment. We also agree with not setting a fee initially since we believe it is more important to maintain the peg when GHO is initially launched than it is to earn a revenue stream. Therefore, we will vote YES in favour of this proposal.
[ARC] Framework For Recognized Delegates
Vote Result: YES
Rationale
This proposal is in line with the Gas Fee Rebate proposal we posted that passed on Snapshot, and we have already agreed with this proposal on the forum here and think it is valuable for Aave to have a better defined governance structure, which this proposal enables. Moreover, the criteria selected are not too harsh but not too simple to achieve either - they present a good balance. Therefore, we will vote YES in favour of this proposal. As a note, if there is a need to re-introduce voting weight as a criteria in the future, we are open to exploring it further.
[ARC] Delegate Code Of Conduct
Vote Result: YES
Rationale
This proposal dovetails with the Recognized Delegate Framework and we are completely in line with the drive to professionalise the Aave delegate community. The code of conduct aligns perfectly with how we have been operating as an Aave delegate. We have published our rationales diligently and have a very high voting participation rate.
We agree with ACI’s feedback on Ethereum Alignment and the decision to omit it from the code of conduct - Aave should be open-minded to developments across the space and expand in a way that is most beneficial to Aave, not only Ethereum. We also agree that the best way to combat conflicts of interest is maximal transparency. Another point we are fully aligned with ACI on is around Security Optimization - we believe in placing trust in the service providers but also keep them honest by challenging them.
Therefore, we will vote YES in favour of this proposal.
Activate Emode for rETH Aave Ethereum V3
Vote Result: YES
Rationale
Adding rETH to emode can bring increased revenue to Aave given its use case for leveraged strategies. The initial approach is conservative, utilising the current borrow and supply caps, and both Chaos Labs and Gauntlet are in favour. Therefore, we will vote YES in favour of this proposal.
Aave Stablecoin E-mode changes for V3 Avalanche, Optimism, Polygon, and Arbitrum
Vote Result: YES
Rationale
This AIP simply implements the parameter changes selected by the community in the Snapshot vote. Even though existing assets will not be removed from e-mode, the parameter changes selected by the community still must be implemented. Gauntlet has provided daily updates about the affected accounts as a result of these changes and has provided ample time for affected accounts to take action. Therefore, we will vote YES in favour of this proposal and await Gauntlet and BGD Labs’ updated proposal to remove assets from e-mode as voted for by the community.
Caps Plus Risk Steward
Vote Result: YES
Rationale
This is the on-chain vote for this Snapshot vote that we voted in favour of according to our rationale here. Therefore, we will vote YES in favour of this proposal as well.
DeFi Saver Aave V3 FlashBorrowers Whitelist Part II
Vote Result: YES
Rationale
This proposal is a re-vote for AIP-196 which failed execution on the Optimism crosschain bridge. Given that this was only a technical issue and that we voted in favour of this AIP previously according to our rationale here, we will vote YES in favour of this proposal as well.
[ARFC] - Chaos Labs Risk Parameter Updates - Aave V3 Ethereum - 2023.05.18
Vote Result: YES
Rationale
Given that increasing LTVs and LTs for the specified assets on V3 Ethereum results in improved capital efficiency, a projected borrow increase of $3.6M, and a negligible increase in VaR and EVaR as projected by Chaos Labs due to the presence of adequate on-chain liquidity to support any significant liquidations, we will vote YES in favour of this proposal.
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DeFi Saver Aave V3 FlashBorrowers Whitelist Part II
Vote Result: YES
Rationale
This proposal is a re-vote for AIP-196 which failed execution on the Optimism crosschain bridge. Given that this was only a technical issue and that we voted in favour of this AIP previously according to our rationale here, we will vote YES in favour of this proposal as well.
[ARFC] Optimism Create ETH E-Mode
Vote Result: YES
Rationale
On-chain data shows that there is a clear demand for yield generation by borrowing wETH and acquiring more wstETH to loop, which will lead to increased revenue generation for Aave as users will be able to enter yield maximising strategies with greater capital efficiency. Moreso, Gauntlet and Chaos Labs are both in support. Therefore, we will vote YES in favour of this proposal.
[ARFC] Optimism v3 Supply Cap Update
Vote Result: YES
Rationale
There is a clear need to increase the supply cap for wstETH on Optimism v3, given the current utilisation of >90%. We are in agreement with Gauntlet to threshold the supply cap to 50% of the local supply which in this case is 18,000. This will also allow for the change to be implemented via the Risk Council as per the AIP-234 vote, and even if this supply cap is reached, the Risk Steward can modify caps every 5 days. This scenario is more efficient for the Aave DAO, given the delays to go through Snapshot and AIP votes. Therefore, we will vote YES in favour of increasing the supply cap to 18,000 units.
[ARFC] Polygon Supply Cap Update 23.05.2023
Vote Result: YES
Rationale
The previous vote shows that there is a consensus on the maximum potential supply cap, which is 75%, in case of MaticX deposits increasing significantly. With that in mind and in respect of the fact that the previous supply cap filled up rapidly, we support Chaos Labs’s conclusion to raise the supply cap to 38M.
Price Feeds Operational Update
Vote Result: YES
Rationale
The update creates more consistency in pricing methods of LSTs on Aave, which will allow the growth of strategic assets for the Aave DAO while maintaining the highest safety standards. Therefore, we will vote YES in favour of this proposal.
[TEMP CHECK] Safety Module Upgrade Part II - Asset Diversity, SM Categories & Slashing Updates
Vote Result: YES
Rationale
This proposal allows for the Aave DAO to accumulate strategic assets in its treasury. Adding stable LP tokens as a category generates a significant amount of the coverage as 60% of the TVL can be slashed with very low price impact across the broader ecosystem. The SM can be diversified to include Curve and Convex Finance risks and not only cover Balancer risks, reducing the risk of the SM. Moreover, adding wstETH as a single asset improves capital efficiency and allows users to earn a higher overall APY. Adding new assets also reduces the amount of liquidity mining done by Aave and reduces sell pressure on the AAVE token. The Volatile LP tokens will generate higher yield for LPs, making it an interesting category to add to the SM, and for the Stable LP tokens, by integrating a GHO pair to the SM, Aave will help bootstrap GHO adoption through incentivised liquidity and will also earn revenue from the GHO borrowing rate.
While there is risk from the potential price divergence of LSTs in the Safety Module, this is mitigated by the divergence having significantly reduced recently and the liquidity for stETH being very deep, as mentioned in the post.
Therefore, we will vote YES in favour of this proposal.
[TEMP CHECK] Safety Module Upgrade Part III - Enable Gauges on BPT in Safety Module (smBPT)
Vote Result: YES
Rationale
It is important for Aave to have strategic assets in the treasury, which AURA is; this is not a consequence of the SM upgrade, but implementing the smBPT gauge would allow for more of these assets to be collected. Moreso, this strategy is shorter-term and flexible, and can be changed as per the community’s decision when needed. As shown in Part IV here, implementing the smBPT gauges and utilising the AURA strategy has the potential to increase cover from $119M to $175M and reduce the cost of insurance from 30.02% down to 17.23%. If users receive BAL and AURA, the selling pressure is externalised only from AAVE, and reducing the liquidity mining budget helps reduce AAVE token inflation and selling pressure on the token. This strategy also incentivises users to deposit into the SM with multiple assets, increasing cover for Aave.
A few negatives are the risks from Balancer gauge and Aura smart contract risk exposure, and from the upgraded SM contracts having greater smart contract risk than in the current implementation. This can be mitigated with comprehensive smart contract audits, which the DAO will have to bear the cost for. However, these costs can also be mitigated if Aave receives AURA in exchange for the audit costs being borne by Aave, which will increase yield and allow higher voting power. As discussed earlier, accumulating strategic assets like AURA and BAL would be beneficial for Aave in the longer term.
Therefore, we will vote YES in favour of this TEMP CHECK and look forward to hearing the community’s opinions on these proposals from Llama as well.
[ARFC] Add fUSDC to Ethereum v3
Vote Result: YES
Rationale
This proposal has been implemented with the conservative parameters outlined by Chaos Labs which we are in agreement with. Listing fUSDC in isolation mode will reduce the risk of unhealthy liquidations by only allowing stablecoin borrowing, and allows for more data to be gathered about fUSDC before setting more aggressive parameters. The supply cap of $4.5M is sensible since it allows for half of the total supply to be liquidated at once. Setting conservative initial parameters somewhat mitigates the ‘unknown’ risks of fUSDC, i.e., Flux Finance and OUSG being nascent, and the protocol and its governance being untested. It allows Aave to gather data about fUSDC and allows for OUSG and Flux to grow further before being listed outside of isolation mode on Aave v3. Therefore, we will vote YES in favour of this proposal.