[TEMP CHECK] AAVE Delegate Ecosystem Upgrade: The Aligned Delegates Framework

Governance
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Author: Apu Mallku - Independent Delegate Platform
Status: TEMP CHECK - Seeking Community Feedback
Date: March 2026

Abstract

With the Aave Chan Initiative (ACI) stepping back from delegate coordination, AAVE’s governance ecosystem faces a structural gap. This is not a crisis — it is an opportunity to upgrade the system rather than replicate its predecessor.

This proposal introduces the Aligned Delegates Framework (ADF): a three-pillar upgrade to how AAVE governance identifies, rewards, and empowers its most dedicated governance delegates. The ADF moves beyond purely quantitative voting metrics toward an automated, objective baseline of governance value. It also reduces passive voting power through a frictionless delegation prompt at the supply/staking level, and initiates the drafting of the AAVE Delegate Charter — a focused baseline document defining the expectations for an aligned delegate.

This Temp Check seeks directional feedback before committing to full specification work. Specific implementation details, budget, and timelines are open for discussion and marked accordingly.

Background & Motivation

AAVE governance suffers from compounding problems:

  1. The Quantitative Trap: The current Orbit program measures delegate eligibility primarily through on-chain voting participation rates (e.g., ≥85%). This creates an incentive to vote without engaging: delegates who vote on every proposal without contributing analysis or rationales can outrank delegates who add genuine intellectual value. Governance quality cannot be measured by volume alone.
  2. Structural Voter Apathy: Supplying and staking AAVE, and delegating voting power, are entirely separate, disconnected actions. The vast majority of suppliers and stakers never delegate. This is not a moral failure — it is a rational response to high friction. The result is voting power permanently concentrated among a shrinking set of actors, increasing governance capture risk.
  3. Undefined Delegate Standards: There is no formal document establishing what is expected from an AAVE delegate beyond showing up to vote. Duties, conflict-of-interest disclosures, and minimum engagement standards exist only as implicit norms.
  4. The Post-ACI/BGD Vacuum & Public Drama: The departure of ACI and BGD leaves a significant coordination void. While Aave Labs is stepping up to take a broader role (as outlined in the AAVE WILL WIN framework), a healthy DAO cannot rely on a single entity. Governance vacuums breed uncoordinated public drama, which damages the DAO’s reputation, impacts the token’s value, and directly benefits competitors. We need a system that retains existing high-value talent, attracts new contributors, and replaces informal social friction with healthy, rule-based politics.
  5. The Regulatory Imperative for Decentralization: A robust delegate ecosystem is no longer just “good governance” — it is a regulatory necessity. SEC Interpretive Release 33-11412 (March 17, 2026), jointly issued with the CFTC, defines a “decentralized” crypto system as one that operates autonomously with no person or group having operational, economic, or voting control. Simultaneously, H.R. 3633 (the CLARITY Act), which passed the U.S. House and is advancing through the Senate, formally defines a “decentralized governance system” as one that is transparent, rules-based, and where participation is not under the effective control of any person or group. To protect AAVE’s status as a digital commodity and avoid centralization risk under these frameworks, we must proactively empower delegates and distribute voting power. True decentralization requires active, compensated, and independent actors.

Core Pillars

Pillar 1 — From Voting Volume to the “Aligned Delegate Baseline”

To address concerns that evaluating delegate “quality” is subjective and resource-intensive, the ADF avoids human grading committees entirely. Instead, it replaces the purely quantitative model with the Aligned Delegate Baseline (ADB) — a set of binary, fully automatable Minimum Engagement Thresholds (inspired by the successful framework used by MakerDAO/Sky).

To qualify for Orbit v2 compensation, a delegate must meet objective Yes/No metrics tracked automatically via APIs (like Dune or Snapshot) every quarter:

— The Voting Threshold: ≥85% participation on all on-chain AIPs and Snapshot ARFCs.

— The Communication Threshold: Must publish a public “Voting Rationale” for at least 75% of Tier 1 proposals (proposals with >$1M impact). A rationale is objectively verified as a forum reply published within 48 hours of a vote.

— The Signal Threshold (Anti-Spam): To ensure forum contributions aren’t just AI-generated noise to meet quotas, a delegate must maintain an active forum presence where at least 3 of their posts per month receive a minimum of 3 likes/reactions from forum users at Trust Level 2 (Regular Member) or above — automatically verifiable via the Discourse API. TL2 requires genuine account history and activity, making it resistant to freshly created sock puppet accounts. The community acts as the decentralized filter for quality.

Capturing Intangible Value: The “Proof-of-Contribution” Path

A purely quantitative system risks ignoring off-chain heavy lifters — delegates who provide massive value by building tools, conducting data analysis, or moderating the forum (e.g., maintaining infrastructure, installing plugins). To ensure these vital contributors can achieve delegate status without introducing subjective grading committees or adding operational overhead to core contributors, the framework introduces a “Community-Validated Proof of Contribution”:

— Delegates performing off-chain or operational work publish a “Monthly Delegate Update” on the forum detailing their specific contributions.

— If this update thread achieves a predefined Community Endorsement Threshold, the system’s API automatically marks their Communication and Signal metrics as fulfilled for that month. To be counted, endorsements must pass strict Sybil-resistance checks using at least one of the following filters — both fully automatable via Dune and the Discourse API:

— Trust Level Filter: The AAVE forum runs on Discourse, which automatically assigns Trust Levels (TL0–TL4) based on account age and activity. Bots and new accounts are TL0. Only endorsements from users at TL2 (Regular Member) or above are counted. This filter eliminates freshly created sock puppet accounts at zero cost.

— Web of Trust Filter: Only endorsements from Aligned Delegates or recognized Service Providers (e.g. BGD, Chaos Labs) with publicly disclosed on-chain addresses count toward the endorsement total. This restricts the endorser pool to actors with public identity and reputational skin in the game.

Gaming this threshold requires either years of genuine forum participation to reach TL2, or colluding with named, compensated, publicly known entities — both of which carry direct reputational cost. No human committee is needed.

This mechanism ensures that technical and administrative work is recognized and compensated, while keeping the evaluation process 100% decentralized, objective, and zero-maintenance for Labs.

Pillar 2 — Frictionless Staking Delegation Prompt

Integrate a one-step delegation prompt into the AAVE staking/supply UI (app.aave.com), displayed at the moment of interaction.

How it works:

— When a user supplies or stakes AAVE, they are shown a non-mandatory prompt: “Activate your voting power — delegate to a verified AAVE delegate.”

— Delegation is executed in the same transaction or as a one-click follow-up. Users can skip, choose any delegate, or self-delegate. (No lockups involved).

Curation of the Delegate Shortlist

The shortlist displayed in the prompt is algorithmically generated from on-chain ADB data. To prevent governance monopolization and empower small players, the prompt will display a randomized mix of up to 12 delegates:

— Aligned Delegates (8 Established Slots): Delegates with ≥20,000 voting power who meet all baseline thresholds.

— Rising Star Delegates (4 Fresh Slots): Reserved for delegates with <20,000 voting power who meet all baseline thresholds. The goal of this tier is talent retention: recognizing and valuing the hard work of smaller delegates who maintain a healthy governance environment, ensuring they don’t leave the ecosystem due to a lack of visibility. Delegates who qualify via the Community-Validated Proof-of-Contribution path are eligible for Rising Star Slots on equal footing with those who meet the binary thresholds directly. The Proof-of-Contribution path substitutes the Communication and Signal thresholds — but candidates must still be active as aspiring delegates with a public delegate profile thread on the forum.

Note: Rising Star eligibility requires an established contribution history. The Voting and Communication thresholds together represent the majority of the ADB requirements, meaning Rising Star Slots are designed for delegates who are already active contributors but have not yet accumulated sufficient delegated voting power. Truly new entrants will need at least one full governance cycle of active participation before becoming eligible.

Pillar 3 — AAVE Delegate Charter: A Formal Baseline for Delegates

Current state: There is no document that formally defines what an AAVE delegate is expected to do, disclose, or commit to. The delegate role is entirely self-defined, making it impossible to hold delegates accountable beyond social pressure.

Proposed change: Initiate a community-led drafting process for the AAVE Delegate Charter — a concise, ratifiable document (target: 5–10 pages) focused exclusively on the delegate role and the decentralization of governance power.

Scope of v1:

— Delegate Role Definition: The distinction between passive token holders, active delegates, and Orbit-tier delegates.

— Minimum Delegate Duties: Voting participation thresholds, rationale publication, conflict-of-interest disclosures, and communication of prolonged inactivity.

— Delegation Principles: Guidelines encouraging decentralization of voting power, including recommended concentration limits and the right of delegators to information about delegate performance.

— Delegate Accountability: The process by which delegates can lose their status, and their rights to contest such decisions.

— Amendment Procedure: Snapshot supermajority (67%) with a 5-day minimum discussion window.

What This Is NOT: This is explicitly not a broad governance constitution, a Service Provider accountability framework, or an attempt to replicate the Sky Atlas. The scope is intentionally narrow: professionalizing the delegate ecosystem and protecting AAVE through rigorous decentralization of voting power.

Drafting process: Open recruitment from the forum. The proposal author is one voice among equals — no editorial authority or final approval. All drafting is done in a public document with open comment access. Ratification via standard AIP process. v1 draft target: 90 days from ADF ratification.

Preliminary Budget & Compensation Breakdown (3-Month Pilot)

To ensure a smooth transition from the current Orbit program and to prove the ROI of the Aligned Delegates Framework (ADF), this proposal requests a 3-month pilot budget.

By shifting from a pure “VP-based” compensation model to an “Objective Threshold” model (inspired by MakerDAO/Sky’s capital-efficient delegate compensation), the DAO ensures it only pays for active, verified governance labor. If a delegate fails to meet the baseline thresholds in a given month, their compensation for that month is forfeited and remains in the AAVE Treasury.

The proposed budget is denominated in GHO to support Aave’s native stablecoin ecosystem.

  1. Delegate Compensation Pool

Aligned Delegates (Up to 8 slots) — Compensation: 6,000 GHO / month per delegate. — Quarterly Max: 144,000 GHO. — Rationale: Matches standard Orbit-tier compensation for large, highly active delegates holding ≥20k VP who consistently meet all voting and communication thresholds.

Rising Star Delegates (Up to 4 slots) — Compensation: 2,000 GHO / month per delegate. — Quarterly Max: 24,000 GHO. — Rationale: 50% of the Aligned tier. This creates a sustainable path to retain high-value, low-VP contributors (like forum moderators, analysts, and active smaller delegates) via the Community-Validated Proof of Contribution path.

  1. Operational & Implementation Core

ADF Facilitator & Data Lead (Apu Mallku) — Compensation: 7,500 GHO / month. — Quarterly Total: 22,500 GHO. — Rationale: To maximize execution speed, ensure capital efficiency, and maintain a single point of accountability for this 3-month pilot, this proposal consolidates the coordination and data analysis roles into a single mandate.

Core Objectives & Responsibilities:

— Delegate Coordination & Mediation: Act as the neutral liaison between the delegate ecosystem and Core Contributors. Host and manage bi-weekly Delegate Syncs to align on complex ARFCs/AIPs.

— Charter Drafting (Pillar 3): Lead the community drafting, review, and ratification process for the AAVE Delegate Charter (v1) within the 3-month pilot window.

— Automated Pipeline Engineering: Build, deploy, and maintain the automated data pipelines connecting Snapshot (GraphQL), Discourse (Forum API), and On-chain data (Dune Analytics/The Graph) to objectively track the Baseline Thresholds.

— Transparent Monthly Reporting: Publish the monthly “ADB Threshold Report” on the forum, detailing exactly which delegates met the automated binary metrics to trigger their compensation.

— Open-Source Accountability: Maintain a public GitHub repository hosting all tracking scripts. Because all data inputs are public, any DAO member will be able to run the script and independently audit the monthly results, ensuring zero human bias and complete decentralization of the evaluation process.

  1. Budget Summary & Capital Efficiency
Category / Role Monthly Cost (Max) 3-Month Pilot Total (Max)
Aligned Delegates (Max 8 slots at 6k/mo) 48,000 GHO 144,000 GHO
Rising Star Delegates (Max 4 slots at 2k/mo) 8,000 GHO 24,000 GHO
ADF Facilitator & Data Lead (1 at 7.5k/mo) 7,500 GHO 22,500 GHO
TOTAL MAXIMUM ASK 63,500 GHO 190,500 GHO

Note: 190,500 GHO is the absolute maximum cap for the quarter. The proposed slots (8 Aligned, 4 Rising Stars) represent a maximum capacity, not a guaranteed quota. If the ecosystem does not yield enough candidates who meet the strict baseline thresholds, these slots will simply remain unfilled, and the actual expenditure will be strictly lower. Any funds from unfilled slots, or unearned funds from delegates missing their monthly metrics, will remain securely in the AAVE Treasury, ensuring strict capital efficiency.

At the conclusion of the 3-month pilot, the ADF Facilitator will publish a full performance report on the forum. If the pilot demonstrates clear ROI — measured by delegate participation rates, rationale quality, and delegation prompt adoption — a renewal ARFC will be submitted for the following quarter.

Implementation: A Lean Team Built for Execution

The ADF is designed to move fast. No standing committees, no multi-month scoping exercises. By consolidating the operational and data roles, we ensure maximum accountability and execution speed.

— ADF Facilitator & Data Lead (Apu Mallku): A single unified mandate handling both strategy and technical execution. Responsibilities include drafting the Delegate Charter, organizing bi-weekly Delegate Meetings, acting as a neutral bridge between Labs and the delegates, and building the automated data pipelines (Snapshot/Discourse/Dune APIs) to track the Baseline Thresholds. Activates immediately upon ARFC approval.

— Frontend Contributor (ad-hoc / Labs?): A developer tasked exclusively with executing the UI integration for the Pillar 2 delegation prompt. No budget is requested for this role in the current proposal. The preferred implementation path will be coordinated with Aave Labs first. If Labs is unable to absorb this task into their current workflow, a separate, targeted budget request will be submitted to the DAO to fund an independent developer.

Critically: the ADF Facilitator role activates immediately upon ARFC approval — not after all pillars are built — filling the coordination vacuum left by ACI from day one.

Key Areas for Community Feedback

The purpose of this Temp Check is to gather directional consensus on the Delegate Framework. The preliminary budget presented above strictly covers governance participation and coordination.

We specifically invite delegates, Aave Labs, and the community to weigh in on the following strategic points before we lock in the final specifications for the ARFC stage:

    1. Threshold Calibration: Are the proposed baselines (85% voting participation and 75% rationale publication) the right balance for an automated system, or should they be adjusted?
    1. The “GovOps” Vacuum: With ACI and BGD stepping back, there is a clear vacuum in day-to-day operational work (e.g., forum moderation, tool maintenance) that falls outside standard delegate duties. While Aave Labs will take on broader roles, the exact boundaries remain undefined. Should the TEMP CHECK include a separate “Governance Operations (GovOps)” compensation track to ensure contributors performing this critical off-chain work are fairly compensated without draining the Delegate budget?
    1. Pillar 2 Implementation: Given ongoing transitions, what is the most efficient path for developing the UI for the staking delegation prompt? Should this be coordinated internally with Aave Labs, or should the DAO explicitly fund an independent frontend developer in the ARFC?

—

This proposal was drafted by Apu Mallku. All feedback, including critical feedback, is welcome on the forum. The goal is simple: a small team, a clear mandate, and fast execution in service of a stronger, decentralized delegate ecosystem.

4 Likes
Apu Mallku [Delegate platform]: Shutdown 🚩
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Supportive of the overall direction here. Moving from pure voting-volume metrics to an automated Aligned Delegate Baseline + Rising Star track feels like the right next step post-ACI/BGD, especially with the new decentralization guidance (SEC 33-11412, CLARITY Act) in mind. Would just flag two points for refinement: clarity on how the 85% threshold treats abstain/technical constraints, and a gentle ramp‑up for new Rising Star entrants so we don’t unintentionally filter out emerging delegates. Happy to contribute on the Charter side, particularly around multi-chain governance risk and anti-capture safeguards.

3 Likes
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Now that the Temp Check has been live for a few days and the community has had time to digest the framework, I’d like to formally invite feedback from the key stakeholders who are most directly impacted by this proposal.

Hearing your perspectives on the operational feasibility, the proposed baselines, and the GovOps transition is crucial before we request a Snapshot vote:
@sid_areta @Ignas @EzR3aL @Kene_Anode @WintermuteGovernance @phenk53 @ACI

Looking forward to your thoughts!

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Overrall very supportive of this proposal, only thing I would flag is possibly considering refactoring the compensation gap between aligned delegates an rising star delegates, currently Orbit delegates earn $5k/month, instead of increasing that to $6k, I would up for aligned delegates to earn $5k/month, while rusung star delegates earn $3k/month, the gap being 50% less is wide enough in my opinion.

Regarding these three issues, here are my thoughts.

  1. Threshold Calibration: A minimum of 85% participation and communication rates makes sense, delegates have to vote and communicate within a reasonable time.
  2. The “GovOps” Vacuum: Yes, the TEMP CHECK should include a separate Governance Operations compensation track. With ACI and BGD stepping back, the day-to-day operational work that kept the DAO functioning (forum moderation, tool maintenance, proposal lifecycle management, Guardian coordination) risks falling into a gray zone. Aave Labs has committed to absorbing roughly 40 functions from both departing service providers, but the exact boundaries of what they will and won’t cover remain undefined. That ambiguity is the problem. Off-chain governance work is unglamorous but essential, and without a dedicated compensation track it either goes uncompensated (and eventually undone) or gets quietly absorbed into the Delegate budget, diluting resources meant for voting and strategic oversight. A dedicated GovOps track would make this work visible, attract contributors with the right operational skill set, and create clear accountability for deliverables that are distinct from what delegates or Aave Labs are expected to do. The cost of formalizing this is small relative to the cost of letting critical infrastructure degrade during the transition.
  3. Pillar 2 Implementation: Staking Delegation UI: The most efficient path is to coordinate this directly with Aave Labs as part of their expanded mandate under the Aave Will Win Framework. The key consideration is that the staking delegation prompt needs to be tightly integrated with the protocol’s staking contracts and governance infrastructure, which Aave Labs already maintains. Splitting this across an independent developer introduces coordination overhead that likely outweighs the governance benefits of separation.
2 Likes
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I support this proposal. Currently, participation among Orbit delegates is quite limited, with only a few active contributors standing out. This is exactly where the proposal provides a meaningful improvement. In particular, introducing a lower tier makes a lot of sense, as it allows smaller delegates below the 20,000 AAVE threshold to actively participate and gain visibility in governance. This would help broaden participation and strengthen decentralization over the long term.

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Thank you all for the constructive energy and thoughtful feedback so far. It is exactly this kind of engaged debate that the Aligned Delegates Framework is trying to foster and protect.

I’ve read through the points raised and wanted to address them while opening up a few questions for the broader community before we move to the Snapshot stage. My idea is to leave a wider window than the typical TEMP CHECK due to ETH CC and other events that are taking place right now:

@phenk53 — Thank you for the support. You nailed the exact motivation behind the Rising Star tier. Relying solely on the 20k VP threshold historically risks leaving out incredible talent. By lowering the barrier for active contributors, we ensure decentralization isn’t just a buzzword, but a pipeline for new talent. Open question to you and the community: When defining the “Community-Validated Proof of Contribution” for these smaller delegates, are there specific off-chain activities (e.g., DAO tooling, forum moderation) that you believe should carry the most weight?

@MconnectDAO — Appreciate the insights and your willingness to help draft the Charter! To clarify your first point: yes, voting ‘Abstain’ is absolutely an active governance stance and will fully count toward the 85% participation threshold. We will also ensure the automated scripts include exception parameters for widely recognized technical constraints (meaning, if Snapshot goes down, delegates won’t be unfairly penalized for third-party infrastructure failures). Regarding the gentle ramp-up, that is precisely the goal of the Proof-of-Contribution path—allowing new entrants to build reputation before hitting the hard VP metrics.

@Kene_Anode — Fantastic analysis. You’ve brought up critical structural points that deserve broad consensus:

  1. The Compensation Gap: Your suggestion to adjust to 5k/month (Aligned) and 3k/month (Rising Star) is highly compelling. Not only does it value the emerging tier more aggressively, but it is literally more capital-efficient for the DAO’s maximum budget. (At max capacity, the original 6k/2k split costs 56,000 GHO/mo, whereas the 5k/3k split costs 52,000 GHO/mo—saving the DAO 4,000 GHO monthly). I’d love to hear from other delegates on this: does the 5k/3k split feel like the right equilibrium to lock in for the TEMP CHECK?
  2. The “GovOps” Vacuum & Pillar 2 UI: You articulated the ‘gray zone’ perfectly. Unglamorous operational work cannot just be quietly absorbed by the delegate budget, and introducing an independent developer for Pillar 2 adds unnecessary coordination overhead and security friction. This brings us to a critical point where we need clarity from Core Contributors.

@AaveLabs — As we navigate this transition post-ACI/BGD, we would love to get your perspective on two key areas regarding the Aave Will Win mandate:

  • First, on GovOps: While it is crucial and expected that Labs absorbs the majority of protocol-level tasks, we believe that everything strictly related to DAO sovereignty—such as delegate coordination, governance tooling, and DAO treasury management—should remain heavily decentralized. Could you share some clarity on where Labs draws the boundary for these specific DAO-operational tasks moving forward?
  • Second, on Pillar 2 (Staking Delegation UI): We agree with the feedback that this UI integration should be coordinated organically with the Labs team. If this framework is approved by the DAO, would Aave Labs be willing/able to co-participate in developing this specific UI integration?

Looking forward to hearing everyone’s thoughts on these adjustments!

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@ApuMallku — Thank you for the detailed clarifications. Happy to contribute to the Charter drafting, especially around participation metrics and exception handling.

On Compensation (Q1): I lean toward the 5k/3k split. The reasoning is simple if we want genuine decentralization of governance influence, we need to make the Rising Star tier financially viable, not just symbolic. A delegate doing serious research and voting consistently deserves stability. The 4,000 GHO/month saved vs the 6k/2k model can be redirected toward Proof-of-Contribution incentives or the GovOps function.

On Proof-of-Contribution (Q2): I’d suggest weighting the following off-chain activities:

  • Governance research & analysis published publicly (Paragraph, Mirror, Forum posts)

  • Voting rationale documentation (not just voting, but explaining the vote)

  • Community onboarding & delegate education

  • Cross-DAO governance participation (Arbitrum, Uniswap, etc.) that brings learnings back to Aave
    The key metric shouldn’t just be quantity of contributions but verifiability can it be independently confirmed?
    On GovOps Vacuum (Q3): This is the most urgent gap. Until Pillar 2 tooling is live, I’d recommend the Charter explicitly define a temporary manual review process perhaps a small multisig or working group so the framework doesn’t stall at launch.
    Excited to see this move to Snapshot. Ready to assist with Charter drafting whenever needed.
    @MconnectDAO

@ApuMallku @Kene_Anode @phenk53 @AaveLabs

1 Like
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Cannot really add much to it as this proposal is already very detailed and other already gave great feedback.
Regarding discourse API Im happy to support here and see what needs to be done so its working properly.
Regarding the compensation I lean more towards a 5/2k model.
Orbit delegates are important to reach quorum on proposals so it makes sense to give them a higher compensation, but I don’t think 6k are needed, just keep the same level.
For rising stars I think 2k is more than enough. If someone is doing a lot extra work the DAO could consider giving a retro active payment or create a tiered system.

So especially for rising stars we would need clear rules for tasks and their fair compensation.

Other than that, great job @ApuMallku

3 Likes
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I oppose this proposal for the following three reasons:

  • Spending 190k GHO on delegate rewards for a 3-month period is excessive.
  • I don’t believe it’s a very good culture if only some voters get incentives.
  • The reward should be paid in $AAVE with performance conditions, not GHO.
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We welcome this initiative and thanks @apumallku for leading the effort.

Aligned Delegate Baseline

  • We are supportive of this direction and look forward to seeing how it improves the quality of forum contributions from larger delegates.

  • Timeline for Rationale Publication: It is sensible to require that rationales are published within a pre-defined timeframe, as it reduces the likelihood of after-the-fact justifications for passive votes. However, we believe the 48-hour window is extremely short and should be extended. Given the frequency of votes and the short voting window for Aave proposals (~3 days), a 48-hour publication window significantly increases the operational burden on delegates. We recommend extending the timeline to within 4 days after a vote closes. This is more practical and better aligned with standard practice across leading DAOs such as Arbitrum, where a similar rationale publication window is in place.

  • Anti-Spam Filter: While filtering out low-quality contributions is a legitimate goal, we view this specific metric as gameable and unlikely to deliver reliable signal. Across many delegate programs we have observed in other DAOs, engagement metrics of this type tend to be noisy, carry little meaningful signal, and fail to reflect the actual value of a contribution. We would recommend removing it as a required threshold.

  • High-impact Proposals: The proposal defines Tier 1 proposals as those with “>$1M impact,” but does not clarify how this threshold is determined in practice. In some cases, quantification is straightforward, for example a proposal requesting a direct treasury disbursement of $1M or more. However, many consequential proposals carry indirect or non-monetary impact that is harder to size, such as parameter/technical updates, or even governance process reforms. Who determines whether a given proposal crosses the $1M threshold, and how?

One-Step Delegation Prompt

  • We view this as a meaningful UX improvement. It directly reduces the friction associated with activating voting power, and given ongoing community discussions around voting power transparency and concentration, we are supportive of any step that makes the delegation process more seamless. The randomized display of delegates within the prompt is also a welcome design choice.

Aave Delegate Charter

  • A charter defining delegate roles, responsibilities, and standards is good governance practice, and one we have seen adopted across leading DAOs. We fully support its introduction for Aave DAO.

Responses to Specific Feedback Questions

  • Are the proposed baselines (85% voting participation and 75% rationale publication) the right balance for an automated system?

    • We think the proposed baselines reflect a fair and reasonable balance.

  • Should the Temp Check include a separate GovOps compensation track?

    • We think a dedicated GovOps budget is sensible in principle. However, we are conscious that the scope of responsibilities here may be relatively light given that Aave Labs is filling key operational gaps left by ACI and BGD’s exits. Any GovOps budget request, including a clear scope of work, should be submitted as a separate Temp Check and not bundled with this delegate framework proposal.

  • Should Pillar 2 UI development be coordinated with Aave Labs or funded via an independent developer?

    • This should be coordinated internally with Aave Labs, as it directly concerns updates to the Aave App’s UI and functionality.
1 Like
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Thanks for the proposal, a lot of thoughtful work here @ApuMallku

On the Compensation gap, I lean toward the 5k/2k split. This is more balanced and clearly more capital efficient for the DAO. Orbit Delegates can anchor their value around hitting the thresholds, while rising stars bring a different kind of value, marketing, X posts, fresh ideas, and community building.

Please make sure we clearly define what tasks qualify and how those contributions are measured.

1 Like
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I am also skeptical about this proposal.

It does not seem a good idea to use GHO for rewards and the total amount seems very high as well.

I’m afraid this could become another easy way to milk the DAO, similarly to what ACI has done in the past. I do not see any structural gap to fill.

Regarding forum contribution, until freedom of speech is restored in this forum it does not seem fair to use the forum to measure rewards: accounts that are not in line with certain story telling are labelled as “fake” or “sponsored” by current moderators.

My posts have been censored and my account has been put on hold just for expressing my opinion, while at the same time all kind of insults and insinuations were made against some individuals and organizations without any action been taken.

Until this forum becomes again a non toxic place, where everybody can express freely his opinion, without censorship, I see very problematic the idea of rewarding forum participation (given this is only possible for someone and restricted for people not in line with current moderators).

3 Likes
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While I do think that active participation from token holders, directly or indirectly, is valuable, I believe this proposal does not serve the direction of Aave well and does not set the foundations for success.

With this proposal, the problem goes even further, as it requires more analysis, more discussions, more opinions, and fewer agreements and execution steps just to qualify for the program while creating execution bottlenecks. Of course, AI is likely to make this problem even worse.

Second, we should strive to move away from creating political corners within the DAO and instead push toward a single shared vision. While it’s okay to have different ideas within a DAO and to debate those amongst ourselves, it should still be done as a team and in a manner that is similar to healthy employee debates. This is the only way we can compete with well structured hierarchical companies or new entrants that carry less governance overhead.

While I do appreciate that the proposal includes delegate standards, which is a positive step, it does not address the primary problem of conduct. I have been monitoring the existing Orbit campaign and am struggling to see the value in it as currently structured. Existing Orbit delegates can be paid while writing negative commentary on socials about Aave, saying disparaging things about partners, and mocking work done by teams that are building and making other high leverage contributions to Aave. In the grand scheme of things, this has many negative consequences that are difficult to quantify, can affect morale in the DAO, and can affect how people see the AAVE token.

Imagine a similar scenario where a company pays an employee or contractor to provide value, and they intentionally create negative value instead. This is a structural issue tied to how program incentives are designed. Delegates face incentives to create controversy because it gains them visibility, engagement, and that in turn can lead to delegated support.

Third, there is no real vetting of delegates and their backgrounds. Everyone has opinions, but what truly matters is merit, which should be the basis for having a seat at the table.

Additionally, all the UI related work mentioned does not make sense to me. These products should focus on users who are actively using the protocols, not on delegation mechanics. Delegation infrastructure has very little to do with understanding user behavior or growing the products themselves.

I do believe delegates can be compensated, but it should not become a burden for the DAO to run what effectively becomes a political system that creates more drag on execution than value. For example, teams should have sufficient autonomy to execute, with results reviewed periodically. This could be arranged outside of Aave, for instance delegates could make direct agreements with token holders they represent, with those relationships being economically incentivized.

10 Likes
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I concur with r0mul0 and stani. The current delegation infrastructure seems sufficient and I would not want to spend money on extensions. The reason is that token holders should be fully responsible for decision-making. The only exception is probably treasury tokens, which would introduce a recursive element if being used for voting (so they should not be used for voting). If some individuals want to delegate they can do so already today. No need for more in my opinion.

3 Likes
15

Thank you to everyone for keeping this debate at such a mature and technically precise level. As an independent delegate, my only compass is the long-term resilience and value of AAVE.

We are at a foundational moment. The “Aave Will Win” framework tacitly accepts what many of us have been arguing for months: Token = Equity. The AAVE token now directly captures the economic value and participation rights of the protocol. I voted in favor of it, along with the v4 license and its activation, as a deliberate tabula rasa. The frictions of the past stay in the past. My commitment to the token’s growth is absolute.

But for this new chapter to work, two things must happen simultaneously: Labs must execute with ambition, and the DAO must decentralize governance power with equal urgency. These are not competing goals; they are the two legs of the same race. The ECB’s Working Paper No. 3208 already placed a regulatory bullseye on Aave’s concentrated voting power. The SEC’s Interpretive Release 33-11412 and the CLARITY Act define decentralization as a system where no person or group holds effective control. Independent delegates are not a political inconvenience: they are the verifiable proof of decentralization that protects @aavelabs, @stani, and the entire protocol from regulatory capture. The SELL button is the loudest governance signal token holders have, and it has been pressed repeatedly. We have more to lose by allowing governance to atrophy than by investing a fraction of our treasury to professionalize it.

A special acknowledgment to @stani for engaging directly. This is the dialogue I tried to initiate privately with Labs before publishing this proposal. That conversation went silent without explanation, which is itself a symptom of the coordination gap the ADF is designed to close. I am choosing to see your comment here as the opening of a new chapter, and I will respond with the same directness.

On execution overhead and bottlenecks

The ADF is built to eliminate governance overhead, not create it. Every threshold (voting participation, rationale publication, and forum signal) is a binary yes/no metric verifiable via Snapshot, the Discourse API, and on-chain data. No committee decides who qualifies. No human judges quality. The rules are pre-defined and self-enforcing. The facilitator role publishes the output of an algorithm, not a subjective judgment. Compared to the current model, where eligibility is assessed retroactively each cycle with an open-ended budget request submitted after the fact, the ADF is structurally leaner. And here I want to be clear: the ACI built something that genuinely worked. Orbit professionalized governance delegates in a way Aave had never seen before. The ADF is not a repudiation of that work; it is its natural evolution, designed to outlast any single entity.

On conduct: you are correct, and this is the ADF’s strongest point

I want to concede this directly: you identified the exact structural flaw that the ADF exists to fix.

Orbit had zero conduct standards. A delegate could vote on every proposal, collect compensation, and spend the rest of their time publishing negative commentary about Aave or damaging the protocol’s reputation with no consequences. That is broken incentive design, and it is a problem the ADF was always going to solve.

I am formally committing to add a Delegate Code of Conduct as part of the ARFC stage. Leading DeFi governance frameworks have been running this model successfully, utilizing formal conduct rules with documented misalignment penalties, all ratified on-chain. The scope I am proposing is deliberately narrow: prohibiting conduct that damages the protocol’s reputation, requiring conflict of interest disclosures, and establishing minimum communication standards with the broader ecosystem including Labs. This will be drafted openly on the forum with full community input. This is exactly the kind of improvement that could have been incorporated from the beginning if the initial dialogue with Labs had not gone silent.

On “political corners”: I need to respectfully and directly disagree

This is where I part ways with your framing, @stani, and I think it matters enough to say clearly.

When you suggest that delegate relationships could happen outside the DAO through private economic agreements between delegates and large tokenholders, you are describing the end of decentralization, not its refinement. That is a patronage system. It concentrates influence in whoever holds the largest bags, creates undisclosed conflicts of interest, and removes the on-chain transparency that makes governance auditable to regulators. The most successful governance frameworks in DeFi explicitly prohibit this model for exactly these reasons.

And here is the harder question: if there are no more compensated, independent delegates, what fills that space? The answer, historically, has been either voter apathy or the concentration of voting power in a small number of entities, which is precisely the dynamic the ECB documented as Aave’s governance risk. A DAO without a professional, diverse delegate ecosystem is not a leaner DAO. It is a DAO heading toward one of two destinations: captured governance, or the Uniswap path where Labs de facto controls direction and the DAO becomes a ratification mechanism. Both are legitimate models. But only one of them is actually decentralized, and only one of them is defensible under MiCA and the CLARITY Act.

The errors you are pointing to (conduct issues, lack of vetting, misaligned incentives) are real. But they are design gaps that we now have the context and the tools to fix, not reasons to abandon the concept entirely. We have a rare opportunity right now to build the right system from scratch, informed by what went wrong and by what is working elsewhere. Other protocols have already proven that codified, automated delegate frameworks eliminate political friction. This is not because they suppressed disagreement, but because nobody has to argue about what the rules are when they are written in advance and enforced algorithmically. We can learn from that without pretending our situation is identical.

We are at a genuine inflection point. The market has already spoken: AAVE is down over 44% in the last year while governance conflict consumed attention that should have gone to building. Every proposal that dies in political noise is a cost to every token holder. The answer to that cost is not fewer rules; it is clearer rules, applied automatically, with a Code of Conduct that makes destructive behavior economically irrational. That is exactly what the ADF proposes.

What I am formally committing to before the ARFC

  1. Delegate Code of Conduct: drafted openly on the forum, modeled on Sky’s Atlas framework, covering conduct standards, conflict of interest disclosures, and communication expectations. This focuses on off-chain governance work only with no additional technical scope.
  2. Merit eligibility baseline: a minimum requirement of one full governance cycle of documented participation and an active delegate platform thread before any delegate qualifies for compensation.

The door to direct dialogue remains open. I am asking only that it stays open on both sides.

Turning now to the rest of the community’s feedback, which has been equally sharp and valuable.

@r0mul0 I understand your concerns about censorship, but this proposal is strictly about rules for delegates and decentralization. It has nothing to do with forum moderation, which I do not control. This framework seeks the exact opposite of censorship: automating compensation through verifiable on-chain data and completely removing subjective judgment. The 190,500 GHO is an absolute maximum cap. If the strict algorithmic thresholds are not met, the funds never leave the Treasury.

@sid_areta You are right: a 48 hour window for rationales is operationally suffocating. The window will be extended to 4 days post-vote to ensure quality without burning out delegates. On the anti-spam filter: if the community feels it generates noise or is gameable, we will remove it entirely. I also agree that GovOps must go in a completely separate proposal.

@0xlide The expenditure is not guaranteed. 190,500 GHO is a ceiling, not a forecast. Under current conditions, only two delegates realistically qualify as Aligned Delegates today, meaning realistic Q1 spend is closer to 34,500 GHO. We are using GHO strategically to strengthen our native stablecoin’s utility. Direct incentives in AAVE remain open for the next stage.

@EzR3aL Thank you for the technical backing and for proactively offering your expertise with the Discourse API. Having constructive delegates involved in the infrastructure is what will make this system fair and truly automated.

@MconnectDAO Your suggestions regarding off-chain tasks (research and cross-DAO education) are at the core of what this framework rewards. Two non-negotiable rules: no double-dipping for Service Providers already receiving DAO compensation, and GovOps goes in a separate thread entirely.

With these refinements incorporated, I will move this TEMP CHECK to Snapshot this Thursday, giving the community an extra couple of days for final review.

The future of Aave is undeniable decentralization. We built the most important lending protocol in DeFi. It would be a historic mistake to let governance entropy undo what the technology achieved. Let’s build it right together.

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If the expected spend is under $35k, I recommend reducing the total maximum ask($190k). Also, when paying rewards in stablecoins, I recommend making a minimum $AAVE holding a mandatory condition for all platforms.

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I want to add a dimension that I think is underweighted in this debate.

@stani is right that merit should be the basis for a seat at the table, and that paying delegates who generate negative value is broken incentive design. But I think the root cause is not the existence of a delegate program — it is the absence of participants with genuine skin in the game.

A delegate who holds meaningful economic exposure to AAVE, who manages capital with fiduciary obligations, or who has professional reputation at stake with every public position cannot afford to vote carelessly, generate controversy for visibility, or damage the protocol’s image. Their LPs, their investors, their counterparties hold them accountable before any Code of Conduct ever could. That is the most effective conduct filter available — and it is one the current system does not select for.

The second point I want to raise is regulatory. MiCA is live. The CLARITY Act defines decentralization based on effective control. The ECB’s Working Paper 3208 flagged Aave’s governance concentration as a specific risk. For institutional capital evaluating DeFi exposure, governance credibility is not a nice-to-have — it is a prerequisite. A protocol without a transparent and independent delegate layer carries classification risk that directly impacts how allocators size their positions.

The ADF is not perfect, but it moves in the right direction. My concrete suggestion: map the framework explicitly to MiCA and CLARITY Act decentralization criteria. That reframes the delegate program from a DAO expense into a compliance asset that protects Labs, tokenholders, and the protocol’s ability to attract institutional capital.

Aave’s governance should be shaped by participants who have something real to lose. That is the standard we should design for.

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[TEMP CHECK] AAVE Delegate Ecosystem Upgrade: The Aligned Delegates Framework (Revised)

Author: Apu Mallku / Independent Delegate Platform

Status: TEMP CHECK / Revised Version incorporating community feedback

Date: April 6, 2026

What Changed and Why

This revised version incorporates the most substantive feedback from the first round of community discussion, including from @stani, @JesusCryptoPlaza, @sid_areta, @Ignas, @EzR3aL, @Kene_Anode, @phenk53, @MconnectDAO, and @0xlide. Three structural changes are worth highlighting:

  1. A formal Code of Conduct is now a core pillar of the proposal instead of a future ARFC commitment. This directly addresses the conduct concern raised by @stani, which we consider the most valid and necessary criticism to address.
  2. The budget section reflects the current reality with one qualified Aligned Delegate candidate rather than a theoretical maximum. The cap remains in place for predictability, but the honest expected spend for the first cycle is made explicit.
  3. The regulatory framing is strengthened throughout, following @JesusCryptoPlaza’s observation that this framework should be positioned as a compliance asset instead of a DAO expense.

Abstract

With the Aave Chan Initiative (ACI) stepping back from delegate coordination, AAVE’s governance ecosystem faces a structural gap. This is not a crisis; it is an opportunity to build the right system rather than replicate its predecessor.

This proposal introduces the Aligned Delegates Framework (ADF): a four pillar upgrade to how AAVE governance identifies, rewards, and holds accountable its most dedicated delegates. The ADF moves beyond purely quantitative voting metrics toward an automated, objective baseline of governance value. For the first time, it establishes a formal Code of Conduct that makes the delegate role not just compensated, but accountable.

Critically, this framework is more than just good governance practice. It is regulatory infrastructure. As the regulatory environment for DeFi tightens globally (MiCA is live, the CLARITY Act is advancing, and the ECB has already flagged Aave’s governance concentration by name), a transparent, independent, and rule bound delegate ecosystem is Aave’s most defensible proof of decentralization. Today’s regulatory laxity is not a guarantee of tomorrow’s. Building this shield now, while the window is open, is the prudent choice for every token holder and for Labs.

Background and Motivation

AAVE governance faces five compounding structural problems that this proposal addresses directly:

1. The Quantitative Trap. The current model measures delegates primarily through on-chain voting participation rates. This creates an incentive to vote without engaging, allowing delegates to collect compensation while contributing nothing of analytical value.

2. Structural Voter Apathy. Supplying AAVE and delegating voting power are entirely disconnected. The vast majority of suppliers and stakers never delegate. The result is voting power permanently concentrated among a shrinking set of actors, increasing governance capture risk. The ECB Working Paper No. 3208 documented this concentration specifically for Aave. The SEC’s Interpretive Release 33 11412 and the CLARITY Act both define decentralization as a system where no person or group holds effective voting control. This is a present regulatory exposure.

3. No Conduct Standards. The current delegate framework has zero conduct rules. A delegate could collect compensation while publishing negative commentary, damaging partnerships, or mocking contributors with no consequences. This is broken incentive design.

4. Undefined Delegate Standards. There is no formal document establishing what is expected from an AAVE delegate. Duties, conflict of interest disclosures, and minimum engagement standards exist only as implicit norms.

5. The Post ACI Coordination Vacuum. The departure of ACI leaves a coordination void. A healthy DAO cannot rely on a single entity (Labs or otherwise) to maintain the governance ecosystem that protects the protocol’s decentralization.

Core Pillars

Pillar 1: The Aligned Delegate Baseline (ADB)

The ADF replaces the purely quantitative Orbit model with the Aligned Delegate Baseline, a set of binary, fully automatable Minimum Engagement Thresholds tracked via Snapshot GraphQL, the Discourse API, and on-chain data. No committee decides who qualifies and no human judges quality. The system is self enforcing.

To qualify for compensation, a delegate must meet all three thresholds per quarter:

  • Voting Threshold: 85% or higher participation on all on-chain AIPs and Snapshot ARFCs. Abstain votes count as active participation. Technical failures are handled via automated exception parameters.
  • Communication Threshold: Delegates must publish a public Voting Rationale for at least 75% of Tier 1 proposals (proposals with over $1M direct treasury impact or equivalent weight). The window is extended to 4 days post vote following @sid_areta’s feedback.
  • Signal Threshold (optional community decision): Following @sid_areta’s feedback, the anti-spam filter is proposed as optional. The community will decide at the ARFC stage whether to include it or replace it with a simpler minimum forum presence requirement.

Proof of Contribution Path: Delegates performing off-chain work (tooling, research, forum infrastructure) can substitute the Communication and Signal thresholds via a Community Validated Monthly Update, endorsed by TL2+ forum members or recognized Service Providers.

Tier Structure:

  • Aligned Delegates: 20,000 VP or more, all thresholds met. Compensation: 5,000 GHO per month.
  • Rising Stars: Under 20,000 VP, all thresholds met. Compensation: 2,000 GHO per month.

Pillar 2: Frictionless Staking Delegation Prompt

Integrate a one step, non mandatory delegation prompt into the AAVE staking and supply UI at the moment of interaction. Users can skip, self delegate, or choose any delegate. No lockups. This pillar will be coordinated directly with Aave Labs as part of their expanded mandate under Aave Will Win. No separate budget is requested for this pillar.

Pillar 3: AAVE Delegate Charter

Initiate a community led drafting process for a formal AAVE Delegate Charter. This will be a concise, ratifiable document (target: 5 to 10 pages) defining the delegate role, minimum duties, conflict of interest standards, and accountability mechanisms. Drafting is open to all forum contributors and ratification will follow the standard AIP process.

Pillar 4: Delegate Code of Conduct (New response to @stani)

This is the pillar that Orbit never had and the one @stani correctly identified as the most critical missing element.

The problem Orbit created: Delegates could be compensated for governance participation while simultaneously engaging in conduct that damaged the protocol (negative public commentary, disparaging partners, or undermining team morale).

The ADF solution: A binding Code of Conduct, ratified on-chain as part of the Delegate Charter, establishing:

  • Prohibited conduct: Publishing content that materially misrepresents Aave’s protocol, products, or team; deliberate attempts to damage Aave’s reputation or partner relationships; conduct designed to generate personal visibility at the protocol’s expense.
  • Required disclosures: Conflict of interest declarations for any vote where the delegate has a material financial interest; disclosure of any compensation received from third parties.
  • Communication standards: Minimum responsiveness to governance stakeholders including Labs. There is no requirement to agree, but there is a requirement to engage.
  • Accountability mechanism: Documented violations reviewed by a community panel of TL4 forum members and Service Providers. Confirmed violations result in disqualification from the compensation program.

Budget: Honest Reality vs. Maximum Cap

The cap is a governance commitment, not a forecast. It provides the DAO with transparency regarding the worst case cost of the program.

Honest first cycle picture:

Component Max Slots Rate Q1 Maximum Realistic Q1
Aligned Delegates 8 5,000 GHO/mo 120,000 GHO 15,000 GHO (1 candidate: Areta)
Rising Stars 4 2,000 GHO/mo 24,000 GHO 0 GHO
ADF Facilitator 1 7,500 GHO/mo 22,500 GHO 22,500 GHO
TOTAL MAX 166,500 GHO ~37,500 GHO

The 166,500 GHO ceiling represents less than 0.17% of the Aave DAO treasury. The realistic Q1 spend of approximately 37,500 GHO is less than 0.038% of the treasury. For a protocol generating over $100M annually, this is a governance infrastructure decision rather than a budget discussion.

The Regulatory Case: A Compliance Asset, Not a DAO Expense

The ADF is not governance overhead; it is regulatory infrastructure. The environment for DeFi is tightening and Aave is already named in relevant documents:

  • ECB Working Paper No. 3208 identifies Aave’s governance concentration as a potential barrier to MiCA exemptions.
  • SEC Interpretive Release 33 11412 defines decentralization as the lack of effective control by any group.
  • H.R. 3633 (CLARITY Act) defines a decentralized system as transparent and rules based.

An independent, compensated, and rule bound delegate ecosystem is Aave’s most defensible proof of decentralization. It also protects Labs’ ability to execute freely, as a DAO with genuinely distributed power cannot be characterized as centrally controlled.

Summary of Changes from v1

Topic v1 Revised
Code of Conduct ARFC commitment Formal Pillar 4
Aligned Delegate rate 6,000 GHO/mo 5,000 GHO/mo
Rationale window 48h 4 days post vote
Anti-spam filter Mandatory Optional community decision
Budget framing Maximum cap Maximum cap and realistic Q1 explicit
Regulatory framing Supporting argument Central strategic rationale

This proposal was drafted by Apu Mallku. All feedback is welcome to strengthen Aave’s decentralization and regulatory defensibility for the long term.

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Some Observations:

During ACI Era, most of the delegates failed to provide meaningful opinions/ valuable inputs. It became either you agree with Marc Zeller of ACI or get out from the orbit compensation list.

What Stani mentioned earlier is a fundamental issue lies with Defi DAO structure. Most of the time, delegates’ interests are NOT aligned with protocol in the long term but serves the delegate’s own interest. It relys on delegates to act in good faith. I have witnessed some of the delegates that are dissent from ACI getting sidelined or just ignored.

A better structure is needed to address this misalignment to make the mechanism work in the long term.

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I echo what @ST0X said.

(Also the suggested amount of 166,500 GHO is outrageus).

Renaming from a DAO expense to a “Compliance Asset”, does not change the reality, this is DAO expense, an unnecessary tax burden.

The crypto space should be for builders, for lean teams with a clear vision and direction and ability to execute quickly.

Being the protocol profitable, this attracts people that, at least in some instances, have no merit, that often have their own agenda, enjoy playing politics, people that otherwise would have troubles finding a real job, rent seekers that found an easy way to get subsidized.

A DAO should not be a welfare organization that provides an income to people that otherwise would be unemployed, this is a role already fulfilled by our national states.

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