Chaos Labs Risk Stewards - Slope2 Parameter Adjustments for Risk Oracle Deployment

Summary

This publication focuses on adjusting relevant slope2 values across instances with significant observed borrowing demand, in preparation for the upcoming launch of the slope2 risk oracle.

Motivation

With the imminent launch of the slope2 risk oracle, we introduce a mechanism that transforms how bespoke markets respond to liquidity contraction. Current piecewise-linear rate curves fail to manage the joint risks of discrete supply shocks and hyper-elastic borrower demand in relatively centralized, high-leverage lending markets. Large withdrawals can instantaneously push utilization to high levels, where abrupt APR spikes accelerate borrower deleveraging rather than restoring liquidity; the asymmetry between supply and demand responses requires substantially different liquidity conditions for the market to return to equilibrium. Thin-margin leveraged positions thus become unprofitable with a minimal negative effective rate delta (e.g., LSTs/LRTs, sUSDe, PTs), amplifying contraction and generating negative second-order effects.

Instead of these abrupt spikes, the oracle stages its response: beginning with a low baseline deterrent when utilization first crosses the kink, compounding convexly the longer stress persists, and decaying predictably once conditions normalize. In practice, the baseline configured slope value shall be defined at its respective minimum, ensuring that borrowers and suppliers enter each stress episode from the most optimal starting point as a function of the underlying risk components that comprise such a market. This approach avoids unnecessary preemptive shocks, provides a transparent and bounded path of escalation, and guarantees that costs only intensify when real liquidity pressure emerges. In effect, suppliers receive robust solvency protection, while borrowers face a fair, time-aligned incentive structure that becomes stricter only if high utilization persists. For more information on how the algorithm operates, please see the initial research paper on this topic.

According to the algorithm described above, the internal parameters that determine the effective growth in slope2 with respect to time and magnitude above the kink vary for such markets. In the plots below, we illustrate the evolution of the market under various stress scenarios, determined by the welfare function and its associated solvency constraints. As market utilization scales upward for extended periods, the protocol aims to gradually align the expected demand response of the supply and borrow sides, minimizing cumulative borrower cost subject to outstanding market risk. Note that such values imply persistent, continuous utilization values that range above the kink to determine its final value according to the algorithm; thus, abrupt spikes are effectively ignored in this sense.

Risk Oracle Permissions

The risk oracle will cover relevant USDC, USDT, USDe, and WETH reserves, with the specification initially setting slope2 to its minimum value in each market, ensuring alignment with the parameterized algorithm of the respective reserve. Based on historical backtesting and the algorithm’s continuous operation under AGRS constraints, which define both the maximum permissible adjustment and the minimum time between changes, the system will be configured to allow a maximum absolute change of 4% every 8 hours. The technical maintenance proposal will follow shortly.

Specification

Instance Asset Current Slope2 Recommended Slope2
Arbitrum USDT0 40% 10%
Arbitrum USDC 40% 10%
Arbitrum WETH 80% 8%
Avalanche USDC 40% 10%
Avalanche USDt 40% 10%
Avalanche WETH.e 80% 8%
Base USDC 40% 10%
Base WETH 80% 8%
BNB WETH 80% 8%
BNB USDC 40% 10%
BNB USDT 40% 10%
Ethereum Core USDC 20% 10%
Ethereum Core USDe 30% 12%
Ethereum Core USDT 14% 10%
Ethereum Core WETH 20% 8%
Ethereum Prime WETH 25% 8%
Gnosis WETH 80% 8%
Linea USDC 60% 10%
Linea USDT 60% 10%
Linea WETH 80% 8%
Optimism USDC 40% 10%
Optimism USDT 40% 10%
Optimism WETH 80% 8%
Polygon USDC 40% 10%
Polygon USDT0 40% 10%
Polygon WETH 80% 8%
Plasma USDT 20% 10%
Plasma WETH 20% 8%
Plasma USDe 50% 12%
Scroll WETH 80% 8%
Sonic USDC 40% 10%
Sonic WETH 80% 8%
Parameter Maximum Change (Absolute) minimumDelay
Slope2 4% 8 Hours

Next Steps

We will move forward and implement these updates via the Risk Steward process. As the Risk Steward constrains slope2 changes to a maximum of 20% every 3 days, updates that require more will be implemented gradually accordingly.

Disclosure

Chaos Labs has not been compensated by any third party for publishing this AGRS recommendation.

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.

LlamaRisk supports the steps to commence the implementation of a slope2 risk oracle. The proposed time-based, convex response to high utilization is a more sophisticated approach than the current static model. While we are supportive of the overall direction, we would like to offer two suggestions to refine the implementation process.

The proposal suggests a maximum absolute change of 4% every 8 hours. Although the system has been backtested, as discussed in a previous analysis, it remains to be seen how borrower elasticity will change in reaction to the increments, especially during significant market stress. To ensure the oracle can respond decisively when needed, we recommend exploring a more flexible adjustment capacity, in the range of 6-8% every 8 hours. This would give the model more latitude to restore market equilibrium efficiently.

Moreover, we believe a phased rollout would be valuable for clarity and to de-risk the deployment. We suggest starting with a targeted subset of markets, particularly reserves that have historically been more prone to high utilization, such as the USDT, WETH, or USDe markets on Aave Core. This approach would provide an opportunity to test the system’s performance at scale in a live environment, allowing to gather crucial insights before expanding the oracle’s coverage to all proposed markets.

Despite these suggestions, we welcome this change. We also acknowledge that in any unforeseen edge cases, the general Risk Steward can intervene to adjust rates if the market situation becomes undesirable, providing a reliable backstop for the system.

Disclaimer

This review was independently prepared by LlamaRisk, a DeFi risk service provider funded in part by the Aave DAO. LlamaRisk is not directly affiliated with the protocol(s) reviewed in this assessment and did not receive any compensation from the protocol(s) or their affiliated entities for this work.

The information provided should not be construed as legal, financial, tax, or professional advice.

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