[ARFC]: Deploy aCRV & CRV to veCRV

title: [ARFC] Deploy aCRV & CRV to veCRV
author: @llamaxyz - TokenLogic & @Dydymoon
date: 2023.02.09

Simple Summary

This proposal presents Aave with two options for managing the CRV holding, with @Llamaxyz recommending to lock the CRV for veCRV via Curve Finance.


Aave currently holds approximately 637k CRV across Ethereum and Polygon networks. Llama has been looking at potential sources for CRV yield and governance influence. This proposal presents one high yield and one governance focused strategy for consideration:

Option 1) Locking CRV on Curve for veCRV
Option 2) Staking CRV on Yearn for st-yCRV

Option 1) includes locking CRV, participating in Curve Finance governance, and voting to direct incentives to pools of Aave’s choosing. veCRV could be used to boost adoption of GHO, yield on staked aToken reserves, and yield on Protocol Owned Liquidity, to name a few potential use cases.

Option 2) focuses on yield, forgoes governance influence (participating in votes), and presents a higher-yielding investment strategy that, over time, will lead to Aave own more CRV relative to Option 1).

To vote NAE is to deposit CRV in Aave v3 on the network it was earned. This represents the “do nothing” approach.

A Snapshot vote presenting the two options will determine how Aave will proceed. Each option has varying degrees of complexity to implement, with Option 1) being the most difficult in a decentralized way, but more closely aligned with Aave’s GHO and staked aToken direction.


Aave currently holds 639k of CRV across Ethereum and Polygon networks. The vast majority, 613.5k, was earned as interest in the form of aCRV. 19.7k was received from the excess debt swap contract. 5.8k is also held on Polygon RFs.

To support Aave in choosing how best to manage the CRV holding, Llama presents two high-level strategies to choose between.

Option 1) Lock CRV for veCRV via Curve Finance


The Curve Finance emission schedule is an automated program governing the minting and distribution of all CRV tokens via on-chain voting by veCRV holders. The longer the CRV is locked for, the more veCRV and voting power is obtained.

veCRV are not transferable and have a decay on the veToken’s balances, which means that the voting power decreases over time if the position is not max-locked. To maintain the maximum benefits, the veCRV holder needs to recommit to the 4 year lock. (1 CRV locked 4 years = 1 veCRV, locked 1 year = 0.25 veCRV etc)

  • Gauge-weight Influence
    Voting to influence how CRV emissions are distributed across different liquidity pools. The votes happen every week on-chain. Voting rights can not be delegated.

  • Governance Influence
    Voting on governance proposals. These proposals require an on-chain vote. Voting rights can not be delegated.

  • veBoost
    Locking CRV earns a boost of up to 2.5x the rewards for providing liquidity up to a certain limit on Curve Finance.

  • Protocol Fees
    50% of all trading fees are sold for 3CRV (stable) and distributed to CRV lockers.

veCRV Yield

Depending upon how Aave seeks to manage the veCRV holdings, there are several ways to earn yield that offer varying levels of return. The below outlines the key revenue source derived from veCRV’s utility.

  • Protocol Fees
    3CRV fees depends on the trading volume (Swap fee: 0.67% APR)

  • veBoost
    This can be utilized if Aave decides to deploy funds into Curve Pools and stake the receipt token within Curve Finance’s gauges. Boosting enables 2.5x the returns to be earned (up to a certain deposit size) and then reduces with additional deposits. Aave can opt to sell all or a portion of veBoost.
    An alternative use case is for Aave to sell the boost into a secondary market. At the time of writing, the lowest price on veCRV boost on Warden is currently 0.00001 CRV/veCRV/week, or effectively 0.05% APR.

  • Bribes
    This involves Aave selling the gauge voting influence. The yield derived from this strategy varies greatly over time and requires continual updating for optimal returns. Last week, the average cost was ~$0.0042/veCRV vote/week. This is effectively 19.7% APR. Aave can opt to sell all of the gauge influence or a portion of its veCRV for rewards.

Aave will always retain the Protocol Fee revenue stream as the veCRV holding is non-transferrable. Aave can utilize the veBoost and Gauge influence to boost the returns on its own liquidity positions, or sell all or a portion of it into secondary markets.

The primary advantage of veCRV is being able to optimize the yield while controlling the voting power, and other underlying benefits without restriction.

veCRV Strategy

This strategy focuses on utilizing the governance influence of veCRV to Aave’s benefit. How the veCRV position is to be managed is fluid and subject to a future forum publication and discussion. At a high level, there is the ability to use the Collector Contract or multisig, depending if the community intends to optimize for yield or having control by governance.

All available aCRV on mainnet is to be redeemed and all CRV, (633k at time of writing) shall be deposited into Curve Finance’s vote-escrowed contract for four years and periodically relocked to retain the maximum voting power. All future earned/acquired CRV will periodically be added to the vote-escrowed contract until governance decides otherwise.

Aave will then able to use the veCRV with the main benefits mentioned below:

  • Participate in gauge votes
  • Participate in Curve Finance governance votes
  • Receive Boost on Liquidity Positions
  • Earn Curve Finance protocol fees

veCRV Position Overview

Locking all CRV for the maximum duration, Aave would receive ~633k veCRV representing 0.12% of veCRV voting supply. With a CRV emission schedule of 3,727M per week, Aave would influence the distribution of ~4,355 CRV/week, or $4,620/week. ($240,300/year with CRV priced at $1.06). This will reduce in line with CRV’s emission schedule, which is to be revised lower from 3.727M to 3,142M CRV/week in mid-August 2023.

There are several strategies that can be explored. Some, but not all, are shown below:

  • Stake a liquidity position in Curve’s gauges and boost rewards (up to x2.5)
  • Stake a liquidity position and offer rewards for veBoost + gauge influence to amplify returns
    • Potential for combined GHO launch and Treasury Management strategy
  • Actively participate in veBoost and gauge voting influence secondary markets
    • Generating $2,100/week on average at the time of writing
  • Help sustain the Safety Module yield
    • Future proposal being developed

The boost amount received depends on the value of the funds deposited and the relative sizing of the veCRV holding. Boost can be used directly on the Collector Contract, but considering the amounts of available funds, the boost is unlikely to be sufficient to boost all of Aave’s positions in Curve Liquidity Pools. Therefore, it is likely any treasury strategies will be a mix of both depositing into Curve gauges directly or via Convex Finance.

The strategy/direction Aave chooses will be determined by Snapshot votes. In addition, separate to the above, potential GHO launch strategies could include renting additional veCRV voting influence and veBoost from other veCRV holders. Aave having a core veCRV holding of its own would form the foundation of such a strategy.

If Aave elects to proceed with this option, then Llama will publish another forum post outlining options for how the governance and gauge vote participation could be administered.

Option 2) Staking CRV on Yearn for st-yCRV

Option 2) maximizes revenue generation but forgoes the ability to actively participate in Curve Finance governance. The current yield on this strategy is currently 39.29% and is likely to reduce by ~5.72% if the mega boost is removed. The st-yCRV holding would be held in the Ethereum Collector Contract.

This strategy involves depositing CRV into Yearn Finance’s yCRV and then staking for st-yCRV. st-yCRV accrues CRV by optimizing for yield and compounding returns over time.

An overview of the strategy is shown below:

  • Current st-yCRV APR: 39.29%
    • 4.98% Curve Admin Fees
    • 28.59% gauge voting bribes
    • 5.72% mega boost
  • Aave can unstake and swap yCRV at any time
  • 1.95x boost on Curve Admin Fees (4.98% APR)
  • st-yCRV gauge weight power is utilized to maximize bribes
  • Yearn Finance earns a 10% performance fee

st-yCRV is staked yCRV and is designed by Yearn Finance to be a ‘set and forget’ yield optimized position for yCRV users. There are two primary yield sources:

  • Admin Fees
    Every week,veCRV holders earn weekly “admin fees” from Curve Protocol. Staked yCRV is where 100% of admin fees earned by Yearn’s veCRV positions are sent and auto-compounded into more yCRV.

  • Bribes
    For all the yCRV within st-yCRV, 1 veCRV worth of vote influence will be used to vote in favour of the Curve gauge which optimizes bribe revenue for st-yCRV holders. Bribes collected from these votes are allocated as supplemental yield to st-yCRV holders.

st-yCRV uses a Yearn v2 vault to perform the auto compounding strategy that sells 3CRV and some claimed bribes into yCRV.

With 633k CRV, Aave could own ~633k yCRV, which can be staked for 563k st-yCRV, representing approximately 2.61% of the st-yCRV supply, [7].

By deploying CRV into the yCRV vault and staking, Aave is electing to pursue a maximum yield strategy that will accelerate the rate at which CRV is earned relative to holding aCRV. If the intent is to maximize the veCRV holding for a particular date in the future, then this strategy is preferred relative to Option 2). However, there is a dependency of there being sufficient liquidity to swap yCRV to CRV when unwinding this position. If liquidity is thin, then unwinding may become a lengthy process or Aave may incur noticeable price impact when exchanging yCRV for CRV.

There are several risks with y-stCRV detailed below:

  • Dependency upon yCRV DEX liquidity for swapping yCRV to CRV when exiting the position
  • The MegaBoost provided by Yearn Finance, 1M yCRV to boost the yield (30k yCRV Weekly) 5.72% APR will likely be removed at some time in the future causing the APR to fall
  • Migration of yveCRV/yvboost

Depositing yCRV into the lp-yCRV pool was considered, however, this is more complex to execute and maintain for marginal additional yield. The trade-off between complexity and additional yield favors the simpler implementation of st-yCRV.

NAE - aCRV on v3 Liquidity Pools

To vote NAE involves Aave holding all CRV positions in the form of aCRV.

All CRV is to be migrated/deposited into Aave v3 on the respective network and held as aCRV. In order to achieve this, CRV must first be listed on Aave v3 Ethereum. The only smart contract exposure is the Aave protocol and this strategy best represents the “do nothing” approach versus either optimizing for governance influence with yield, Option 1), or outright CRV yield, Option 2).


To help with the decision making, the table below presents some pros and cons of each approach.

veCRV has an immediate impact on the Aave ecosystem whilst st-yCRV is a longer term, higher return strategy that compounds over time.

Llama suggests Option 1) to focus on accumulating active voting power and enabling Aave to determine how to manage the position.

We are particularly interested in creating an Aave aToken liquidity pool and explore what can be done to support GHO and staked aTokens when more details emerge around those upgrades. In our opinion, Option 2) has several significant unknowns which can impact the success of the strategy.


Depending upon the outcome of the Snapshot, Llama will perform either of the following after the Snapshot has been performed:

Option 1) Lock CRV for veCRV via Curve Finance

Step 1)

Llama will prepare a governance forum publication presenting options for how Aave will manage the veCRV holding. Based upon this discussion, the address which will hold veCRV will be determined. This proposal will also determine what functions are added to the Collector Contract and/or permissions are granted to a multisig to administer.

Step 2)

On Aave’s behalf, Llama shall seek permission to deposit CRV via a smart contract into Curve Finance’s voter escrow contract. This is to be performed via Curve Finances governance process and will involve Curve Finance approving adding the Ethereum Address determined by Aave to the voter-escrow whitelist.

Step 3)

Upon Curve Finance whitelisting the Aave address, a new proposal will be submitted which summarizes redeeming, transferring and deploying the CRV to veCRV. This proposal will detail all the implementation details decided upon in Step 1) and will determine how Aave will manage the position. At this point, Aave will have a veCRV holding and a philosophy for managing the holding. This proposal will detail how Aave’s aCRV revenue streams, across various networks, are to be converted to veCRV over time.

Llama expects to share an Ethereum Treasury strategy for discussion in the coming weeks. This will likely include an allocation to Curve Finance liquidity pools and potentially include the creation of a new Aave v3 aToken pool. Deploying capital to earn yield and be managed by the address holding the veCRV position comes after alignment on how to manage the position and creation of the vCRV holding.

Option 2) Staking CRV on Yearn for st-yCRV

Step 1)

All aCRV would be redeemed for CRV, then all CRV would be deposited into the yCRV vault and staked for st-yCRV. The st-yCRV will be held within the Ethereum Collector Contract.

Step 2)

This proposal will detail how Aave’s aCRV revenue streams, across various networks, are to be converted to st-yCRV over time.

Aave reserves the ability to pivot from either strategy’s direction at a later point in time.

Next Steps

This forum post will remain in the discussion phase until the 19th February when a Snapshot will be created, with voting commencing on the 20th February.


Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.


complete ACI support for this proposal, Let’s put the CRV at work and increase our synergies with Curve.

That being said no support at all on st-yCRV, the whole point is to be able to support Aave related pools have some strategic usage of the veCRV holdings.


@Llamaxyz + co is there any reason that StakeDAO’s liquid locker solution (sdCRV) isn’t being considered? It would allow for full ability to influence gauges as if holding veCRV, while still retaining liquidity.


If we have it [CRV] let’s use it to its maximum potential. Supportive of locking for veCRV

One question about the following:

How will Aave approach voting with these vote-escrowed tokens if the DAO chooses a more active participation strategy? Twelve basis points of the voting supply are substantial.


Agree with that. Why not using sdCRV though? I don’t see it on the list, but it lets users vote as they whish on both governance proposals and gauge votes, so I think it makes sense.
Compared to locking directly on Curve, the main difference would be:
1/ You stay fairly liquid (sdCRV has the best track record in terms of peg maintenance amongst veCRV wrappers)
2/ You receive additional yield compared to normal veCRV: boosted 3CRV yield, some platform fees, and some SDT incentives. You can vote for gauges with vote incentives if you seek yield or support Aave pools as you whish.
3/ Your voting power is boosted depending on Aave’s veSDT position. This can be a negative point at the start since it means that Aave having no veSDT position, it would lead to a discount on the voting power. However, it can also be a way to get an even better voting power if Aave locks the farmed SDT or uses part of the farmed rewards to rent some boost via Warden. I know this gets a bit technical, but if played smartly, Aave can multiply its voting power by 1.5x.

Would be keen to have your opinion on this.


In favour of deploying Aave’s CRV to veCRV, having the ability to direct emissions is most important.

StakeDAO’s liquid lockers are interesting however I believe if Aave were to pursue this, we would be forfeiting our veCRV boost right? We would then need to acquire SDT to boost emissions paid in SDT. For LPs to benefit from this they would need to stake their Curve LP into StakeDAO which defeats the purpose of letting Curve LP positions be used as collateral on Aave.

I can see a nice synergy existing with veCRV where Aave (if approved by governance) can continue supplying liquidity to Aave markets while minting GHO and LPing it on Curve. With the veCRV boost, we should be able to capture a decent amount of CRV emissions that we are directing


I checked the StakeDAO offering and that option might make sense as well.

Will present this weekend a third path with figures for governance consideration.


The boost only applies to Aave’s PoL of LPs. Not sure how sizable it will be, but there are alternative options that would probably enable achieving an even better yield : staking on Convex, Yearn or Stake DAO would allow having the boost + some incentives.
So not sure that from a pure yield perspective, it would be better to stake directly on Curve. You can see the example of Abracadabra which has a Curve whitelist but still chose to go through aggregators to get their boost + incentives (if I am correct).
Furthermore, with Stake DAO, Aave could achieve a 1.58x boost on the voting power, which would translate into bigger emissions for pools where Aave has PoL, so you would still have boost coming from there.

To put it in a nutshell, I believe that even from a pure yield perspective on future LP, it would be more profitable to Aave to use sdCRV.


Would just like to throw my 2 cents in here.

I agree with Hubert that there are better options if deciding to use derivatives.

The merits of veCrv are that on top of direct governance votes and gauge weighting, there are no other contract risks or trust involved. As a large protocol this point should definitely be highly viewed. But the idea of boosting LPs is a bit moot. There’s really no way this much CRV would give enough boost power in the long run. All in all I think vecrv is still a good choice as I can see reduction of risks as very valuable.

This token works fine I think for individual users or smaller positions. However for large protocols like Aave I dont see it having the utility that you really want as well as puts all revenue at the risk of token price. If Aave wants to put some weight on a specific gauge, they can sell a bit each time and pay for incentives but price changes in the token determine if any profit was even made at a given timespan.
Aave would be much better off with a price agnostic token.

The real derivative choices: Price agnostic tokens
cvxCrv: cvxCrv allows indivudal reward weighting between gov tokens and stables. This means its the higher stable option of any crv derivatives. While it has no voting mechanics, rewards can be used as incentives. Choosing stables is always a high demand reward and gives lots of leeway in how reward can be used, choosing CRV+CVX gives more crv compounding plus exposure to CVX. CVX will in turn give back more cvxCrv as well as gain access to Curve governance and gauge weightings (which will also add a bit more cvx to pools that CVX vote with in the future).

And another big point is that CVX will also give Aave governance voting for Frax(veFXS). With the release of GHO, a partnership with FRAX would go a long way in creating liquidity for GHO by using veFXS to vote on FXS gauges for GHO on the Frax platform. Holding CVX would put Aave in a good position there as well as Convex holds a very sizeable position there as well.

sdCrv is also, as pointed out above, another good choice for Aave. Aave will have a choice between claiming vote incentives or even voting for their own pools. It also is the only crv derivative currently with core Curve governance exposure (and all in all would be better than the ycrv flavor of governance rights). sdCRV also gives exposure to SDT tokens, which can be used as a means of revenue OR use it to boost the sdCRV.
There’s a lot more options on sdCRV via gauge voting.

SDT also has some mechanics ties in with FXS as well! Any boosting done to sdCRV also boosts their sdFXS token. 3 tokens have to be held in that case but it does give options.

1) The price agnostic properties of cvxCRV and sdCRV should be highly valued for a protocol’s holdings. There is no loss of rewards when token discounts expand or shrink and each token’s utility mechanics perform each week as it did the pervious.
2) Both cvxCRV and sdCrv give more options in general and also exposure to things like veFXS which should also be highly valued. (CVX is direct, SDT via boosting)
3) vanilla veCrv is still a very viable option as reduction of risks and simplicity should be highly valued over APR.


After running some simulations, and taking the very good points made by @C2tP , I did a quick sumary of analytics to compare all those different options from a numerical and practical point of view (in the table below).

Back up of this image can be find here.

Putting aside risk considerations, it appears that if ACI and Emilio were to delegate their veSDT boost to Aave, the most attractive option to maximise Aave’s impact on Curve’s governance and emissions would be to use sdCRV. The 633k CRV owned by Aave would translate into 837k veCRV votes.
Moreover, if other veSDT holders were to delegate their boosting power, Aave could reach more than 1m veCRV votes, thus increasing by 60% its ability to direct emissions and incentivise liquidity compared to doing it by simply locking CRV.
Finally, I think it’s important to point out that the use of sdCRV doesn’t require to regularly increase the lock duration, an onchain transaction that would be needed every other week or so in order to maintain Aave’s voting power to the maximum if the veCRV road was chosen.

Looking forward to hear feedback on this, I really think a smart approach such as the one mentioned above could be a great opportunity for Aave ahead of the GHO launch.


If the StakeDAO option is chosen by governance, the ACI commits to delegating all our boost to Aave DAO for a period of 1 year.


Hi everyone, :wave:

Thank you for the feedback on the above proposal. It is great to see a number of stakeholders investing time and effort participating in the discussion.

We opted to share two preferred strategies depending upon if there is a preference for governance influence or yield. Llama’s preference is for Aave to have exposure in governance influence via the base layer protocol as a core strategic holding. A relatively smaller, liquid and higher risk allocation to protocols built on top / around base layer protocols is possible as it compliments the primary core holding.

Earning a holding in another protocol requires a lot of time and capital whereas the core holding in the base protocol offers immediate benefits. This is why our preference is for Aave to initially acquire veBAL over auraBAL and veCRV over st-yCRV / cvxCRV and sdCRV.

When comparing the yield strategies offered by Convex Finance’s cvxCRV to Yearn Finance’s st-yCRV product, we preferred the st-yCRV product for the below reasons:

  • Higher Yield of st-yCRV relative to cvxCRV currently
  • Yield is nominated in CRV equivalent tokens 1 yCRV = 1 CRV and is auto compounded
  • Aave has a very small CVX holding, therefore preferable to grow CRV influence first. However, locking CVX earnings from the collector Contract to vlCVX could be considered

As for the governance influence strategies, the sdCRV option was omitted from the original proposal for the below reasoning:

  • Whilst sdCRV is tradable, there are liquidity concerns for entering and unwinding the position:

  • Upon entering CRV to sdCRV, Aave would gain 10k more units of sdCRV (0.983:1 at the moment)

  • Unwinding sdCRV to CRV, Aave would receive 41k less unit of CRV

(0.936:1 at the moment)

  • The liquidity is low: $4.3m and the pools is skewed towards sdCRV which makes up 67.6% of the pool.

  • veCRV offers boost whilst sdCRV forgoes Aave’s ability to boost the yield generated from depositing liquidity on Curve Finance’s liquidity pools
  • sdCRV requires revoting each week, compared to veCRV where the vote is reapplied if the gauge(s) vote wasn’t changed by the users.
  • There is no liquid wrapper for veSDT, which removes any ability to exit the position early if needed.
  • When entering in the Stake DAO liquid locker, the voting power is accruing progressively over 30 days because of the TWAVP period voted on Curve.
  • The sdCRV voting power is much lower than 1:1, even after the TWAVP period ended. If Aave decides to deposit on sdCRV without acquiring veSDT, or acquiring boost, 1 CRV when locked for sdCRV is worth 0.64 veCRV vote.

  • In order to receive the equivalent veCRV voting power, the sdCRV holder must also own veSDT or buy veSDT boost.

Aave would need to acquire 170,000 veSDT to realize the same voting power as holding veCRV.

  • To benefit from the max voting power boost and keep it (currently 57%), Aave would need to acquire 446,582 SDT locked for 4 years and periodically relocked according to the CRV current holdings.

At the current rate, 446.582 SDT is worth $151,840.

With the same $151,840 amount, Aave could directly boost its veCRV voting power of 23% by acquiring ~ 150,000 more CRV. This also avoids Aave having any exposure to SDT.

Aave naturally earns CRV which can be converted to veCRV periodically to increase its voting power, veCRV boost and its yield over time.

  • Part of the voting power boost on Stake DAO is from:
    • sdCRV held in the Curve pool
    • New deposits during the TWAVP period
    • Users who have no or low veSDT holdings
    • sdCRV holders who didn’t stake / vote or delegated their voting power

As this system can be complex, it’s very possible to see the voting power boost proposed by Stake DAO decrease if all sdCRV holders decide to stake & vote.

Also, less depositors in the sdCRV liquid locker means less voting power boost from the TWAVP period.

  • If Aave opts to hold sdCRV and veSDT within the Collector Contract, this will require the Collector Contract to be upgraded and generate a lot of governance oversight. This is not optimal given the existing governance process.

At this point in time, we do not believe acquiring SDT or sdCRV holding is an optimal path forward for Aave. There are more compelling alternative options which are veCRV for governance influence and st-YCRV if Aave seeks a high yield option.


Hi @fig,

Great question!

We have been discussing with Ernesto regarding how to implement this on the Collector Contract. There are a number of considerations with varying degrees of complexity that need to be considered. Governance votes and gauge votes are different when comparing Balancer and Curve. As a result, we intend to address both veBAL and veCRV within a single forum post. This forum post is being developed and will be shared in the coming weeks.

Ideally we would like Aave to prefer holding veCRV before going to deeply into how to manage veCRV on the forum. We are confident we have several paths forward and look forward to discussing the various options in the future.


As mentioned several times above, our recommendation is to utilize the veCRV voting power for Aave pools. Since the DAO didn’t voted any bribe budget, we don’t expect to generate any bribes revenue from the veCRV holdings.
When the yield from bribes is removed from the table above, the sdCRV interest is significantly reduced.

Otherwise if you count the bribes yield, you should also count it on veCRV. This way we are comparing similar data with the same underlying assumptions. It’s easy to inflate the numbers with selective data.

Also, while the yield is not the priority for this strategy, it’s worth mentioning that even with the unknown max veSDT amount that could be delegated from ACI and Emilio, the yield from st-yCRV remains better than sdCRV based on your calculations.

There is the exact same issue with veSDT lock, but with more management as sdCRV also requires to re vote each week to not lose the voting power.

It’s kind to delegate your veBoost for free, especially since you could earn 21% APR by selling it on Warden.

Would it be possible to know the total size of the veSDT holding that could be delegated to the DAO, and if the intention is to periodically re lock the position during the full year to avoid decreasing voting power ?


Hey All, Corn from Yearn here. I want to point out another aspect of utility and strategy the yCRV wrapper satisfies that hasn’t been mentioned: the ability to move between st-yCRV and vl-yCRV depending on if Aave wants really high yield or just control over gauge voting.

vl-yCRV is about to go live and Aave will get 100% of the gauge voting power they’d get with veCRV. Aave would give up the curve admin fees (these go to st-yCRV), but they get the ability to exit back to CRV (there’s still a peg) whenever they’d like. Moving between st-yCRV and vl-yCRV is easy too.

sdCRV is a great product if you are bullish on SDT and we agree with the math posted by @Llamaxyz above.

You can read more about vl-yCRV here: Overview | Yearn.finance

Thank you again for considering the yCRV wrapper. If there are any other questions please ask. I’ll make sure to keep an eye on this thread.


This is a bit of a moot point as Aave won’t have have enough veCrv to boost themselves properly anyway.

This seems minor as it should be automatable. Also take note that vanilla veCrv also needs to revote as more veCrv is locked and/or voting power decays.

I do agree that veCrv is a good choice all around though.


As of now 270k veSDT on my side & 40k veSDT on Emilio side. As shown in the table of @Hubert post

I’m not particularly interested in doing that for now, I’m more interested in Aave success as part of the ACI.


Based on @Hubert 's quantitative analysis, amazing @C2tP 's points, feedback from @MarcZeller and community, sdCRV is the best solution to max out value for Aave on Curve Ecosystems (bribes, boost, gauge voting etc). That’s why Stake DAO Admirers Crew will delegate >500k veSDT voting power to support sdCRV.

I’ll also personally support this path from Curve’s angle by engaging Curve Llama Gangsta Club to continue voting for Aave pools since it will bring even more rewards down the road.


That’s quite the support to Aave DAO, thx ser.

With that commitment the “maxBoost” scenario is achieved


The ACI is in favor of supporting StakeDAO.


That’s a great approach which can leave the door open for locking the actual CRV for veCRV if there is an appetite for that in future, without actually changing the asset to a completely different one!

But of course, applying for whitelist is welcomed as well, or why not both!