[TEMP CHECK] Aave Will Win Framework

Before deciding if this is a good or bad or neutral proposal I need to have some questions answered. So let’s start.

Revenue is defined as gross product revenue earned by Aave Labs, minus any direct revenue sharing paid by Aave Labs to external partners including revenue rebates, revenue subsidies, revenue sharing arrangements and any additional direct user incentives.

  1. What are the numbers for all of the above? The DAO needs to understand what 100% exactly means. If we are talking for example about 10m, how much is flowing back to the DAO in the end?

  2. Why should we force people out of v3 through adjusting parameters?

V3 is generating revenue, v4 does not. And it won’t be able to generate the revenue of v3 very likely for a couple years. Instead we should see both as separate products, whereas v3 is the money machine to keep things alive whereas v4 is the new protocol with other features, focused on other customers.
If v4 for example fails and we push users out of v3, the DAO is at risk of not being able to survive, which means every SP with it as well.

  1. Who is leading the foundation that would hold the Aave IP?
  2. Where does the justification come from for the funding? In total, including the growth/development grants this results in roughly 50m in total ask.

V4 in total asked 12m, for a completely new protocol, with new infrastructure and mechanisms.
So why for example does the Aave App cost 5m, which is about 42% of the whole budget for v4?
Taking all of the growth grants into account these features, built on top of Aave v4 (I guess) will cost more than Aave v4 itself.
And then I’m also confused regarding the frontend, I was told by an Labs employee that hosting the frontend would cost much more than 10m a year, which was the justification for keeping the cowswap fees. Now its “only” 5m which is better but raises the question if the 10m that were mentioned are simply way too much for managing and hosting the frontend.

  1. What are the exact KPIs for each named product?
  2. How many people are there working per team on each product?
  3. Shouldn’t each product be a separate proposal? Cause maybe I agree with 80% but not with the rest. I would then vote NO on this.
  4. How should the DAO evaluate Labs should receive X amount for launching product Y?
    To better understand this, Labs should disclose cost on these products, as “Aave Labs has largely self-funded the cost of building and scaling the product layer”.
  5. What will be the difference between Aave.com and pro.aave.com?
  6. Do you intend to pay back/transfer the Cowswap fees that you have collected so far to the DAO? Will the recipient address be changed to the Aave collector address?

I guess another comment will follow based on the answers.
In general first good step, but biggest problem for me is the bundle proposal and the funding.

18 Likes

This proposal properly aligns Aave Labs, DAO, and AAVE token, which is very much needed. The debate over how much and on what terms to compensate Aave Labs is warranted, but their framework is reasonable. The DAO should strongly consider moving forward with a version of this proposal to ensure Aave’s continued success.

TLDR

  • Blockworks is supportive of the the proposal as-is but believes some additional information on forward-looking projections could benefit AAVE DAO and prospective AAVE tokenholders

  • Aave is a growing onchain-native business and a nascent fintech platform. We believe that this strategic investment is likely to generate long term value, with a market expansion beyond crypto natives.

  • While the funding amount requested might seem large, is effectively low compared to fintech peers, and the treasury can absorb it without creating undue insolvency risk.

  • In light of this welcomed growth focus, we recommend reviewing some strategies, such as buybacks, to preserve additional runway and diversify the treasury.


Blockworks is generally supportive of the direction of the proposal. In our view it functions as a credible reset from the perceived Labs/DAO misalignment that’s weighed on sentiment and, more importantly, it lays down the foundations for AAVE to exit the “crypto” cohort and enter the fintech classification. Some of the specific numbers/mechanics may need rework, but the strategic intent is right.

We also understand the desire to split items into separate votes, but we think unbundling could be counterproductive. Crypto is increasingly competing with more attractive verticals (notably AI) for talent, capital, and allocator attention. In that environment, we think Aave needs a coherent barbell strategy:

  • Institutionalize the ecosystem, and

  • Push into consumer-facing distribution to sustain growth.

Fragmenting the package increases the risk of ending up with partial measures that don’t reach a strong end-state. We see Aave Card and the Aave App as major potential drivers of the consumer push, real “DeFi to daily utility”, and democratizing financial services for the masses. The vertical integration with the lending platform is a meaningful moat worth leveraging. The risk of unbundling is adding friction (governance/process) that slows shipping while competitors integrate similar rails and win via faster iteration and stronger distribution. Aave Kit and Aave Pro can multiply Aave’s core strengths by enabling third parties to build neo-bank style experiences on top of Aave rails, giving ability to scale distribution without the DAO needing to operate everything directly.

More than anything, we think better alignment between Labs and the DAO makes AAVE more appealing for investors, and for this reason a light Foundation managing IP rights is also a welcome initiative. But alignment alone won’t be enough in a world where allocators are more selective, and, over time, Aave likely needs stronger investor communication, clearer long-term positioning, and more deliberate institutional relationship-building. Still, this alignment is a foundational prerequisite, needed for what is next.

Crypto’s future looks structurally different from its past. Strategies that worked in prior cycles won’t drive the same success going forward given macro shifts, competition for mindshare, and changes in how capital allocates risk. Thinking of Aave as the DeFi protocol it has been so far is a severe mistake, and is worth instead analysing what grows means for a Unicorn fintech spun from crypto rails instead. We can in this sense analyse the numbers provided.

Aave is a growing onchain-native business and a nascent fintech platform.

Aave is entering a new phase of growth, going after a new class of users (fintech retail with Aave app and card, institutions with Aave Pro). While the lending infrastructure is extremely valuable and expanding with v4, the additional distribution of these apps would directly benefit the protocol and the revenues. The TAM of the traditional financial services market justifies the shift and the related investment.

In our opinion, while some more details are needed, the grant ask is proportionate to the goal and market benchmarks for crypto and traditional companies. Acquisition costs are the larger line item for growth-stage fintech companies:

  • Fintech B2C customer acquisition costs (CAC) are among the highest across industries, with 2025 benchmarks averaging roughly $1,450 for specialized Fintech/SaaS, while broader B2C apps often range between $70–$130

  • B2B and institutional acquisitions costs is even higher

By other market sources (like multiples.vc) we can estimate the global costs:

  • Ramp (pre-profit): $60M–$100M annual burn

  • Brex (growth phase): $80M+ annual opex

  • Revolut (pre-profit years): $100M+ annual operating costs

On the other hand, The current expenses for the DAO (e.g. the protocol) are in line with the market benchmarks.

Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
Lido (2026) Uniswap (2026) MakerDAO/Sky (2025 Est.)
Annual Funding Ask ~$60M for 2026 ~\$70M Uni ~$100M (including subdaos)
Primary Scope Core Dev, Node Ops, Safety Core Dev (V4), App, Card, RWA Stablecoin, SubDAOs

We also want to address the comments regarding treasury sustainability by first quickly checking revenue potential, and then quoting costs incurred by the DAO and the composition of assets held.

Regarding revenue, Aave made over $100M in 2025, mostly in reserve factor fees, and is off to a strong start in 2026 with annualized revenues of $120M, despite the broad market downturn. However, we estimate that, due to the general growth of the lending market and Aave v4 unlocking new revenue streams, we could end the year closer to $150M.

On the cost side, according to tokenLogic, current annualized costs are $141M. After this proposal, they should increase to around $190M, generating a potential shortfall between $40M and $60M that would have to be absorbed by the treasury.

Finally, the treasury has a total value of $165M, of which $50M is in stablecoins. The total ask of roughly $50.7M is 30.7% of the entire treasury.

Taking into account the revenue flow we have today, the treasury is capable, in the near term, of absorbing these costs, leaving around 3–4 years of runway. Conservatively, we are not assuming additional revenues from new product lines. The implied burn multiple (cost / revenue) would be around 1.2–1.3, which is standard for companies over the $100M revenue mark that are still in growth mode.

One more critical thing is the consequent increased treasury concentration, as the stablecoin ask alone is 42% of the DAO’s non-AAVE reserves. While this is tangential to the current topic, it is worth at least trying to properly frame the costs incurred by the DAO so far in the context of a future that puts Aave into the fintech category and not in DeFi.

The Aave DAO spent about $35M on buybacks in 2025; due to the market downturn, the current value of the almost 160,000 AAVE tokens bought back is around $17M, showing a net loss of $18M so far, an amount that is 35% of the requested budget by the lab. As already mentioned in the past in our aavenomics post, Blockworks is generally against the buybacks at this stage in Aave’s growth journey, and especially mechanically executed ones that don’t have a strategic plan and strong KPIs behind them. We believe that buybacks are not a good investment for protocols in the growth stage; given the increased revenue alignment and the graduation of Aave into the fintech category (which bears further growth multiples ahead) we believe that potentially revising this plan could help soften the impact of this proposal without touching any DAO or service provider costs. Moreover, reducing buybacks would improve treasury diversification.

We do think there is margin to improve the proposal to better set expectations for the future. We would like Aave Labs to probably outline, in greater detail, what the next few years after the approval of this proposal would look like in terms of revenue projections to better contextualise what we see not as a cost, but as an investment from the DAO.

Recommendations

While supportive of the proposal as-is, we think that a multi-year plan that clearly outlines future revenue projections, associated costs, and the ultimate financial and strategic targets that will serve as the justification for this significant investment would benefit not only current AAVE tokenholders, but prospective AAVE tokenholders that want to better understand the business forward-looking .

Even if the proposal does not jeopardize treasury, we recommend reviewing the buyback strategy in light of the increased alignment between labs, DAO and tokenholders and increased funding needs. We don’t see runway as a potential concern, but increased treasury concentration in volatile tokens requires mitigation measures.

8 Likes

Multicoin is a significant holder of $AAVE and is pleased to see Aave Labs put forth this proposal.

We believe that redirecting 100% of Aave-branded product revenue to the DAO is a meaningful and strategic shift. It moves Aave toward a cleaner, token-centric economic model. We thank Aave Labs and contributors for putting forward a comprehensive framework that attempts to reset the Aave Labs–DAO relationship in a more sustainable direction. If executed correctly, this proposal could set an important precedent not just for Aave, but for DeFi more broadly.

Initial Thoughts

We are directionally supportive of this framework. The idea that the DAO captures product-layer revenue and explicitly funds execution is strategically sound from our perspective. It reduces perceived value leakage from Aave-branded distribution surfaces and acknowledges that distribution is now a primary competitive vector in DeFi. We believe this is the correct approach.

At the same time, in our experience we’ve found that capital allocation discipline matters. The proposal allocates roughly $25M in stablecoins plus 75,000 AAVE (approximately $9M at ~$118 AAVE), with additional variable milestone grants. In aggregate, that implies economic exposure north of $40–50M, representing roughly 25–30% of total treasury. That is a substantial percentage of Aave DAO’s Treasury. Given the scale and precedent-setting nature of the funding ask, we believe the proposal should provide more detailed financials and underwriting data to substantiate the magnitude of the request.

We believe this proposal can be improved collaboratively between Aave Labs and DAO participants along the dimensions outlined below.

Ideas to Improve the Proposal

  1. Funding ask is a sizable portion of the Aave DAO Treasury: A $5M upfront allocation may be reasonable to establish momentum, but committing the full $25M in stablecoins before most initiatives are live and generating revenue risks misaligned incentives. We would welcome a phased capital deployment schedule tied to concrete launch milestones and measurable revenue targets. A clearer 12–24 month operating budget breakdown and explicit ROI framing would further strengthen the case. When roughly a quarter of treasury is being allocated, the underwriting standard should reflect that reality.

  2. The definition and verification of “100% revenue” warrants refinement: Revenue is defined as gross product revenue minus revenue sharing, rebates, subsidies, and other direct incentives. We understand that growth requires flexibility around incentives and partner agreements. However, without defined guardrails, the economic meaning of “100% revenue” can become elastic. Clear frameworks around deductible categories, transparent product-level reporting, and potentially independent P&L verification would ensure that revenue redirection is economically meaningful and free from conflicts of interest. In our opinion, the goal is not to constrain execution, but to preserve trust and alignment.

  3. Variable Grants: We believe compensation should be structured as a function of delivered economics rather than primarily milestone-based product launches. Launching products is necessary, but we view sustainable revenue generation is what ultimately matters. We believe a revenue-linked model—such as a predefined percentage of incremental net revenue over a baseline—would better align incentives. This structure preserves upside participation for Aave Labs while anchoring compensation to realized economic value.

  4. Non-Aave branded revenue? Finally, we would appreciate clarity regarding the scope of Aave Labs’ activities outside Aave-branded products. The framework focuses on Aave-branded revenue flowing to the DAO, but it is important to clarify whether Labs intends to launch non-Aave-branded products or operate revenue streams outside this agreement. Addressing this explicitly will prevent ambiguity and ensure alignment around Aave’s long-term strategic footprint.

As a side note, there has been a criticism that token value capture remains unclear even if revenue flows to the DAO. In our view, that issue is out of scope for Aave Labs to resolve in this proposal. This framework should focus on directing product revenue to the DAO. Questions around buybacks, staking yield, or fee redistribution should be addressed in a separate, DAO-originated value capture proposal. First align revenue. Then debate distribution.

Closing

We support the direction of this proposal. We believe that moving toward a token-centric, DAO-funded execution model is strategically correct and positions Aave to compete in an increasingly institutional and product-driven market.

Given the magnitude of the economic ask and its share of treasury, we believe it should be strengthened through phased capital deployment, clearer ROI framing, revenue guardrails, revenue-linked variable grants, and clarity around product scope. If refined along these lines, we would be comfortable supporting the proposal and believe it would materially strengthen Aave’s long-term positioning. We look forward to engaging constructively and working together to get this right.

Multicoin Capital Management LLC (“Multicoin”) provides investment advice to certain private fund clients (the “Fund(s)”) that own AAVE tokens discussed above and stands to gain in the event that the price of the token increases. Multicoin is not otherwise affiliated with the Aave Protocol and is in no way affiliated with Aave Labs. Neither Multicion nor the Funds hold equity in Aave Labs or any of its affiliated entities. Multicoin’s response is provided as an opinion for discussion purposes only, and should not be relied upon as the basis for an investment decision or for valuing tokens. The contents herein are not to be construed as investment, legal, business, or tax advice. You should consult your own advisors for those matters. This discussion does not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services.

7 Likes

Disclosure: I spend a few hours a week with Blockchain Capital as a venture partner but the opinions expressed here are solely my own.

It’s super exciting to see Aave Labs propose a model where they are 100% aligned economically with the DAO. I believe this creates huge additional value for the DAO and ensures that one of the best teams building in DeFi is 100% focused on making the Aave protocol successful and building the necessary technology surrounding the protocol that is needed for this. The new products they’re launching are exciting! With Aave Labs proposing to direct 100% of its revenue streams to the DAO we need to ensure their continued funding to develop the protocol.

I’ve been in crypto since 2017 and spent most of my time building Centrifuge and seeing the complexity involved in building a project to the scale that Aave has grown. Centrifuge created the first RWAs and grew TVL to $1B. As someone who’s been running a crypto startup for nine years, my honest reaction to the funding request is: this is totally in line with what I would expect. Aave’s competitors and other top DeFi protocols have raised or spent >$100M in their treasury to support the development teams:

* Morpho, a direct competitor, just raised $70M from Ribbit, a16z, Coinbase Ventures, Pantera, and others — with ~$10B in deposits, a fraction of Aave’s revenue, and no market dominance. Aave Labs is asking for less than that to operate the #1 protocol in DeFi lending with 60% market share, while giving 100% of revenue back to the DAO.

* Sky (formerly MakerDAO) operational expenses run approximately $100M per year — and that’s after a reported 61.5% reduction. In H1 2025 alone, Sky transferred 51.7M USDS and 124.8M SKY tokens across 11 Atlas budgets. The rebrand from DAI to USDS alone cost around $44M.

* Uniswap most recently raised $165M in 2022 in cash giving them a healthy budget to invest and build.

While Aave has claimed a market-leading position, this industry is still young. DeFi lending is a tiny fraction of global credit markets and we have most of the growth ahead of us. Aave Labs as a team has delivered results for years and I have no concerns that they will use this budget to contribute valuable features to the DAO. I believe underinvestin in the things that actually matter: engineering, BD & marketing — is critical. The question isn’t “is $50M a lot of money?” but “what is the cost of NOT funding Aave’s future development?” The protocols that win the next decade will be the ones that invested aggressively now.

4 Likes

This proposal is exactly what Aave needs: alignment between Aave DAO, Aave Labs, and SPs.

  1. $25m annual funding to Aave Labs makes sense
  2. 75,000 AAVE should NOT be granted unless Aave Labs commits to complete transparency regarding its current Aave holdings (Aave governance control by Aave Labs).

Aave Labs should not be granted AAVE tokens on an annual basis with a linear vesting schedule. This creates a dual problem of governance centralization and/or $AAVE sell pressure.

A more fine-tuned agreement for granting AAVE tokens, with lockups instead of linear vesting, is more aligned.

Aave Horizon and Aave App are new revenue sources with significant potential growth. Aave DAO can expect to be able to pay $25m to Aave Labs annually, without suffering shortfalls to the treasury.

1 Like

I support the direction of this proposal and will vote YAE on the TEMP CHECK stage.

However, I will vote NAY at the ARFC stage unless the following are included:

  • Three-year outlook (2026-2028) and detail for each product
  • Stronger long-term incentive alignment.

To all SPs: Please focus on each other’s strengths and work toward aligning your respective roles. Missing calls, ignoring messages, and engaging in personal attacks are unacceptable.

1 Like

Dear Aave fam,

We all stepped into DeFi with the same fire in our hearts :

  • Total freedom over our funds,
  • The end of middlemen stealing our future,
  • True decentralization where every voice matters and value flows back to those who truly believe.

We gave everything for this.
Sleepless nights, hard-earned money risked, unwavering faith when almost no one else believed.
Aave was our dream turned into code: a protocol governed by us, revenues feeding the community and not a select few.

Today that dream is shaking.
The tension between Aave Labs and the DAO hurts deeply because it strikes at the very core of what we fought for. Who really controls this? Who really gets the value we created together?
The token dropping, trust fraying, accusations flying… it hurts because it’s our shared story cracking apart. And yet we’re still here.
We’ve all invested so much money, time, emotion, that we simply cannot afford to lose it all now. Not in this chaotic crypto market, not with unpredictable regulations looming, not against relentless competition that never sleeps.
Everyone has their own clear vision of the right path: more immediate decentralization, more resources to scale fast, more transparency…
That’s normal. That’s healthy.
But what matters right now is that we find a compromise that preserves what’s essential :
Aave must survive and thrive, together.

Three simple, fast steps to come out stronger:

  1. Transfer IP, brand, and domains to a DAO-controlled foundation → real community ownership.

  2. Give Labs a clear, audited budget unlocked only on concrete milestones (V4 live, TVL growth, real adoption) → reward the work without a blank check.

  3. Launch a small, inclusive working group right away (Labs + major delegates + strong community voices) to turn this into an AIP proposal within the next few weeks.

We don’t need to agree on everything.
We just need to remember why we started. We wanted to build something bigger than any one of us.

@stani As W.B. Yeats wrote:
“But I, being poor, have only my dreams;
I have spread my dreams under your feet;
Tread softly because you tread on my dreams.”

Let’s not trample what we built all together.
Let’s talk, negotiate, vote, and make sure “Aave will just win”, for real, for all of us and for everyone out there.

7 Likes

Finally less gaslighting from AAVE labs.

All that “it doesnt matter” blah blah over strange christmas voting.

Thanks for this proposal, I’m in favor of it!

Just want at the same time share the concern that, in this framework, who is representing the interest of token holders? The revenues flows back to the DAO but some DAO’s member seem to be organization with their own agenda, promoting a deceptive story-telling, not representing the interest of token holders.

marc zeller makes a HUGE point in his response to this Labs proposal

read the fine print
revenue as defined in this proposal:

gross product revenue - (partner revenue sharing +
revenue rebates + revenue subsidies + additional direct user incentives).

in the proposal, Labs says:

"Labs retains discretion to redirect product inflows (revenue) directly to user incentives.”

I.E.:

labs can unilaterally classify any product revenue they want as “user incentives” and reduce/eliminate revenue share as they see fit

as marc states, 100% revenue needs to be a definition the dao can control BEFORE ANY DEAL IS DONE

8 Likes

Stani and AAVE Labs’ shamelessness and greed never disappoint. They want to squeeze every last penny out of the DAO; can’t you see that? Are you unable to distinguish right from wrong, or are you in cahoots with AAVE Labs?

1、AAVE Labs’ power must be supervised and limited. Their voting rights should be completely restricted; otherwise, any vote is meaningless and will only continue to exploit the DAO.

We have seen that in recent votes, AAVE Labs, relying on its more than 600,000 AAVE tokens, almost completely controlled the voting results. Given AAVE Labs and Stani’s previous shameless actions, the current discussion is meaningless without restrictions on AAVE Labs’ voting rights. A dictator can issue any proposal. If the DAO doesn’t have enough votes to veto a proposal, Stani can easily demand that all of the DAO’s revenue go to AAVE Labs. He can always find more reasons to ask for more money, just like their previous shameless acts.

2、Since AAVE Labs and Stani continue their greed, we shouldn’t wait for them to have a change of heart or a change of heart. The AAVE DAO must have the power to veto and replace AAVE Labs and Stani.

I believe everyone is fed up with AAVE Labs and Stani’s behavior. The DAO must unite everyone and have genuine veto power over AAVE Labs and Stani’s proposals, even if AAVE Labs has the upper hand in the vote. It should also be able to veto proposals or restrict fund redemptions. The reason AAVE Labs and Stani compromised today is because their actual interests and reputation were affected; they certainly expect to take 100% of the DAO’s profits.

3、AAVE Labs’ proposal is an option for the DAO, not a necessity. Lens can die, but AAVE and the DAO must survive.

We acknowledge the significant contributions AAVE Labs and Stani have made to AAVE, but BGD Labs’ V3 version also seems quite good. AAVE Labs didn’t contribute much to this version, and it’s well known that Lens failed. If AAVE Labs leads AAVE to its destruction, should we blindly follow its lead? The DAO should have its own strategic decision-making capabilities, not just do whatever AAVE Labs wants.

4、AAVE Labs’ $50 million proposal, which seeks to take one-third of the DAO’s total assets, is unacceptable predation. The DAO should reject any inappropriate expenditures.

Clearly, AAVE Labs and Stani are prioritizing profit over the DAO’s interests, leading to these conflicts. We could all be busy with other things instead of posting here. The $20 million paid for AAVE V4 is already astronomical, yet we haven’t seen any deliverables. The DAO’s funds come from every AAVE user; we must manage these funds carefully. We can’t just give AAVE Labs whatever it wants. If Stani had a choice, they would definitely want to take everyone’s AAVE.

5、Every penny taken from the AAVE DAO by any service provider, including AAVE Labs, should have a corresponding outcome. This is basic financial management and accountability to everyone.

Similar to ACI’s annual summary, any service provider requesting funding should clearly state the specific amount requested, the expected results, or the strategic significance. The DAO will analyze and negotiate based on the actual performance.

6、Continuing to reward AAVE Labs with AAVE tokens is unacceptable; stablecoins should be used instead.

Rewarding AAVE to AAVE Labs will give them more voting power and create selling pressure in the market.

7、AAVE V4 should have a smooth transition; do not force users to migrate.

V3 is currently working well. V3 and V4 must run in parallel. Have at least a basic respect for the $50 billion in assets users hold in AAVE. Users should have the freedom to choose, not be forced to. If the V4 code has problems and user funds are stolen, are Stani and AAVE Labs willing to bear the user losses?

2 Likes

The core vision for Aave is to build a financial powerhouse rivalling some of the largest financial institutions in the world on open, permissionless rails. We are only a few years into this decades-long journey, and Aave has already become the undisputed market leader in DeFi, having gained a dominant lead in the crypto-native market; essentially, Aave is currently the biggest fish in what is a relatively small pond. However, the total prize up for grabs is all of finance, and Aave is now graduating from that pond to a shark-filled ocean where the competition isn’t just other DeFi protocols, but giants like Revolut, JP Morgan, Fidelity, BlackRock, and Robinhood.

The Vision

Stepping away from the governance discussion for a moment, the most compelling element of this proposal is its coherent, grand vision of a world powered by onchain finance. The pathway to challenging the largest financial institutions in the world is clear: to capture the “blue ocean” RWA and traditional finance market, such as fixed-rate lending, OTC lending, and debt trading, and bring them onchain under one unified Aave umbrella. Tangible products like Aave v4, Aave App, Aave Card, and Horizon are already either in production or very close to being launched to help capture this opportunity. Furthermore, an institutional product like the Aave ETF is one that only Aave Labs can feasibly take forward given its internal capabilities and the significant legal and regulatory engagement required, making it a very positive development to expand the reach of the Aave ecosystem and token to a broader audience.

Aave V3 to V4

Regarding the transition from Aave v3 to Aave v4, it is essential to recognise that products must constantly be improved and innovation does not stop, especially in this early stage of the protocol’s development (8 years is a very short time period). Aave v4 builds upon v3 and can ostensibly do everything v3 does, while enabling even greater functionality; this is the hallmark of progressive innovation, and if Aave wants to scale the pinnacle of finance, innovation must be embraced rather than pushed back against. We would ask Aave Labs to publish a technical paper addressing how v4 builds on v3 and expanding upon the analyses provided by Chaos Labs, TokenLogic, LlamaRisk, and other service providers.

It is clear that Aave Labs recognizes the value provided by v3 and is not proposing a sudden move to v4. Instead, the v3 Maintenance Plan reinforces safety and represents a measured approach to trialing v4 while ensuring Aave does not lose the benefits of v3, which is the right approach for such a significant protocol change.

Aave Brand Governance

Additionally, regarding Aave Brand Governance, establishing clear licensing processes and a Foundation or similar entity is the right path forward. As there is already broad alignment on this point, there is no need to comment further.

100% of Aave Product Revenues to the DAO

The most significant point here is the direction of 100% of Aave product revenues to the DAO, which is a novel move in the space that very clearly aligns incentives between all parties. The funding approach makes sense given this paradigm shift, and the amount requested is not absurd or extractive. In fact, the funding may even be too low given that Aave aims to compete with FinTech and finance behemoths in the immediate term. Aave is a high-growth scale-up, and trying to minimise spending or allocate a perfectly optimal level of funding for growth is almost impossible with the goal of achieving high growth.

In early-stage businesses, capital allocation is akin to taking many shots on goal. You might score with some and miss with others, but the point is to allocate capital as reasonably and at scale as possible to grow the pie and win the market. Therefore, the question of whether the funding ask is reasonable is answered with an unequivocal yes. Comparables provided by @Blockworks.Advisory show that companies like Ramp, Brex, and Revolut all had significantly higher burn rates of $60-100M, while protocols like Lido, Uniswap, and Sky all have higher budgets than what Aave Labs is requesting. We recommend reading the full Blockworks comment to understand why this ask is more than reasonable, especially considering the revenue that can be unlocked by new products and Aave v4 spokes, though we think it is fair to clearly define net revenue and its components.

Governance Concerns

Regarding governance concerns, trying to pick apart the “bundling” of different elements in a proposal where there is broad alignment will only lead to stasis, paralysis, and extreme operational and execution inefficiency. The goal is to compete with extremely well-capitalized and operationally efficient traditional firms. This proposal clearly demonstrates that incentives will be aligned between Labs and the DAO from here onwards. To ensure excellent execution, the DAO and contributors need to place trust in Labs, especially given the clear vision, the product roadmap, and the fact that feedback from discussions over the last few months has been absorbed.

Conclusion

While debate over certain elements like the definition of net revenue is healthy, and we would welcome a technical paper outlining the benefits of v4 over v3, the funding ask is financially very reasonable and ensures complete incentive alignment. Overall, we think this proposal is hugely positive and bullish for the Aave ecosystem.

5 Likes

First, we’d like to say thank you to everyone who has provided feedback on the Aave Will Win Framework proposal. The Temp Check process is designed to gather this kind of input so we can refine the proposal before moving to a formal ARFC vote after the Temp Check. In this post we’ll address the main, recurring questions raised in the thread so far.

Note: We will continue to gather feedback and follow up with responses throughout this process.

What is the difference between the Primary Grant and the Growth/Development Grants?

The Primary Grant of $25 million in stablecoins is to fund the ongoing cost of operating, maintaining, and advancing the Aave protocol, while also enabling continued innovation at the product layer. This includes ongoing protocol development and maintenance, research into future protocol versions, application security, ecosystem and integration support, governance implementation, legal and compliance coordination, operational infrastructure, and the other core functions required to ensure the protocol remains secure, competitive, and resilient.

Importantly, V4 introduces greater flexibility at the protocol level, enabling more opinionated product decisions to be embedded directly within the architecture. This represents a meaningful evolution in how Aave can compete, differentiate and monetise. However, that flexibility also increases the scope of ongoing work. Designing, implementing, managing, and iterating on these product-level decisions within the protocol requires sustained technical, operational, and strategic resources over time.

In addition, it’s important to build infrastructure and tooling around V4. Responsibility for building and maintaining that infrastructure would also need to be covered within this scope.

These costs are not dependent on the launch of any single new product. They represent the continuous effort required to run the protocol responsibly, expand its capabilities, and execute effectively at the product layer.

The 75,000 AAVE is separate from the operational budget. It is exclusively for employee alignment and retention. Hiring the best talent the industry has to offer requires compensation packages that compete with fintech, CeFi, and pre-TGE token offers. These tokens are structured with long-term vesting schedules, which is standard practice for long-term employee retention. Most importantly, under this framework any talent hired by Labs is working for the Aave Protocol and completely aligned towards growing it.

The Growth/Development Grants, totaling $17.5 million, are launch-based payments tied to specific new products. Each new product launch expands operational costs and requires additional spend, particularly during the go-to-market period. These products are competing in highly competitive verticals where user acquisition, marketing, distribution partnerships, and ongoing development and improvements are expensive. The grants cover these costs.

They are structured as separate payments, with six month streaming because they are contingent on delivery. If a product does not launch, the grant is not paid. Given they are streamed, the DAO also has oversight on these grants and can decide whether they are being used effectively.

We’d also like to note that the $10-30 million in annualized revenue from the CoW Swap integration is a day-one contribution from a single product. We will be adding more features here to drive more volume and fees with the release of Aave Pro interface including automated leverage, trigger and limit orders, and more. The proposal also directs 100% of the revenue from several additional product lines.

Why does the proposal request AAVE tokens, and what are the selling restrictions?

As mentioned above, the 75,000 AAVE tokens are for employee alignment and retention. Aave Labs competes for talent against fintechs, CeFi companies, and pre-TGE startups that all offer equity or token-based incentives. To hire and retain the best people in the industry, Aave Labs needs to offer compensation packages on par with these competitors.

The token grants are structured with long-term vesting schedules to support retention and long-term alignment. This means the tokens are distributed to team members gradually over time and are not intended to fund operational expenses. The two-year linear unlock at the DAO level flows into these longer-term individual vesting schedules, reinforcing long-term alignment and reducing short-term sell pressure.

Regarding governance, Aave Labs will not use any AAVE tokens received as part of this funding package to vote in Aave governance. The only time these would ever be eligible for governance use is when they are no longer in Aave Labs’ custody, which can be easily monitored by the DAO.

Is this budget justified? Why is it substantial?

While building in DeFi does have structural cost advantages, going after the mass market and competing for consumer and enterprise attention is a different game entirely, and the costs there are similar regardless of the underlying rails. User acquisition, marketing, partnerships, and distribution are expensive at consumer scale. Major fintechs spend hundreds of millions of dollars a year on sales and marketing alone. The benefit of this, however, is that they also make billions of dollars per year from this spend. Many fintechs have multiple revenue streams that bring in $100M+ per year.

The reason this matters now is that DeFi’s TVL peaked in 2025 at roughly the same level it reached in 2021, around $205 to $225 billion. New capital is not flowing into DeFi in large amounts. Aave captured a bigger share of the overall market during that period, but the market itself has not grown meaningfully. Without a strategy to bring new users, new collateral types, and new revenue sources onchain, the protocol risks stagnating as does the DAO’s revenue. This budget would aim to fund that strategy.

Can you provide more transparency on Aave Labs’ internal structure and cost allocation?

Aave Labs currently has 90 staff members, all focusing their efforts on Aave. The team is organized across several functions, with the majority focused on engineering and product development. A high-level breakdown of spend covers protocol and product engineering, go-to-market and growth, business development, legal and compliance, application security, and operations.

100% of the $25m budget funding will be used for product development, growth and support for Aave. To deliver the product launches and growth strategy, we estimate the $25m is split across the following:

  • Production and Protocol Development: ~65%

  • GTM, Marketing, and Business Development/Engineering: ~10% + Growth/Development Grant budgets

  • Security and Legal: ~15%

  • Operations: ~10%

Additionally, Aave Labs will not be working on any non-Aave revenue streams in line with the token-centric model.

We’d like to also note that Stani takes only a minimum wage salary as the legal requirement, and does not receive AAVE tokens.

Why are the Growth/Development Grant amounts similar for different products

The grant amounts for Aave App ($5M), Aave Pro ($5M), Aave Card ($5M), and Aave Kit ($2.5M) are based on their estimated go-to-market costs. When compared to the request to build Aave V4, or other protocols, it’s important to note that the DAO typically takes on the cost of the protocol’s go-to-market expenses as well. So these aren’t just the cost to build each product.

Launching consumer-facing products like the Aave App, Aave Card, and Aave Pro requires significant investment in user acquisition, marketing, and distribution partnerships. Aave Kit has a more targeted go-to-market (e.g. fintechs and institutions) and maintenance strategy and therefore a lower grant amount.

These are good-faith estimates and on the low end of what we believe will be effective. The use of these funds will be detailed in our quarterly reports to the DAO, which will include key performance indicators for each product. As streamed amounts, these totals would also come with DAO oversight. We will also include a commitment that any funds that are not spent will roll forward and be considered part of any future funding requests.

Why do the Growth/Development Grants cost more than V4 development?

The V4 budget of $12 million covers building the protocol itself. It does not include funding for ongoing growth, maintenance, or continued improvements to V4 after launch. For context, the DAO has historically funded V3 growth separately through incentive programs and partnerships, and may choose to do the same for V4.

Building a production-ready protocol and bringing consumer products to market are different cost profiles. Protocol development is relatively low capex but also low margin, since protocol fees flow directly to the DAO. Consumer-facing products require higher upfront investment in go-to-market and user acquisition, but they also create higher margin revenue opportunities that would go to the DAO under this framework.

The Growth/Development Grants cover go-to-market across four net new product lines, including user acquisition, marketing, and ongoing security, development, and maintenance. These are the costs of competing in crowded verticals, and they typically exceed the engineering investment. The DAO has historically funded growth separately from development, and this proposal follows the same logic.

What are the revenue deductions and how would it be limited?

As we point out in the proposal, “Revenue is defined as gross product revenue earned by Aave Labs, minus any direct revenue sharing paid by Aave Labs to external partners including revenue rebates, revenue subsidies, revenue sharing arrangements and any additional direct user incentives.”

These funds are not for salaries or operational costs and will be used exclusively to grow the underlying product. We will disclose additional user incentives spending in our quarterly updates and are open to defining a maximum revenue incentive spending percentage in future product-specific proposals.

Some existing partnerships include revenue share arrangements between Aave and the respective counterparty. In certain cases, a percentage of fees is passed directly to the partner at the integration level, meaning that portion of revenue is never received and therefore cannot be passed through to the DAO. In other cases, partners may receive rebates to satisfy minimum revenue-share commitments, or a defined share of vault yield fees.

These arrangements reflect standard commercial structures designed to secure valuable integrations and distribution. They represent negotiated trade-offs based on the strategic and economic benefits the partnership brings to the protocol.

Similarly, products like the Aave App or Aave Card carry transaction processing costs that scale directly with user activity. If these products are successful, those costs could grow significantly over time, potentially exceeding the size of the grant request itself.

In a traditional business model, these variable costs are incorporated into the fees charged to users to ensure the product remains profitable on a marginal basis. If instead all gross revenue from these fees is routed directly to the DAO, Aave Labs would still have to pay the growing costs, which could become very expensive, very quickly if adoption is strong.

This also applies to user incentives, such as cashback offers on the Aave Card, which may be necessary to drive adoption and remain competitive. Without the flexibility to fund these incentives at the transaction level, we risk not having sufficient resources to meet those obligations if the product scales successfully.

In summary, these outflows are not regular operating costs but are externally revenue-related payments.

We are committed to transparency around these outflows and how they evolve over time. Revenue reporting, including these revenue outflows, will be reported on the DAO. Most of the revenue deductions can be tied to independently, public and verifiable metrics such as transaction volumes and TVL. We will also work with the DAO on a solution to have a third party independently verify this data. However, we need the flexibility to make product-level decisions on fees and incentives to ensure fast execution, sustainable unit economics, and the ability to responsibly scale successful products.

Why would we shut down V3 in favor of V4 and is the timeline reasonable?

V4 is a strict superset of V3. At launch, it will serve V3 users with higher capital efficiency and more advanced features.

V3 configurations can be replicated within V4 where needed, preserving existing market experiences, while V4 will expand into new, currently inaccessible areas to drive additional demand.

That said, there is zero rush. V3 is stable, battle-tested, and will continue to be actively maintained and serviced until users are comfortable migrating to V4 at their own pace. Some of that migration will happen naturally as new partnerships and integrations are built on top of V4. The timeline proposed in the framework is open to discussion, and we want to emphasize that the migration can be very slow and steady. A separate proposal will follow for V4 protocol activation, and that vote will focus on the readiness of the code and launch parameters.

For similar reasons stated above in other questions in this response, we do think it’s important that Aave embrace and pursue innovation, which historically the DAO also agreed with voting to fund V4. So that’s why we believe it’s important to ratify the strategic direction behind V4.

27 Likes

First of all, it is truly commendable that Aave Labs has re established a strong communication channel with the DAO and the community, addressing concerns one by one and taking ownership of the process. This communication effort alone shows that the intent is a genuine search for a solution.

A brief summary of this week proves we are on the right track. The moment the impression of a unified vision between the DAO and Labs was given to the market, we saw a 30% price surge followed immediately by the Grayscale S1 ETF filing. This is no coincidence. The market and institutional investors do not want a fragmented structure; they want to see a true DeFi powerhouse united under the “Aave Will Win” vision. This synergy is the fuel that will transform Aave from just a protocol into the undisputed leader of decentralized finance and the backbone of the future financial system.

Your clarification that the transition from V3 to V4 will not be forced, and that V3 will continue to be supported in parallel through a natural migration process, has resolved the community’s biggest technical anxiety. Sustaining innovation without risking current cash flow is the only logical path. However, if we want to pass this vote with “full consensus” and 100% acceptance, there are still three main friction points on the table that need resolving.

The first and most debated issue is the token grant. The request for 75,000 AAVE is perceived as quite high given current market conditions. Even though it is pledged that these tokens will not be used in voting, the concentration of such a large supply in a single entity creates valid anxiety within the community regarding governance balances. Reducing the amount to the 35-40,000 range and tying it to a 4-year schedule would eliminate this concern of “latent influence” and fully restore trust.

The second issue is the $25 million operational budget. For a team of 90 people plus overheads, this figure might seem reasonable today when looked at on a per-headcount basis. However, we need technical and financial clarity here: Is this $25 million a “Capex” spike specific to the heavy lifting of V4 development, or is it a permanent “Opex” baseline forever? Once the heavy development is done and V4 is stable, shouldn’t this budget decrease in subsequent years? Our proposal is that this budget should not be static but dynamic, adjusting according to the project’s phases. The DAO already supports development; we just want to know that the tap has a flow control mechanism.

Third and finally is transparency. The DNA of DeFi is built on the principle of “don’t trust, verify.” Your statement that you are open to oversight by an independent body is a great step. Ensuring that this audit is not just on paper, but that expense items and revenue deductions (the net revenue calculation) are verified by independent auditors with both on-chain and off-chain data, is the cornerstone of this deal.

In summary, Aave Labs is on the bridge of this ship, and the DAO is in the engine room and ownership. With small revisions on these three points (Token Amount, Dynamic Budget, Transparent Audit), let’s achieve 100% consensus and spend our energy not on convincing each other, but on conquering the vast blue ocean of finance out there.

3 Likes

hmmmm… So @EzR3aL was right all along about those numbers. huh.. hmmm…..

Joke aside, I’m glad all of Aave is moving forward. This proposal feels like a reasonable step in the right direction. Labs gets the runway and flexibility needed to execute at scale, and the DAO gets clearer alignment and value capture from Aave-branded products.

That said, in my personal opinion, those numbers will definitely need more adjustment and clarity, as many comments here already point out. Also, Aave v3 is still expected to be around at least through 2030, with @bgdlabs leading some innovation there. Already Umbrella new update with it own oracle will be sweet thanks by @ChaosLabs and @LlamaRisk .

Overall, this proposal feels directionally positive, and I’m glad we’re ending the week on a good note.

Great work, everyone. Aave will win.

7 Likes

Thanks for the detailed reply. I appreciate the improved tone and community engagement. However, we’re still avoiding the elephant in the room.

The Core Governance Problem:
How will you address the voting power centralization issue? According to multiple forensic analyses, Labs and the founder control 600K+ voting power (likely significantly more). This has never been officially disclosed.

Why This Matters:
This concentration creates hyper-centralization regardless of whatever AAVE tokens you’re requesting in this proposal. You currently possess sufficient power to:
∙ Pass any proposal unilaterally
∙ Veto any community initiative

What’s Needed Before Progress:

  1. Complete voting power disclosure - all Labs/founder-controlled wallets

  2. Clear governance policy - limiting concentration and requiring transparency

    Without addressing this fundamental issue, we’re just rearranging deck chairs.

5 Likes

Additionally, I’m proposing a 50MM in stables and 50MM in $AAVE as a “Time-Weighted” Divident to all token holders. I mean, why not

8 Likes

Great to finally see this proposal. Whilst definitely very expensive for the dao it would bring the dao and Aavelabs into collaborative alignment moving forwards. I would like to see some forecasts of revenue for the new apps to get an idea of the revenue that could be expected.

1 Like

The DAO has been and should be controlled by tokenholders. 1 token = 1 vote has worked great for all these years. We don’t need a tyranny of the minority.

1 Like